Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

State of Utah v. John L. Legg : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alan J. Buividas; Attorney for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. John L. Legg, No. 20041035 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5393

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STMT. Or li'i u i

Plaintiff/ APPELLEE
CASE NO. 20041035-CA

JOHN L. LEGG

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Third District Court of Tooele County
State of Utah
HONORABLE RANDALL SKANCHY

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah S4114-0854

ALAN J. BUIVIDAS (6704)
7321 S. State. St., Ste. A
Midvale, Utah 84047

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE CO'

OCT 2 7 200,

HE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

II M l n r 111,Ml

Plaintiff/ APPELLEE
V
CASE NO. 20041035-CA

JOHN

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF < M' I Hh AITIU LAIN \"

Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Third District Court of Tooele County
State of Utah

HONORABLE RANDALL SKANCHY
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

ALAN J. tsuIVIDAS (6701)
7321 S. State. St., Ste. A
Midvale, Utah 84047

\ II (>RNHY FOR APPELLANT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents

ii

Table of Authorities

vi

Statement of Jurisdiction

2

Statement of Issues & Standard of Review

2

Determinative Constitutional Provisions,
Statutes, Ordinances and Rules

5

Statement of the Case

6
ii

Statement of Facts

7

Summary of the Argument

12

Argument

13

I. Mr. Legg was sentenced without counsel in violation of his
rights under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution

13

II. Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 22(a)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated when
the prosecuting attorney was not given the opportunity to speak
at Mr. Legg's sentencing

19

III. Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated when he was not given the
opportunity to speak and present information regarding his criminal record and
other mitigating factors

23

iii

IV. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that good cause
existed to not dismiss the charges against Mr. Legg even though
the State failed to bring Mr. Legg to trial within 120 days after
receiving notice from Mr. Legg under UCA Section 77-29-1

Conclusion

24

35

Addendum

Addendum A. Determinative statutes and rules.

Addendum B. Information, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment

Addendum C. Cases

Addendum D. Notice from Prison of 120-Day Disposition, Certificate of Inmate
Status, Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges

IV

Table of Authorities

U.S. Constitution
4th amendment

5, 13

6th Amendment.>

5, 13

14th amendment

5

Federal Cases
Gardner v. Florida, 97 S.Ct 1197,430 U.S. 349, 51 L.Ed.2d393
Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1989)

13
14, 15, 16, 17

Utah Constitution
Article I section 12

5, 13, 23

Article I section 7

5, 2, 3

Utah Cases
State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah 1985)

3, 4

State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982)
State v. Coleman, 2001 Ut App 281, 6, 34 P.3d 790
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998)

VI

13, 17
26
26, 32

State v. Howell, 707P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)

21

State v. Leatherbury, 65 P.3d 1180, (2003)

27, 30

State v. Lindsay 18 P.3d 504, (2000)

27

State v. Pedockie 95 P.3d 1182, 2004 UT App 224, 2004 UT

26

State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241,

2, 3, 4, 20, 22

Utah Code
Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1

4, 5, 6, 7, 8,24,26, 27, 28 29, 31, 32, 33, 35

Utah Code Ann otated §77-29-2

5, 6, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35

Utah Code. Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)

2

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

3, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

2, 3, 4

California Case
People v. Ngaue, 280 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1991).....

vn

16, 17

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

CaseNo.20041035-CA

JOHN L. LEGG,

:

Defendant/Appellant

:

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment
Third District Court of Tooele County
State of Utah

HONORABLE RANDALL SKANCHY

1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for THEFT BY RECEIVING
STOLEN PROPERTY, a 2nd Degree Felony and from a judgment of conviction for
ARSON, a 3rd Degree Felony in the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, State
of Utah, the Honorable RANDALL N. SKANCHY, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). See Addendum A
(Information, Sentence, Judgement and Conviction).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW

ISSUE I: Was Mr. Legg sentenced in violation of his rights under the Utah
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by being sentenced
without counsel?
Standard of Review: The issue presents a purely legal question
which the Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, paragraph
89.
Preservation of the Argument: Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure permits the Court of Appeals to consider the legality of a sentence
2

even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah
1985).

ISSUE II: Were Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule
22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure violated when the prosecuting attorney
was not given the opportunity to speak at sentencing.

Standard of Review: This issue presents a purely legal question
which the Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, paragraph
89.
Preservation of the Argument: Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure permits the Court of Appeals to consider the legality of a sentence
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah
1985).

ISSUE III. Were Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule
22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure violated when he was not given the
opportunity to speak and present information regarding his criminal record and other
3

mitigating factors.
Standard of Review: This issue presents a purely legal question
which the Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, paragraph
89.
Preservation of the Argument: Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure permits the Court of Appeals to consider the legality of a sentence
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah
1985).

ISSUE IV: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that good cause existed to not
dismiss the charges against Defendant because of the failure to bring Defendant to trial
within 120 days after receiving notice of Defendant's written demand as required under
Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 and did the trial court misinterpreted Utah Code
Annotated §77-29-1 and §77-29-2 by refusing to dismiss pending charges against him
because more than 120 days had transpired between when tendered his disposition request
and when his trial occurred. Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law
which the court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial
court's interpretation.

4

Standard of Review: This issue is in part a legal question which is
reviewed for correctness and in part a review of the Court's discretion which standard is
abuse of discretion.
Preservation of the Argument: Appellant John L. Legg, JR.'s,
("Legg") challenge to the Trial Court's failure to dismiss the charges under Utah Code
Ann. §77-29-1 is preserved on the record for appeal (R00271 at pp. 32 and 33). Mr. Legg
raised the issue of the 120 da> i iile under UCA Section 7 1 29 1 and Section 77-29-2 at a
motion hearing on the 6th of May 2004 and the 23rd of August 2004. Mr. Legg also made
several written motions with respect to the 120 day rule.

CONST1TUTIONAL

PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

4th and 14th Amendments, U.S. Constitution
6th Amendment, U.S. Constitution
Utah Constitution
Article I section 7
Article I section 12
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-2
Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

Mr. Legg appeals his jury conviction for THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 and
with ARSON, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-102(l)(b).
Mr. Legg also appeals his sentencing alleging his rights to due process under Utah and
United States Constitutions, his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and his rights under UCA §77-29-1 and §77-29-2 were violated.

B. Course of the Proceedings

The State's Information was filed in the Third Judicial Court In and for Tooele
County, State of Utah on the 14th of January 2004.
The State's information charged Mr. Legg with one count of Theft by Receiving
Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-408
and one count of Arson, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 766-102(l)(b).
An Initial Appearance was held on 26 January 2004
6

A Roll Call was held on 2nd of February 2004
A Preliminary Hearing was held on the 3rd of March 2004.
An Arraignn lent w as held 8th day of 1!\ lai ch 2005.
A Pre-Trial Conference was held on 26th day of April 2004.
A disposition hearing was held on the 6th of May 2004 with respect to a Motion
filed by Defendant's counsel, Mr. Broadhead. The motion asked that the charges against
Mr. Legg be dismissed because Mi 1 egg's rights u

•? UCA Section 77-29 1 dealing

with dispositions had been violated. This motion was denied. The trial was reset for the
25th of May 2004.
A motion hearing was held on the I <>hl of August 2004, a disposition hearing was
held on the 23rd of August 2004 and a pretrial conference was held on the 18th of October
2004.

Disposition at the Trial Court

A one day jury trial was held on the 3rd of November 2004. The jury found Mr. Legg

guilty of botl I Theft and Arson.
On the 24th of January 2005 Mr. Legg was sentenced on the charge of theft by
receiving stolen property to 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison and on the arson charge
7

from zero to five years. The two sentences to run consecutively.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On December 3, 2003, Defendant an inmate at the Utah State Prison, received a
packet of information regarding 120 day Dispositions under UCA § 77-29-1 which
included a form entitled "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges."
(R00271atP.26)
Defendant filled out the form December 9, 2003 and placed it in the mailbox for the
Division of Institution of Operations (DIO) (R00271 at p.26)
The DIO agent marked the "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
Charges," as being received on January 8, 2004, but date stamped the document as being
received on January 5th, 2004. (R00271 at p.27)
On the 14th of January 2004 an Information against Mr. Legg was filed with the
Third District Court-Tooele, Tooele, County, State of Utah. (R at p.3)
On the 15th of January 2004 a letter from the Prison about the 120 day disposition
was filed with the trial court. (R at p. 6)
On the 16th of January 2005 a Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending
Charge was filed with the trial court. (R at p. 7)
On the 8th of March 2004 a two day jury trial was scheduled for the 19th of May
8

2004 before Judge Skanchy. (R at p. 26)
On the 26th of April 2004 a pretrial conference was held in this matter. The date of
the jury trial in this *

r was advanced thirteen days from a setting on the 19th of May

2004 to a new date of 6 May 2004. (R at p. 42)
The reason given for this rescheduling is stipulation of parties. (R at p. 42)
On the 4th of May 2004, counsel fc n I\ It I -egg, I\ It Bi oadhead, filed a Motion to
Dismiss. In his Motion to Dismiss Mr. Broadhead points out that the "Notice and Request
for Disposition of Pending Charges" was delivered on the 9th of December 2003 by Mr.
Legg to the DIO. Mr. Broadhead then points out that based upon the 9th of December
delivery (Lilt flu I ,N) clays .-

•

•

iy-52).

'•'•.,..'.-

Mr. Broadhead further points out in his Memorandum and again at the Motion
Hearing, that DIO stated that the Notice was received on January 8, 2004, but date
stamped the document as being received on January 5, 2004. That based upon the January
5, 2004 date stamped delivery dat

: *he "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending

Charges" the 120 days passed on May 4, 2004 and if the January 8, 2004 hand written
delivery date is used, the 120 days passes on May 6, 2004. (R at pp.49-52), (R00271 at pp.
26-35).
On the 6th of May 2006, a disposition hearing was held with respect to Mr.
Broadhead's Motion to Dismiss. (R00271 atpp.26-36)
At the Disposition Hearing Mr. Broadhead pointed out to Judge Skanchy that Mr.
9

Legg's Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges sat at the office of the DIO
(Utah State Prison) for approximately four weeks before they sent it to the Court. (R
00271 at pp.26 and 27)
At this Disposition Hearing Defendant's counsel argued that the Defendant signed
and delivered the "Notice and Request For Disposition of Pending Charges" on December
9, 2003 to the DIO consistent with the requirements of the statute and that based upon the
December 9, 2003 delivery date, the 120 days passed on April 7, 2004. (R00271 at pp. 27
and 28)
The DIO wrote on the Notice that they had received from Mr. Legg that they had
received the Notice on January 8, 2004, but the DIO then date stamped the document as
being received on January 5, 2004. Based on the January 5, 2004 date stamped delivery
date, the 120 days passed on May 4, 2004. If the January 8, 2004 hand written delivery
date is used, the 120 day period passes on May 6, 2004. (R00271 at pp. 26 and 27).
At this 6th of May 2004 deposition hearing on the Mr. Legg's Motion to Dismiss,
the Court, counsel for the defense and the prosecutor discussed which date would be
correct to begin the 120 days. The prosecutor argued that the defendant remained silent
during his various court hearings regarding the 120 disposition rule and therefore
shouldn't be able to take advantage of such rule. (R00271 at pp.32 and 33)
At this Disposition Hearing the Court determined that the beginning date as to the
120 day period must be either January 5th or January 8th 2004. The Prosecutor argued that
10

the Court did not receive the notice until January 16, 2005 and therefore the prosecutor
had good cause not to begin the tolling of the 120 days until January 16, 2005. Further,
tl le Pi osecu ltor argi led that Defendant and his coi insel came before the Coi irt for felony
first appearance, arraignment, pretrial conference and that these dates were set with the
approval and agreement of Defendant and his Counsel. The Prosecutor argued that neither
Defendant nor his counsel ever objected to those dates and therefore cannot complain that
there 1

it been a 120 day disposition. (R00271

. J>2 and 33).

On the 6th of May 2004 the Court ruled that:
"All right, I appreciate these arguments and I understand this problem. This is what
I consider to be a serious problem by the prison. As I read the statute though it
suggests to me that receipt oiit to be receipted by the prison. I've got two dates
frankly to pick from, January 8 or January 5, Frankly, it appears to me to be
irrelevant which one of those two dates I pick and the reason for it is, I think there's
good cause to set this matter over,. . . (R00271 at pp 32 and 33).
The Court finally selected the 8th of January, 2005. (R00271 at 35).
Mr. Legg, prior to trial, had requested to represent himself during his trial. He
agreed to have standby counsel to assist him during his trial if necessary. (R0027 at pp 6370) At 1 1: ic em i of I" I Legg's trail, Mi "h ::n i Williams, Mr. Legg's standby counsel, asked
the Court if he should continue to act as Mr. Legg's standby counsel for sentencing
purposes or at least to consult with Mr. Legg. The Court stated that it thought that was

11

appropriate. (R00269 at p. 287) and (R00271 at pp. 63-70).
During sentencing, Mr. Legg at first tried to convey to the Court errors that Mr.
Legg believed existed with respect to the pre-sentence report. When Mr. Legg decided he
needed counsel to help him present these errors to the court he asked that he be appointed
counsel to help him..
"Mr. Legg: Okay then, then why don't you appoint me counsel and we'll get all
this straightened out?"
THE COURT:

Because you have chosen to go the other route.

Mr. LEGG: Make up your mind.
THE COURT: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you on these charges to theft
by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, 1 to 15 years in the Utah State
Prison. On arson, zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. I'll run them
consecutive to each other. I'll do so based upon the aggravating circumstances that
your adult record is legend and as a result of it being legend. (R271 at p. 85).

Summary of the Argument
When Mr. Legg asked for counsel at his sentencing hearing the Court should have
appointed counsel.
At Mr. Legg's sentencing hearing the Court should have allowed the prosecuting
attorney the opportunity to speak.
12

At Mr. Legg's sentencing hearing the Court should have allowed Mr. Legg the
opportunity to finish speaking.
Mr. Leggs trial was held more than 120 days after Mr. Legg til

)tice

and the charges against him should have been dismissed.

Argument
I. Mr. Legg was sentenced without counsel in violation of his rights under the
Sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution Article 1 section 12.

It has been held that the Sixth Amendment i ij:li( to counsel applies at sentencing.
Gardner v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 430 U.S. 349, 51 L.Ed.2d 393.
It has also been held that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceeding at
which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d
1005 (Utah 1982).
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, has held that under California
law a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of an attorney at a post-trial hearing
when prior to trial he waived the right to counsel and chose to represent himself. This
Court stated, "We therefore hold that, at least in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances, an accused who requests an attorney at the time of a motion for a new trial
is entitled to have one appointed, unless the government can show that the request is made
13

for a bad faith purpose." Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1989).
In Menefield the defendant had asserted his right to self-representation during the
trial. After his conviction on all counts, Menefield asked the court to appoint counsel to
assist him in the preparation of a motion for trial. The trial court denied his motion. One of
the factors cited by the trial court for its denial was that the proceeding would be delayed
while counsel familiarized himself with the transcript and the issues in the case
The Court in Menefield held that,
Because the right to counsel is so central to our concepts of
fair adjudication, we are reluctant to deny the practical
fulfillment of the right—even once waived—absent a
compelling reason that will survive constitutional scrutiny.
We are certainly unwilling to deny counsel because of
some conception that the defendant's initial decision to
exercise his Faretta right and represent himself at trial is a
choice cast in stone. It is not surprising that a criminal
defendant, having decided to represent himself and then
having suffered a defeat at trial, would realize that he would
be better served during the remainder of the case by the
assistance of counsel. . . .
Forcing the defendant to stumble through post-trial
14

proceedings serves neither the individual nor our system of
adversarial justice well. Therefore, although we recognize
that the right to counsel—once waived—is no longer absolute,
we start with the strong presumption that a defendant's posttrial request for the assistance of an attorney should not be
refused. (Cites omitted). {Menefield at 700).
The Court went on to state, "In determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance, courts of appeals have considered whether
the continuance would adversely affect witnesses, counsel, the court and the government;
.. . There is, however, a substantial practical distinction between delay on the eve of trial
and delay at the time of a post-trial hearing

Conversely, it is unlikely that a

continuance after the verdict will substantially interfere with the court's or the parties
schedules." {Menefield at 700).
The Menefield Court further stated, "Under harmless error jurisprudence, Sixth
Amendment violations that pervade trial require automatic reversal of the tainted
proceedings. The parties do not suggest that the rule should be different when the error
pervades a post-conviction hearing.(Cites Omitted). (Menefield at 701, fn 7).
While the Court in Menefield was dealing with a defendant's request to have an
attorney help him with a motion for a new trial, much of the language of the Menefield
court is stated in terms of "post —trial proceedings" and there is little doubt that the
15

holding in Menefield would apply to the sentencing phase of a trial.
It has further been held that a defendant who was convicted of attempted voluntary
manslaughter and robbery was entitled to remand to enable the trial court to consider
defendant's motion for appointment of counsel to assist at sentencing after the defendant
had earlier waived right to counsel. People v. Ngaue, 280 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.
1991). This California Court of Appeal while not adopting Menefield completely, relied
on the Menefield rational in making its ruling. The court in Ngaue stated,
Application of these principles to the present case suggests
counsel should have been appointed unless appellant was
seeking representation for an improper purpose such as delay:
Since he had already been convicted, granting appellant's
request would cause less disruption than that considered
acceptable in Hill, Cruz and Elliott (see Menefield v. Borg,
supra, 881 F.2d at p. 701);. ..
More persuasive is appellant's contention that entirely
apart from the new trial motion, counsel would have been
able to assist at sentencing either by arguing for a lesser
sentence or by raising the claims of error addressed in later
portion of this opinion

Counsel might have made a

difference. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand for a ruling
16

on appellant's motion for appointment of counsel."
(Nague at 765).
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal
proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, (see
Casarez) This court should find that Utah law requires a trial court to appoint counsel at
sentencing upon the defendant's request even if the defendant had previously chosen to
represent himself.
Application of the analysis found in Menefield and Nague to the present case leads
to the conclusion that counsel should have been appointed to Mr. Legg for his sentencing
phase.
As the Court in Menefield so apply stated, "It is not surprising that a criminal
defendant, having decided to represent himself and then having suffered a defeat at trial,
would realize that he would be better served during the remainder of the case by the
assistance of counsel."
In our present case, Mr. Legg, at his sentencing, finding himself unable to convey
to Judge Skanchy the errors Mr. Legg believed were in his pre-sentence report, became
overwhelmed and frustrated. Mr. Legg at this time appears to have realized that his selfrepresentation had done him little good during the trial and that he needed help at his
sentence hearing. From the transcript of his sentencing hearing, Mr. Legg clearly
understood that he was facing up to twenty years of prison and he knew that he needed
17

help to straighten out his pre-sentence report. Mr. Legg also seems to have realized that
his limited resources in prison required Mr. Legg to have the help of an attorney to
properly research and address the issues with respect to his record. At the Sentencing
Hearing we find the following dialog between Mr. Legg and Judge Skanchy
Mr. LEGG: Okay then, then why don't you appoint me counsel and we'll get all
this straightened out"
THE COURT: Because you have chosen to go the other route.
Mr. LEGG: Make up your mind.
THE COURT: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you on these charges.
As this dialog shows, Mr. Legg asked Judge Skanchy for counsel to assist him at
this sentencing hearing. Judge Skanchy in essence said you have chosen not to be
represent by counsel, that choice is cast in stone and I deny your Motion.
There is no compelling reason shown that will survive constitutional scrutiny as to
why Mr. Legg could not have been appointed counsel to help him at sentencing.
Mr. Legg's standby counsel, Mr. Williams, was present at the sentencing hearing
and had been present throughout the trial. Mr. Williams was very familiar with Mr.
Legg's case.
Sentencing is of course a post trial hearing and the appointment of counsel and the
rescheduling of the Legg's sentencing would not have involved a significant disruption
of court scheduling.
18

There is no indication that appellant was attempting to manipulate the right to
counsel for any improper purpose. Defendant Legg made an attempt to represent himself
at trial and at sentencing. At sentencing, after trying to convey to the judge the errors he
believed existed in his pre- sentence report and the problems he was having to prepare for
his sentencing hearing because of his incarceration, Mr. Legg realized he needed the help
of an attorney and asked the Court for such attorney. Judge Skanchy could easily have
asked Mr. Legg's stand by counsel, Mr. Williams to assist Mr. Legg. Such motion was
incorrectly denied.

II. Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated when the prosecuting attorney was not given
the opportunity to speak.
Rule 22(a) URCP states:
"Before imposing sentencing the Court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show
any legal reason why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also
be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of the
sentence"
However, the record of the sentencing shows that the prosecuting attorney was not
given opportunity to present any information in the imposition of the sentence in violation
19

of 22(a), URCP. The rule states, "The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of the sentence." The
rule uses the word "shall" which under statutory construction means the Court must
affirmatively ask the prosecutor to material information as to Mr. Legg's sentencing. The
prosecutor may have agreed with the Judge's sentence or he may disagreed and
recommended a lesser sentence in accordance with the pre-sentence report. It is not known
what may have happened if the prosecutor was given the opportunity to speak. The
prosecutor could have chosen to remain silent and submit the case to Court or he could
have presented mitigating facts and recommended concurrent sentences.
It has been held that a trial court erred when it failed to provide the prosecutor an
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App.
241, 31 P.3d 615 affd 2003 Ut 46, 79 P.2d 937.
As the Court of Appeals of Utah stated in the first Wanosik case,
At sentencing in this case, the trial court did hear briefly from
defense counsel on the issue of Wanosik's absence
concerning any "legal cause why sentence should not (have
been) imposed" at that time, Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) briefly
addressed that issue as discussed above; and then proceeded
to impose sentence. However, before proceeding with
sentencing, the trial court heard from neither defense counsel
20

nor the prosecutor with regard to "information in mitigation
of punishment" or "and (other) information material to the
imposition of sentence." Id. The state argues that under rule
22(a) the burden rests on counsel to request an opportunity to
present information relevant to sentencing. The State's
argument is contrary to the plain language of the rule and the
construction given it in case law... .
Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative obligation on the
trial court to extend the opportunity to be heard; it does not
contemplate the court will passively wait for counsel to make
a request to be heard. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court
has said that rule 22(a) "directs trial courts to hear evidence
from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to
the sentence to be imposed" State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115,
118 (Utah 1985).... The onus is thus on the trial court to
"afford" the defendant and to "give the prosecutor the
opportunity to present relevant information. Utah R.Crim. P.
22(a). The trial court in this case erred by not affording
defense counsel an opportunity to present information in
mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor an
21

opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing.
Noncompliance with rule 22(a) in this case was not
harmless, as the State suggests. Had either defense counsel or
the prosecutor been given a chance to address AP&P's
recommendation that Wanosik be sentenced to 20 days in jail
with credit for time served and that he then be committed to a
substance abuse treatment program, the sentencing outcome
for Wanosik may well have been more favorable than the
maximum sentences imposed by the trial court. Thus, we
vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for re sentencing.
(Paragraph numbers and head notes omitted and emphasis
addedj Wanosik, 2001 Ut. App paragraph 64-66.
As in Wanosik, had the prosecutor been given a chance to address the Court, the
sentencing outcome for Mr. Legg may well have been more favorable than the sentence
imposed against Mr. Legg by the Court. According to the record, The Court did not
afford the prosecutor an opportunity to speak. This is especially egregious violation of
Mr. Legg's rights where the Court sentenced to harsher then sentence then requested in
the Pre-Sentence report.
In Wanosik, it was not considered harmless error since the defendant was
sentenced to the maximum sentence by the Judge and the Judge did not follow the pre22

sentence recommendation of credit for time served and treatment. Mr. Legg was
sentenced to a consecutive sentence instead of the pre-sentence report recommendation of
a concurrent sentence.

III. Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure were violated when he was not given the opportunity to speak and
present information regarding errors in his criminal record and other mitigating factors.
Mr. Legg was asked by the judge if anything was not correct in his record. He
started to explain that were things that were not correct in his social history. The Judge
cut him off and asked him about his criminal record. As stated above, he had several
concerns about the accuracy of his criminal record. He wanted an attorney to help him.
Rather then being given that opportunity, the judge proceeded to sentence him.
Rule 22(a) URCP states in part:
"Before imposing sentencing the Court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show
any legal reason why sentence should not be imposed.."
Clearly the Court did not afford Mr. Legg the opportunity to speak on his behalf
concerning these issues. This was a violation his constitutional due process rights under
the Utah Constitution Article I section 12 and Utah Constitution Article I section 7 and
United States Constitutions and in violation of Rule 22(a) URCP.
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IV. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that good cause existed to not dismiss
the charges against Defendant Legg because of the failure to bring Mr. Legg to trial within
120 days after receiving notice of Defendant's written demand as required under Utah
Code Annotated Section 77-29-1. Mr. Legg's rights to due process under the United States
and Utah's constitutions and Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 and 77-29-2 were violated by
the State failing to bring Mr. Legg's case to trial within 120 days.

Defendant rights under UCA 77-29-1 have been violated. This statute gives an
incarcerated individual the right to request a 120-day disposition for any pending
indictment or information. Under this statute defendant must submit a written notice
requesting a 120-day disposition. If the case is not tried within 120 days plus any
reasonable continuances for "good cause/' it must be dismissed with prejudice. Once a
proper notice has filed with the appropriate authorities, the burden is on the prosecutor to
comply with this statute. If the prosecutor does not comply with the statute then the case
must be dismissed with prejudice. This statute states:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand
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specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and
requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written
notice.
(2)

Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand

described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted
any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the even the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within
the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion
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for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed
with prejudice.
Determining whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss
pursuant to the UCA §77-29-1 requires a two-step analysis. See State v. Coleman, 2001
Ut App 281, 6, 34 P.3d 790. "First, we must determine when the 120-day period
commenced and when it expired, Second, if the trial was held out the 120-day period, we
must then determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay". State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d
911, 916 (Utah 1998). State v. Pedockie 95P.3d 1182, 2004 UT App 224, 2004 UT at
paragraph39.
In the absence of good cause, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) requires the court to
grant the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice.
A finding of 'good cause ' that will excuse the failure of the prosecution to bring a
defendant to trial within the time required means (1) delay caused by the defendant—such
as asking for a continuance; or (2) a relatively short delay caused by unforseen problems
arising immediately prior to trial. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). State
v. Pedockie 95 P.3d 1182, 2004 UT App 224, 2004 UT at paragraph 42

PREMATURE REQUEST
Under UCA 77-29-1 a notice for a 120-day disposition by a defendant incarnated
shall occur when there is a pending information or indictment. The Utah Supreme Court
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and the Utah Court of Appeals have consistently ruled that there must be a pending
indictment or information filed before such notice can be valid. State v. Leatherbury, 65
P.3d 1180, (2003) and State v. Lindsay 18 P.3d 504, (2000). In the present case there was
no pending indictment or information pending when Mr. Legg submitted to the prison his
notice for a 120-day disposition on December 9, 2004. (R52) There was some dispute as to
which day the prison received Mr. Legg's notice, whether it was December 9, 2004,
January 5, 2004 or January 8, 2004. The court made a factual ruling that the prison
received it on January 8, 2004. (R217-pg35) In a case where 120-day demand was
submitted previous to the filing of an information or indictment, the Utah Court of Appeals
has stated in Lindsay that the defendant's notice for a 120-day disposition does not "kickin" on the day the information was filed.
However, if we look at the 120-day disposition UCA 77-29-1 in conjunction with
UCA 77-29-2, it can be argued that Due Process requires that it should "kick-in" on the
day the information was filed under the facts of this case.
Section UCA 77-29-2 states:
"The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or information
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that
prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof."
This code section places an affirmative duty upon the warden or prison to promptly
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inform prisoner in writing of any untried indictments and of the prisoner's right to make a
request for the final disposition thereof.
In this case, the defendant was given the packet on Dec 3, 2003. (R00271-p26) He
submitted filled it out and put it in his mail box to be sent to the prison's Division
institutional Operations (DIO). The information charging him was not filed with the
Third District Court, Tooele Department until January 14, 2005. The prison did not
promptly notify Mr. Legg in writing of the source and contents of his untried indictment of
Arson and Receiving Stolen Property out of the Third District Court Tooele Department
and of Mr. Legg's right to make a request for a final disposition thereof as required under
UCA 77-29-2.
Further, Mr. Legg had a hearing on this matter on May 6, 2004, the Court ruled that
the 120 days began January 8, 2004 when the prison dated his request. Further, at another
hearing on this matter on August 23, 2004, the Court changed its mind and ruled that the
120-days did not begin until the information was filed January 14, 2004. The State cannot
come back and state Mr. Legg's request for a 120-day disposition is "null and void" when
the prison did not follow the statutory requirements under UCA 77-29-1 and 77-29-2.
After reviewing the arguments presented by the defense and the prosecutor and the
rulings by the Judge in this matter, it is clear that they did not understand the law in this
matter. If the prison had given Mr. Legg his packet and explained his rights after the
information had been filed with the Court as required by UCA §77-29-2, Mr. Legg would
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have the opportunity to comply with it. If the Judge had understood the statute and had
ruled accordingly on May 6, 2004, Mr. Legg would have sent the required notice at that
time.
The State could argue that the prison did not have a duty to promptly notify Mr.
Legg in writing of the information filed in this case and explain his rights to a final
disposition after the information was filed. The rationale being that it previously gave Mr
Legg this packet with an explanation of his rights on December 3, 2003 and it would
"kick-in" on the date the information was filed and therefore due process was already
followed in this matter. Mr. Legg could argue that the State was also on notice since in
fact the State received his demand for a 120-day disposition. If the prison, attorneys and
the Judge did not understand UCA 77-29-1, then how can Mr. Legg, a prisoner with
limited resources and understanding of the law be expected to perfectly understand this
statute. It is such common sense that it would "kick-in" when the information was filed
that apparently neither the court nor prosecutor thought otherwise.
On December 15, 2003, Mr. Legg met with Utah Department of Corrections
contract attorneys' Freestone and Angerhoffer to obtain information relating to the
procedures in filing his 120-disposition, but Mr. Legg states that he was told they could not
provide any services in regards to his request. (R103)
The State was on notice that Mr. Legg filed his notice and that the prosecutor knew
of his duties under this statute. There is no prejudice to the State in fulfilling its duties
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under the statute since on January 16, 2004, they had actual notice of Mr. Legg's demand
for a 120-day disposition. (R00271-p35)
Also in this case Mr. Legg was being held on an arrest warrant issued by the Utah
Board of Pardons issued on December 2, 2003. (warrant #22128) (R103). His parole
hearing with the Parole Board would be put on hold until the disposition of these charges.
It was imperative to his fundamental rights of due process and freedom that this case had
been adjudicated as soon as possible.
As Mr. Legg argued on his motion filed with the Trial Court on September 1, 2004,
the County Attorney's office sat on Fire Marshall's report dated for December 10, 2003 in
regards to the incident Mr. Legg was subsequently charged with. This report was faxed to
the Tooele County Attorney's office on December 12, 2005. (R00112 and 00111 and
R00032). It was one month before the Court filed his charges with the Court on January
12,2004.
In Leatherbury, the prosecutor signed the information, but did not file it with the
court until about one month later. The defendant filed his 120-day disposition demand
prior to actual filing the information. The Court ruled that this still was premature even
though the prosecutor apparently sat on the information for about a month before filing
with the court. The present case is different in that we are looking at several factors to
show that the State had violated Mr. Legg's rights under 77-29-2. Thus Mr. Legg's due
process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution
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and Article I section 7 of the State of Utah's Constitution and UCA §77-29-2 require that
the State recognize his demand for a 120-day disposition of his case.
All these factors taken together as a whole dictates that the commencement of 120day period should begin on January 14, 2004, the day the information was filed. This
means that the 120-days expired on May 12, 2004, absent any continuances for "good
cause."
The trial court held two hearings on the 120-day disposition to determine if the 120day disposition. The first was held on May 6, 2004 and the second one was held on August
23,2004.
May 6, 2005 Hearing
On May 6, 2005, the court heard arguments on Defendant's motion for a 120-day
disposition. The Trial Court made a factual determination that the prison received Mr.
Legg's notice for a 120-day disposition on January 8, 2004. The Court then ruled that this
date was the date to begin counting the 120 days under UCA §77-29-1. This put the
expiration date of the 120-days at the trial date scheduled for May 6, 2004. This trial,
scheduled on May 6, 2004, was continued without placing any good cause reasons on the
record.
On R 271- p 35, the Judge stated that on three different occasions the defendant
stood in front of the court prior to this hearing and never objected to what would have
otherwise been the window time for the 120-day time period. The court stated that this
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was a factor the Court weight associated with good cause why this action was not brought
within the time period.
The court incorrectly stated the law on this particular issue. In State v. Heaton 958
P.2d 421 (Utah 1991) the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
In Peterson, the trial court asked the defendant whether the trial date was
acceptable, and the defendant did not object to the date, which was outside
the 120-day period. Nevertheless this court concluded that the defendant was
not required to object to the trial date in order to maintain his rights under the
statute because the burden of bringing the case to trial within the disposition
period rested solely with the prosecution.
Clearly the burden is on the prosecutor to bring the case within 120 days. The
Court in Heaton also stated in this case in referring to complying with section 77-29-1
that: "Because the statute places on the prosecutor alone the burden in bringing the case to
trial within 120-day period..." (emphasis added) The defendant is allowed to remain silent.
The burden is solely on the prosecutor.
Since the Court did not address the issue of a pre-mature notice, it ruled incorrectly
as to the dates. However, it is important to analyze this ruling in conjunction with the trial
court's ruling on August 23, 2004 to completely analyze if "good cause" was shown for
any continuances beyond the 120-day period beyond May 12, 2004.
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August 23, 2004
On August 23, 2004, the court allowed Mr. Legg to again argue the 120-day
disposition rule pro-se with Mr. Hogan acting as standby counsel. The court states that:
"Extension has been granted as a result of requests of counsel and they're
reasonable." (R00271-P58
The Court does not refer to which court dates have been extended. It does not
specifically state which counsel, the prosecutor or defendant's, requested the extensions. It
further states they are reasonable. Reasonable is not the standard set forth by case law.
The rule is "good cause." The Court did not rule that whatever extension it was referring
to was for "good cause." The Court is vague and did not apply the correct rule of law.
The Court needed to specifically state for the record the facts to show good cause. As
stated in Heaton above:
"Rather, when concluding that the defendant's owns actions constitute "good
cause" for denying a motion to dismiss under section 77-29-1(4), a trial court
must have sufficient evidence to support a finding a that, but for the
defendant's actions, the trial would have been brought within the required
disposition period."
The court ruled that the date pursuant to UCA §77-29-1 disposition of detainer for
prisoners begins to run the date the information is filed. In this case the information was
file on January 14, 2004. (R00003) This contradicted his earlier ruling on May 4, 2004,
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that it begin to run on January 8, 2004. (R271-pg35)
More problematic, the court stated that the 120-day disposition began on the
January 14, 2004 and that 120 days landed on May 29, 2004. Therefore, the Court
reasoned the trial dates set on May 6, 2004 or May 25, 2004 is well within the 120 days.
(R271-P58.) The problem is that from January 12, 2004 to May 29, 2004 is 137 days. 120
days would fall on May 12, 2004. This incorrect assumption of dates caused the court not
to do a proper analyze to determine if any continuances were for "good cause." The Court
is all over the map in its analysis of this issue especially comparing when the May 6, 2004
hearing date and August 23, 2004 hearing date. The end result of this error of
miscalculating when 120 would fall is that the Court gave a vague and incomplete ruling.
Any ambiguity should be held in the favor of the defendant.
The first prong of test of this rule is to determine when this date began and
expired. In this matter the Court ruled on two different dates at two different hearings.
Second, On the August 23, 2004 hearing, the Court clearly miscalculated the expiration
date of the 120 days. Therefore it did not properly follow a proper analysis. It also failed
the second prong of the test. It did not determine if the May 6, 2004 trial continuance to
the May 25, 2004 trial dates were continued for good cause. Nor did it analyze if any
continuances beyond the May 25, 2004 trial date were continued for "good cause". In
light of this obvious miscalculation the prosecutor had a duty to stand up and correct the
record. The prosecutor had a duty to show that any continuances were for "good cause."
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The May 25, 2005, trial date was continued off the Court record. The Court did not
state why. (R56) No inquiry was made as to reasons. Nothing was put on the record as to
why. As stated above the burden is on the prosecutor has the burden to put it on the record
and show that the continuance was for "good cause."
Clearly, the May 25, 2004 trial date was beyond the 120 days. Also there was no
"good cause" was shown for any of the continuances in this matter. It was continued off
the record as reflected by a court clerk e-mail dated May 24, 2004. (R56).
CONCLUSION
The Court should hold that the charges against Defendant Legg should be dismissed
because of the failure of the Trial Court and prosecutor to adhere to the requirements of
UCA Section 77-29-1 and UCA Annotated 77-29-2.
If The Court does not hold that the charges against Defendant Legg should be
dismissed then at a minimum the Court should hold that Defendant Legg should be resentenced.

SUBMITTED THIS 27th day OF October 2005.

ALAN J. BUIVIDAS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Addendum A: Determinative statutes and rules.
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77-29-1
Section
77-29-5.
77-29-6.
77-29-7.
77-29-8.

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section
77-29-9.

Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text of
agreement.
Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
state agencies and political subdivisions to cooperate.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual criminal law.

77-29-10.
77-29-11.

DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS

B u r d e n of compliance*
The language of Subsection (4) clearly places
the burden of complying with the statute on the
prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421
(Utah 1991).
The trial court erred in concluding that defendant was in the same position as was the
state and therefore shared some of the responsibility to find out why his case had not been set
for trial. State v. Heaton, 958 P 2 d 911 (Utah
1998).
The trial court erred in concluding that a
delay caused by the court clerk's error constituted "good cause" and thereby relieved the
prosecutor of its burden under this section.
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998).
It is the State's responsibility to ensure that
all determinations of good cause shall be shown
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel
being present, as required by this section; the
burden of complying with this requirement is
on the prosecutor. State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT
App 146, 473 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 71 P 3 d 184.

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Contin-.
uance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for,
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state^l
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is<
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-j
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in^
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying [
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting, t
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to t |
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, j
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the,
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
^
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or withia
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

ANALYSIS
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Forfeiture.
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have
charges against him dismissed by remaining
silent and failing to request an earlier setting
when trial court set date for trial beyond
ninety-day period required under former § 7765-1; burden of complying with statute rested
on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,
453 P.2d 158 (1969).

Delay c a u s e d by codefendant's action.
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond
the 120-day time period, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that there
was good cause for the delay, where the delay
was reasonable and not the result of the prosecution's actions or inactions, but was due to a
codefendant, who was to be jointly tried with
defendant and who was expected to plead guilty
at trial as the result of plea negotiations,
changing his plea to not guilty on the scheduled
trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah
1982).

Cross-References. — Right to speedy trial,
Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6.

Dismissal with prejudice.
Forfeiture.
Good cause for delay.
Premature request.
Prosecutor's delay.

Dismissal w i t h prejudice.
Defendant's convictions were reversed and
the charges against him dismissed with prejudice, where the trial date was set for 218 days
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of
disposition, and the trial court's finding of good
cause could not be supported by a conclusion
that the delay was for the purpose of allowing
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve
their conflicts. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421
(Utah 1991).

Commencement of period.
Ninety-day period for prosecution under former § 77-65-1 commenced on the day defendant notified county attorney of his request for
final disposition of case or cases pending
against him; and the filing of a complaint,
information or indictment did not affect the
commencement of the period. State v. Moore,
521 P2d 556 (Utah 1974).
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden
received notice of his request for final disposition of pending charges was properly denied
since computation of then 90-day time period
commenced from date that notice was delivered
to county attorney and appropriate court. State
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of compliance.
Commencement of period.
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Delay caused by prisoner.

brought to trial within ninety days of his request for disposition of pending charges, the
ninety-day disposition period was to be extended by the amount of time during which
defendant himself created delay. State v.
Velasquez, 641 P2d 115 (Utah 1982).
When a defendant causes a trial to be delayed, he temporarily waives the right to a
speedy trial. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986); State v. Maestas, 815 R2d 1319
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651
(Utah 1991); State v. Sioudonne Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Because defendant's own actions in requesting continuances, changing counsel, and agreeing to postpone trial until after disposition of
pretrial motions were the main cause of delay
and because defendant failed to show any prejudice caused by the delay, he was not denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v.
Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

Showing of prejudice.
Standard of review.
Warden's delay.
Written demand.

Interstate agreement — Escape o f
prisoner while in temporary'
custody.
'lxi**»
Interstate agreement — Duty I f
warden.
,J* Jj, ,
Interstate agreement — Attorney'
general as administrator and
information agent.
t

tfSy*?J

9

fe

77-29-1

Delay c a u s e d by prisoner.
Where statute provided that prisoner be

Good c a u s e for delay.
Where defendant's trial date was originally
set for time within ninety-day period provided
for under former § 77-65-1 but, to accommodate defendant's counsel, was postponed until
five days beyond the statutory period, the order
fixing the trial date was within the authority of
the court since good cause for a continuance
had been shown. State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d
117, 477 P 2 d 147 (1970).
Defendant, who was charged at a time he had
other cases pending against him and in one of
those cases requested and received psychiatric
examination and who was appointed various
counsel because of necessity and at his own
request, was not denied right to speedy trial.
State v. Carlsen, 25 U t a h 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326
(1970).
Trial court was within its discretion in grant-
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77-29-1
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ing continuance for trial on date 91 days after
defendant had submitted written request for
disposition of pending criminal case where subpoenas had not been issued soon enough to
proceed with trial on original date, despite
defendant's counsel suggesting trial date
within ninety-day period. Danks v. Turner, 28
Utah 2d 277, 501 P.2d 631 (1972).
Extending the trial date to a reasonable time
outside the disposition period to accommodate,
in part, defense counsel's schedule constituted
"good cause" under this section. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998).
Trial court's sua sponte postponement of trial
date, noting only that defendant's trial had
been "bumped by a high priority case," did not
comply with the requirement that a determination of good cause be made in open court. State
v. Wagenman, 2003 UTApp 146, 473 Utah Adv.
Rep. 57, 71 R3d 184.
Premature request.
Defendant's request for final disposition was
premature where proceedings had advanced
only to point of filing of complaint against him,
since person accused of felony must plead to
and be tried under information or indictment.
State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60
(1970).
Defendant, who was not finally tried within
ninety days from date of request made pursuant to former § 77-65-1, was not entitled to
exoneration because his request was premature
since only complaint for felony charge had been
filed, good cause was shown for granting continuance, and insanity defense had precluded
earlier trial. State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37,
475 P.2d 60 (1970).
Parolee who, after being arrested on complaint, filed petition requesting final disposition of case within ninety days was denied relief
under former § 77-65-1, where trial was held
more than ninety days after filing date of petition but within ninety days of filing of information. State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d
274 (1972).
Former § 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled
charges and defendant was not entitled to assert ninety-day limitation upon prosecution for
any crime discovered or undiscovered he might
have committed. State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah
2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974).
There was no error in refusing inmate's request for a speedy trial ruling because no information had been filed, and thus the case was
not officially pending when the request was
made. State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 18
P.3d 504.
Appellate court's determination that there
was no information pending against defendant
at the time of his request for disposition was
proper where defendant's request for disposition of the charges against him was made on

February 8, 1999; the request was premature
because there was no pending information until
the clerk of the court received the signed docu- * "I
ment and filed it on March 26, 1999. State v
Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, 467 Utah Adv. Rep 3
65P.3dll80.
P r o s e c u t o r ' s delay.
». •
A prosecutor's delay in filing charges does not
violate defendant's right to a speedy trial where
no tactical advantage is gained over the defen-.,
dant, since a strict rule that prosecutors musi
file charges as soon as probable cause exists
could result in the charging of innocent people, - ;
and could also hamper the investigation of
y^
crimes. State v. Smith, 699 R2d 711 (Utah ' ""tS1
1985).
S h o w i n g of p r e j u d i c e .
Nothing in this section, its predecessor,
any of the case law under either statute re- 1 ^
quires a showing of prejudice in order for the
charges against a defendant to be dismissed.
On the contrary, this section clearly provides
that if there is not good cause for the delay, the
court shall order the matter dismissed. State v.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991).
S t a n d a r d of review.
The decision not to dismiss under Subsection
(4) is based on a finding of "good cause," as is
the decision to grant a continuance under Subsection (3). Therefore, the same standard of
review should be applied to both subsections.
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991).
W a r d e n ' s delay.
Any attempt by the warden to retain, beyond
a reasonable time, a prisoner's request for final
disposition of pending charges, his failure to
complete the required certificate, or any attempt to misdirect the request and certificate, 1
would violate prisoner's right to a speedy triaW|
and provide a basis for judicial relief. State v.;f
Taylor, 538 P2d 310 (Utah 1975).
Written demand.
,
Defendant's reliance on his notice of appearance to commence the running of the 120-day '
period within which his trial had to be held was •
misplaced since the notice, which merely conVij
tained a plea of "not g u i l t y and a request that ; |
he be granted a trial upon the charge, was not s
delivered to the warden, and did not specify the, t
nature of the charge or the court where the" ,'
charge was pending. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d-*?
1175 (Utah 1985).
'[ .
A letter from defendant's federal probation , 1 |
officer to a Utah county attorney which did not ^
specify the nature of the charges pending J
against defendant, was merely an inquiry and':
did not trigger the statutory right to demand- '
trial. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987).'.~
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77-29-5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 2 LA Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 849 to 875.

77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of
untried indictments or informations.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 77-29-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, c h . 15, § 2.

77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 77-29-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 77-29-4, e n a c t e d b y L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
into law — Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in
the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
911

Rule 22

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2004 amendment renumbered this rule, formerly Rule 21.5,
and substituted "'Protected'" for "'Controlled"'
in Subdivision (a).

450

R e p e a l s . — Former Rule 21.5", establishing
procedure for pleas claiming mental illness or
insanity, was repealed effective J a n u a r y 1,',
1996. For similar provisions, see § 77-16a-103.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less t h a n two
nor more t h a n 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds t h a t a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, U t a h Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1995; J a n u a r y 1, 1996.)
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investigation, § 76-3-404.
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing

and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E.
Suspending imposition of sentence and placing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Advising defendant of right to appeal.
Appellate review.
Delay reasonable.
Final judgment.
Guilty pleas.
Illegal sentence.
Imposition of sentence.
Jurisdiction.
Res judicata.
Sentences.
—Habitual offenders.
'•—Indefinite suspension of sentence.
Sentencing hearing.
—Continued hearing.
—Evidence.
Delinquency record.

Polygraph examination;
Presentence report.
—Presence of counsel.
—Presence of defendant.
—Time.
Continuance for defendant.
Waiver.
—Waiver of rights.
Statements before sentencing.
—Defendant.
—Duty of court.
Validity of conviction.
Cited.
A d v i s i n g d e f e n d a n t of right to appeal.
Trial court's failure to again advise defendant
of his right to appeal at sentencing was harm-
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 041300016 FS

JOHN L LEGG,

Judge:
Date:

Defendant.

RANDALL N SKANCHY
January 24, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
tawnil
Prosecutor: CUNDICK, DAVID C
Defendant
Defendant pro se
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 13, 1968
Video
Tape Number:
2005-005
Tape Count: 9:45
CHARGES
1. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/03/2004 Guilty
2. ARSON - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/03/2004 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ARSON a 3rd Degree Felony,
the. defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the TOOELE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
Page 1

00223

Case No: 041300016
Date:
Jan 24, 2005
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison sentences on Counts I and II are to run consecutive; and
these sentences are to run consecutive to the prison sentence the
defendant is now serving.

Jon D Williams is present as standby counsel.
Dated this ^ ^

day of

_Ja-7C~

, 20 ^TfJ"

RANDALL N SKANCHY
D i s t r i c t B^On-rt .TnHg^
^ M P USED AT
D.nECTiON OF JUDGE

Page 2 (last)

00

."ILEDBY

^ t ^

Gary Searle, 7620
Deputy County Attorney
47 South Main Street
Tooele, UT 84074
Telephone:
(435)843-3120
Fax:
(435)843-3127

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
INFORMATION
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN LEGG
4726 West Caplan Street
Kearns, UT 84118
DOB: 12/13/1968

Case No.
Judge Randall N. Skanchy
OTN: 15766611

Defendant.

The undersigned Gary Searle, Deputy County Attorney, under oath states on information
and belief that the defendant committed the following crime(s):

COUNT 1: THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, as follows: That John Legg on or about November
30, 2003, in Tooele County, State of Utah, received, retained or disposed of property of another,
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or
concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, knowing
the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and the property stolen was
an operable motor vehicle.

00003

State of Utah v. John Legg
Information
Page 2

COUNT 2: ARSON, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b), as
follows: That John Legg on or about November 30, 2003, in Tooele County, State of Utah,
unlawfully and intentionally damaged the property of another by means of fire or explosives, and
the value of the property was or exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es): Craig
Ward of Utah Highway Patrol; Jim Dudzinski, State Firemarshall; Bruce and Barbara Webb;
Layne Morris; Ken Smith, and Kirk Peterson.

DATED this/^_ day of January, 2004.
Authorized
for presentment and filing

By_
Gary Searle
Deputy Coun

This form (fully filled in)
presented to a magistrate as
possible but in any event no
than 48 hours after the time

must be
soon as
later
of arrest

Date 8c Time of Arrest
Arresting Agency Case Number: 080301241
Name: LEGG, JOHN
AKA:

A y arrest and for continued detention from
P/C statement below.
Yes
No
Date:
. ;Time
Judge: __
Bail amount"

11/30/03
S0#;

L/

12:41
DOB: 12/13/1968

CHARGE INFORMATION
Complainant: WARD, CRAIG
Count 1 POSS STOLEN VEHICLE
Count 2 ARSON
Count 3
Count 4

Code
Code
Code
Code

Agency: UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL
# VC-41-1A-1316
# CC-76-6-102
#
#

ID#:

OFFENSE INFORMATION AND PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT FOR ARREST
Date: 11/30/03 Time: 12:41 Location: 1-80, MP 49 EXIT
Victim:
Statement of P.C. as of the time of arrest.
I WAS CALLED TO A VEHICLE FIRE OFF EXIT 49, NORTH OF THE FREEWAY. WHE
N I EXITED THE OFF RAMP I SAW A SUBJECT WALKING TOWARD THE FREEWAY. I
TALKED TO THE SUBJECT AND HE BASICALLY STATED HE DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING
ABOUT THE FIRE OR VEHICLE. I TOOK HIM BACK TO THE SCENE. THE REPORT
ING PERSON WAS STILL AT THE SCENE. HE STATED HE HAD PICKED UP THE SUB
JECT I HAD WITH ME AND HE STATED TO HIM THAT HE DIDN'T NOTICE THE FIRE
I CHECKED AROUND THE BURNING VEHICLE AND COULD ONLY SEE ONE TREAD
PATTERN OF TRACKS. THERE WAS A BUNDLE 5 0 YARDS FROM THE VEHICLE. THE
TRACKS LED THAT DIRECTION DRAGGING A BLACKET HOLDING MISCELANEAOUS PRO
PERTY FROM THE VEHICLE. THE SUJECT STARTED OUT GIVING ME ONE STORY AND
THEN CHANGING IT. A FRIEND BROUGHT HIM OUT TO SHOW HIM SOMETHING. SH
OWED HIM THE VEHICLE THEN STARTED TEARING IT APART. MY SUBJECT THEN S
TARTED REMOVING ITEMS FROM THE VEHICLE TO KEEP THEM FROM GETTING DESTR
OYED. ANOTHER WITNESS STATED THAT HE SAW THE SUBJECT I HAD PULLING
STUFF OUT OF THE VEHICLE AND THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE OR PERSON
S AROUND. THE VEHICLE THAT WAS BURNED WAS NOT LISTED ONNCIC. DISPATCH
CONTACTED THE REGISTERED OWNERS AND THfiY NOTICED THE VEHICLE WAS NO LO
NGER IN THEIR POSSESSION. DISPATCH CALLED SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF OF
FICE FOR THE VICTIMS. I CONTACTED THE' VICTIM, SHE DOES KNOW THE SUJEC
T I HAD WITH ME LEAVING THE AREA OF THE CAR FIRE. AFTER TALKING WITH
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF, I ARRESTED THE MY SUJECT FOR THE STOLEN VEHI
CLE AND ARSON. I STATE TAX IMPOUNDED THE VEHICLE. THE STATE FIRE MA
RSHAL AND SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTIES WILL COME OUT TO WENDOVER TO FURTH
ER INVESTIGATE. I TRANSPORTED MY PRISONER TO TOOELE COUNTY JAIL.
Screening cases is the responsibility of the arrestng officer and agency.
Arresting Officer:

/^__

l
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materially increases the amount of exempt
property withdrawn from liability for the
c^ebts of the owner of the property impairs
the obligation of existing contracts and is, as
to existing creditors, unconstitutional because an exemption may not be applied retroactively").
;.
;.,

uted and supervised by the trial court ina<
manner not inconsistent with our opinion.:
1137 We also reverse the trial court's decision that the sum the Millers received from'
Academy should be considered a portion of
the Millers' homestead exemption. Finally,
we conclude that the trial court should deterU 34 Accordingly, based upon the principles mine the amount of the homestead exemption
of statutory interpretation discussed above based upon the declaration in effect at the
and : the public policy considerations, sur- time of the actual sale of the Property.
rounding homestead exemption statutes as
11 38 The trial court's decision is affirmed in
articulated in Macumber, we.conclude that in part and reversed in part.
supervising the distribution of proceeds from
the sale of the Property, the trial court
1139 I CONCUR:., PAMELA T.
should determine the amount of the home- GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge.
stead exemption based upon the declaration
DAVIS, Judge (concurring, concurring in
in effect at the time of the actual sale. The result, and dissenting):
trial court's ruling is therefore reversed and
If 40 I concur in the main opinion respectremanded in order that a factual finding may
ing
the purchase money mortgage and equibe made upon which to base the determinatable subordination issues. I concur in the
tion.7
result respecting the circularity of liens issue; * however, I dissent on the issue of the
CONCLUSION
allowable homestead exemption."
U 35 We conclude the trial court correctly
1141 In my view, under the facts of this
determined that Homeside's trust deed is, not case, the amount of the allowable homestead
a purchase money mortgage, and that equita- exemption was determined at the time of
ble subrogation is inapplicable in this matter. filing and in accordance with the amounts set
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's deci- out in the declaration of homestead.2 Here,
sions regarding these matters.
the Millers apparently filed their declaration
1136 We reverse the trial court's decisions of homestead shortly after, and probably as a
finding circularity and establishing priorities, result of, Transworld's judgment. Between
and hereby assign the following priorities: the time that the Millers filed their declara(1) Transworld's judgment lien; (2) Home- tion of homestead and the time that this
side's trust deed, and (3) the Millers. The matter was tried, the statutory homestead
hen and trust deed are each to be satisfied, allowance was increased, by the Legislature.
in turn, to the extent that assets are. available Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-23-3(2)
to satisfy the claims; We acknowledge that (Supp.2000), with Utah Code; Ann. § 78-23different assets, or a portion thereof, may be 3(1) (1996), and Utah Code Ann, § 78-23available . as each succeeding creditor at- 3(1) (1991). ,
tempts to satisfy their claim because the
1f42 By filing their 1991 declaration .»of
homestead exemption protects a portion of homestead, the Millers were immediately
the proceeds from Transworld's judicial lien. protected from the Transworld judgment
The proceeds from the sale,are to b^distrib- Ken.. "A homestead is exempt from judicial

lien and from levy, execution, ^forced sale."
Utah Code Ann.- § 78-23-3(3) (Supp.2000)
(emphasis added). - The filing of the declaraW
tion immediately exempted the amount set
out in the declaration from Transworld's lien/
regardless of whether a levy, execution, or
forced sale ever occurred. Here, the Millers
could have waited to declare their homestead
exemption up to the date of sale of the
property; however, they chose not to. Instead, they elected to immediately exempt
the allowable homestead from Transworld's
Hen.
If 43, In order to exempt property from
judicial; hen, the statute requires the filing of
a "sighed and acknowledged declaration of
homestead.'' Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-4(1)
(1996).' The Utah Exemptions Act does not
specifically provide for1 sequential declara^
tions of the homestead exemption. See, id.
§§ 78-23-1 to~15. ' ' ' ; '
'"
''
1144 Further, while it is ; true that-the
deadline for filing a, declaration of homestead
is, the sale of the property, it is illogical to tie
the exemption amount to a' sale which may or
may not occur. This approach suggests' that
a sale of the property and generation of the
sales' proceeds is a precondition to realization of the homestead by the debtor.
1145 "[T]he purpose of the; homestead ex^;
emption of, -Article XXII, Section, 1 of the
Utah Constitution is to protect 'the dependent and helpless' and to insure such persons
shelter ,and support free from ,fear of. forced
sale." Sanders v^Cassiiy, 586 p.2d 4^3, 425
(Utah 1978) (citation omitted)!5" Jhus, al-^
though /the declaration can be filed or served
any time prior to,sale, see id" the amount of
the exemption should not"'jbe determined as
of the time of sale, because^ a sale' fh'ay never
take place. See Utah Code AhhV •§ 78-234(5) (1996) ("Property that,includes-a
stead shall not be sold at execution if there is
no bid which exceeds the amount of the
declared homestead exemption':'*).'

7. We are reluctant to determine the^ specific
amount of the exemption because niultiple^declarations may be filed before the Property is actually sold; Further, it is more appropriate for the
trial court to make the determination because the
Millers' original declaration is neither part of the
record, nor part of the, addenda submitted.

1146 In addition, the 1991 declaration gave
constructive notice to all,interestedparties of

. Defendant who pleaded.tguilty to drug"
charges in the,District Court^Salt Lake De-

3. Although the homestead exemption, in general,,
is to be construed irt favor o£'Qie : debtor,'-see
Russell M. Miller Co. v. Givan, 7. Utah 2d 380,
325 P.2d 908, 909 ,(1958), ttas line of cases does
hot apply here because Ho'meside, .as' a result of
our decision, effectively succeeds to the Miller's
, exemption amount.t ;• .

4. Assuming' the Millers did" not have: as many- as
sixty children in 1991. See, Utah Code .Ann.
§ 78-23-3(1) (1991).

1. While I concur in the result regarding the
circularity of liens issue, I believe it is unneces-

sary for this court to address the allocation of
proceeds if a sale of :the property ever occurs.
Once it has been determined that no circularity
of liens exists, the rules of priority will control'
the respective positions of the parties.
2. The Miller's actual 1991 declaration of homestead was apparently not made part of the record
at trial or on appeal.

the scope of Transworld's lie^n on the real
property. To the extent Transworld or> other
creditors may have relied on the amount"
stated in the declaration, the Millers should'
ber bound by that amount. "
1f 47 Finally, the Millers'cannbt rely^ori the
amendments to the Exemption amount" in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (Supp.2000) be-:
cause when statutory'amendments are "substantial and substantive,"•* and not merely
procedural, then "retroactive application" is
not appropriate." '-Thronson v. Thronson,
810 P:2d;428, 432 (Utah.App.1991). If the
"vested rights" given by a statute have been
enlarged, then-the amendment cannot'be
considered procedural. Smith v. ~ Cook, 803
P.2d 788,!792 (Utah, 1990K' . The- changes
made by the Legislature to the' Utah Exemptions Act since 1991 significantly increase the
allowable homestead.4. Thus, the.amendments to the exemption amount in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (Supp. 2000) are not
merely procedural, • and "retroactive applica^
tion is not appropriate." Thronson^ 810 P.2d
at 432.
1148 Accordingly, I would 'remand- to^'the'
trial court for the limitedpurpose f of ^determining the amount claimed by the Miller's in
the 1991 declaration of hdm&siead.'

:2001 U T A p p 2 4 1 ;

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
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and-Appellant.
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Court of Appeals of IJtah.
Aug. 16; 2001;;

partment, J. Dennis Frederick, J.,:,and. was
sentenced in absentia. Defendant appealed.
The Court,of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1)
defendant was not entitled to explicit warning that, even if defendant were absent,.the'
court might proceed with sentencing; (2)- sentencing court was required to inquire into
defendant's ability to appear at sentencing
proceeding, and State was required to make
preliminary showing of voluntariness of defendant's absence, before sentencing court
could decide that defendant had waived his
right to be present; (3) sentencing court's
failure to properly inquire into whether defendant's absence at sentencing hearing was
voluntary was harmless error; and (4) sentencing court's failure to hear evidence from
prosecutor and defense counsel at sentencing
hearing was not harmless error.
, .-..•
Vacated and remanded.
1. Sentencing and Punishment <&=>341
A criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages of trial includes the right to
be present at sentencing.
>
2. Criminal Law <3»636(1)
To intentionally relinquish the right to
be present, the defendant must have notice
of the proceedings. Rules Crim.Proc., Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b). •
'
. ,
3. Sentencing and Punishment <^=»345
Defendant's right to be present at all
proceedings may be waived by defendant's
voluntary absence from sentencing; this
waiver must be voluntary and involve an
intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
4. Sentencing and Punishment ®=>345
Defendant was not entitled to explicit
warning that, even if defendant were absent,
the trial court might proceed with sentencing, and thus defendant's voluntary absence
from sentencing proceeding after He. pleaded
guilty did not bar trial court from pronouncing sentence. .Rules Crim.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b). •
5. Sentencing and Punishment ®=»345
To require an explicit warning that sentencing will proceed even in the defendant's

O l A l J C i V. TTXJLL^IV70XXV
Cite as 31 P.3d 615 (Utah App. 2001)

voluntary absence.is to conclude, that, without such a warning, defendants will assume
they have the right to avoid sentencing simply by refusing to appear. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
6. Criminal Law <3=»636(2)
Notice of the proceeding is alone sufi>,
cient to allow a defendant to exercise the.
right to be present by appearing, or to waive,
that right through voluntary absence. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
7. Criminal Law <s=>636(2)
A defendant need not be warned that
the proceedings may go forward in his, absence in order to deem voluntary absence a
knowing.waiver of the right;to be present.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
8. Sentencing and Punishment <&=>345
Sentencing court was not required to
conduct analysis as to whether the public
interest in proceeding with sentencing clearly
outweighed the interest of the voluntarily
absent defendant in attending the proceeding; neither federal rules, nor federal constitution required such a balancing test. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). '
9. Criminal Law ®=*636(2>
The fact that a defendant was1 informed
of the time and place of the proceeding allows a court to presume that a defendant's
absence therefrom is knowing, i.e., that the
defendant knows he is missing the proceeding; the fact that an absent defendant had
notice of the proceeding does not, however,
allow a presumption that absence, therefrom
is voluntary.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
J.
10. Criminal Law ^636(2)
A trial court may not assume a defendant's knowing absence is voluntary, but
rather is required to determine whether a
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary.
Rules Crim.Proc., Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
11. Sentencing and Punishment @=»345
Sentencing court was required to inquire
into defendant's ability to appear at sentencing proceeding, and State was required to
make a preliminary showing of the voluntari-

ness of defendant's absence, before-sentenc- the reasons for his^absence..-; Rules Crhh.
ing, court could decide that defendant, had Proc, Rules 17(a)(2),22(b).
waived his right to be present at sentencing.
; /
Rules Crim>Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b),
.. 18. Sentencing and Punishment <s=>345
Some avenues for establishing voluntary
ness of defendant's absence at sentencing
The voluntariness of defendant's absence proceeding are: (1) ihcjuiry of law Enforcefrom sentencing; proceeding may not be pre- ment agencies to determinei whether' defensumed by the trial court; rather, an mquiry dant is incarcerated;1 (2) inquiry1 of local 'hosinto the defendant's ability to appear at the pitals as to whether defendant is admitted to'
proceeding is required; Rules Crim.Pi:pc> one of them; (3) inquiry of defendant's emRules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
ployer,, if employer can j be readily determined, as to employer's knowledge of defen13. Sentencing and Punishment ^ 3 4 5
dant's whereabouts; (4) a reasbiiably diligent
The voluntariness of defendant's absence, attempt to contact defendant at'his residence
from, sentencing proceeding is determinecl,by or other place counsel knows; defendant t;6
considering the totality of the circumstances,. frecjuent;! (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). '* •' other entity supervising defendant's presentence release; and "(6) inquiry; of any bail
14. Sentencing and Punishment <S=>345
bond'comjpany or other person or entity postThe state carries the burden of showing ing bond to secure defendant's appearance.
the voluntariness of defendant's absence Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(.a)(2)>-22(b).;
,
from sentencing proceeding.. .Rules Crim.
Proc,-Rule : sa7(a)(2)„22(b),'",,'. "/',',.'"{ \', 19. Sentencing and Punishment <3=»345
12. Sentencing and Punishment <s=»345

15. Criminal Law <3=>636(2) v
A defendant must have a compelling reason to stay away from the trial; if his absence
is deliberate ^without a-sound reason, the trial
may start in his absence.,,v Rules(,Qrim.Proc,
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b)'.
T
,
16. Sentencing and Punishment <3=*345

>

When defendant is absent from sentencing proceedings, the State must make a pre-,
liminary showing, based on reasonable:inquiry, that' defendant's absence is voluntary;
except as otherwise required by the attorney-client privilege, defense counsel has an
obligation to aid the State by being forthcoming with any information "defense counsel
may have that could be helpful hi determining the defendant'swhereabou'ts or reasons
for the defendant's 'absence. '•: Rules Crim.
Proc,-Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). ! v
' • V'--'

Once inquiry appropriate to the case has
been made, and a compelling reason for the
defendant's absence at sentencing proceeding
remains unknown, voluntariness, while not
guarantied, may then be properly inferred;
however, defense counsel must then have,the
opportunity to rebut the inference of voluntariness. • Rules Crim.Proc, Rules '17(a)(2),!
22(b).
20. Criminal Law <3=>1166.14
A trial court's error in failing to conduct
an adequate inquiry into whether a defendant's absence was voluntary does not merit
reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced
by the lack of adequate inquiry. Rules Crim.
Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
21. Criminal Law ^IITIZ^

Sentencing court's failure 'to properly inquire into Whether defendant's absence at
When'neither court nor "counsel'have sentencing hearing was Voluntary was harminformation as to why the defendant is not less error; where defendant^ after being appresent at sentencing, a continuance will or- prehended* sent letter to''sentencing court
dinarily be required to allow the prosecution stating that defendant did "not have a legitiand defense counsel an opportunity to in- mate excuse" for appearing for sentencing.
quire into the defendant's whereabouts and Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)@);:22(b). •
17. Sentencing and Punishment <§=»582 i
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22. Sentencing and Punishment @=>345, 360 28. Criminal Law «®=>1177
Defendant, by his voluntary absence at
Sentencing court's failure to hear evisentencing proceeding, waived the right to dence from prosecutor and defense counsel
personally make a statement at sentencing at sentencing hearing was not harmless erand to personally present information, in miti- ror, even though defendant voluntarily failed
gation. of punishment or to show legal cause to appear at sentencing; defense counsel had
why sentence should not be imposed; howev- to be given an opportunity to present inforer, sentencing court was required to afford mation in mitigation of punishment and prosthe defendant,the opportunity to exercise his ecutor had to be given an opportunity to
allocution rights through counsel. . Rules present information relevant to sentencing.
CrimJProc., Rule 22(a). „
, '_','"^i Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).
23. Sentencing and Punishment €=>356

29. Constitutional Law <s=>270(2)

,,.. A defendant's personal exercise of the
rights granted in the rule of criminal ^procedure which allows,defendant to make a..statement at sentencing is referred, to as "allocution." Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 22(a).
See publication Words and,Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.
'"
'

The state due process clause requires
that a sentencing judge act on* reasonably
reliable and relevant information in exercising-discretion in fixing a sentence. Const.
Art. 1, § 7.
' !

24. Sentencing and Punishment <£»360

A sentence in a criminal case should be
appropriate for the defendant in light of his
background and the crime committed and
also serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system. Const.
Art. 1, § 7.

Allocution is an inseparable part of the
right to be present at sentencing, which a
defendant waives by; his .voluntary absence.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a). ,
25. Sentencing and Punishment ^ 3 6 0 ,
A defendant does not altogether waive
his? allocution rights through voluntary, absence at sentencing; he waives only the right
to personally exercise them., Rules Crim.
Proc, Rule 22(a).
26. Criminal Law <S=>641.13(7)
Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, and
the right to effective assistance of counsel
cannot be waived through voluntary-absence
alone. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
27. Sentencing and Punishment <&=>345
Even when defendant is voluntarily absent from sentencing, and thereby waives his
right to allocution, trial court is ; required to
afford defense counsel opportunity to make
statement in: mitigation of sentence and to
give prosecutor opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. Rules Crim.;
Proc, Rule 22(a).
<

30. Sentencing and Punishment <s=>40, 66,
90

31. Constitutional Law <3=>270(2)
Sentencing and Punishment <3=>94
Defendant's state due process rights
were violated by sentencing court's failure to
base.its sentencing decision on relevant and
reliable information regarding the crime, defendant's background, and the interests of
society, and basing the court's decision solely
on defendant's voluntary absence, at sentencing. Const. Art. 1, § 7.
32. Criminal Law <®=>1177
Sentencing court's failure to base, its
sentencing decision on relevant and reliable
information regarding the crime,, defendant's
background, and the interests of society, and
basing the court's decision instead solely on
defendant's voluntary absence at sentencing,
was not harmless error. Const. Art. 1, § 7.

Joan C. Watt, Catherine E. £.illy, and Andrea J. Garland, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
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rant for his arrest returnable forthwith no
bail. My inclination is to sentence him
. today, and I recognize -'you,would prefer
(that I d i d not, but I am inclined to do so.
It is curious that he has failed to appear
today, although I can only assume because
he has not been in touch with you nor has
he been in touch with my court that he has
chosen to voluntarily absent himself from
these proceedings,
••••;,;
Consequently,-it is the judgment and
sentence of this Court that he serve the
term provided by law in the adult detention center of one year for the class A
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession of..,a. controlled substance, and six
months for. the possession of a controlled
substance, a misdemeanor charge to which
he fhas pled guilty. I will; order that those
.terms be served,concurrently and not,consecutively,and that ; they be,imposed forth-

Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and
Jeanne B. Inouye^ Assistant Attorney Genera
al, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before JACK&0N, Associate Presiding '
Judge, ORME and THORNE, Judges.
OPINION
r ?
ORME, Judges ;7" "
"
111 Defendant Anthony James Wanosik appeals the sentences imposed by the trial
court pursuant to his guilty pleas to attempted unlawful possession or use of a controlled
substance and unlawful' possession or use of a;
controlled substance^ class A and fr misdemeanors, respectively, each in violation 6f
Utah Code Ann. • ; § 58-37-8(2J(a)(i); feupp.
2000); We vacate the sentences and remand
u
for resentencings
'• : - - -''

•'••, B A C K G R O U N D
;
112 The facts are : Undisputed. Wanosik
pled guilty to-two misdemeanor^ drug ofn
fenses- At the plea hearing, the trial court
told Wanosik that sentencing would be held'
on May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., and, ordered
Wanosik to report to Adult Probation .and
Parole (AP & P) for preparation of a presentence report. The trial; court did not specifically inform Wanosjk.that he could be sentenced in absentia..if he.;,failed,to appear for
sentencing. .
.
_.; .,. ,;... • . , ,.
H 3 Wanosik reported %o, AP .i & • P, and
presentence report was completed. AP &,P
recommended that, Wanosik be sentenced, to
twenty days, in jail^with, credit for time
served and that he then be, committed.toa
substance abuse treatment program. ;..'. :
14 A sentencing hearing, was held as
scheduled on May 26, 2000.,; Wanosik was
represented at the; hearing by .counsel but
did not appear personally at the hearing or
at any other time that morning.
.......
115 Defense counsel expressed:to,the court
her belief that Wanosik had intended.to appear for sentencing but had perhaps written
down the wrong date. Defense counsel
asked the court to wait before issuirig' an
arrest' warrant to give counsel time to locate
Wanosik. The court denied defense' counsel's request and proceeded to impose, sentence:.. '••!'••,.;
;.:::. .v .« = ;\ J.~ :'-i.\]
[G]iven [Wanosik's] failure to appear I will
terminate his pre-trial release, issue a war-

. . W i t h .

,.

.•:.•

/•••

.

. ,. ; ! - f .-*V-.: K V-

;..-

• • • - , . ,

•;••..

JVEs. Garland, in the, event he is in touch
with you or shows tup before he's arrested,
then you u may approach me, but in the
meantime, Mr. D'Alesandro, you prepare
the findings of fact,, conclusions of law and
order;, determining,.voluntary absent, compliance, and that will be the; order. , ,,-,. >•
Defense, counsel promptly objected: .,., .• .».• ,••...,
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to
a that order because, I donft think that. it
takes into account his due process rights
- or his rights about— : >. •'! •-;•: .• <^-THE COURT:,Right twil - ; >.s,
MS. GARLAND: Howeverl I realize that's
your order. ;•• '':-: :.-;;'';r'' v .••.-««..»•,•..
• •>:..
THE COURT: Your objection is noted.
I'll grant him credit for the eight days 'he
served awaiting inipositibn or a resolution.
The hearing was then immediately concluded. The 'prosecutor, Mr. D'Alesandrb, wsfe'
present but made no statement during the;
sentencing hearing^ .and the" court addressed
the prosecutor only to direct him to prepare
the court's .findings, of fact and conclusions of
l

a

W

i

•'-

'

" • <

• • • • •••••<;•'*:•••

'

•'•••

'

>••'•

• ' '

;

•:

•"-'•'•

\ i 6 \ b n June " 14^£oo6V %anosik, through
counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal of the
sentences imposed' in his absence;' Wanosik
was arrested a few moniiis^ater on the warrant issued at the: sentencing^' -After his ar-
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rest, Wanosik sent a brief, handwritten letter
to the trial court in which he forthrightly
acknowledged, with his own emphasis:/"I do
not have a legitimate excuse" for being absent at sentencing.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1f 7 Wanosik makes two general claims on
appeal: (1) that sentencing should not have
proceeded in his absence; and (2) that even
if sentencing him in absentia was proper, the
trial court erred by the manner in which it
conducted sentencing.
1f8 Under Wanosik's first general claim,
i.e., that sentencing should not have proceeded in his absence, we address several distinct
issues. First, we address Wanosik's contention that, as a matter of law, a defendant's
absence at sentencing cannot be deemed Voluntary if the defendant was not Warned that
sentencing could proceed in his voluntary
absence. This contention presents a purely
legal question, which we review for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932;" 93536 (Utah 1994). Second, we address Wanosik's argument that even if a defendant's
absence is properly deemed voluntary, the
trial court may not proceed with "sentencing
without first balancing society's -interest1 in
proceeding and the defendant's interest in
being present. This argument also presents
a question of law, which we review for correctness. See id. Thirds we believe that
sound analysis requires us to address whether, in this case, the trial court's inquiry regarding the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence was properly conducted. Specifically,
we address the, questions of what type of
inquiry is required of the trial court in making ;the factual determination of voluntariness; who has the burden of proving voluntariness; and what type of evidence may
suffice to meet that burden. These are all
legal questions, which, again, we review for
correctness. See id. Finally, we conclude
;

1. Wagstaff involved a defendant's absence from
trial rather than from sentencing. See 772 P.2d
, at 988-89. The Utah Supreme Court, however,
has previously relied oh both Wagstaff arid State
v.Houtz, 714 P.2d-677 (Utah 1986) (per curiam),
another Utah case involving a defendant's absence at trial, in addressing a criminal defendant's right t d ' o e present at Sentencing. See
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah

this first section of the opinion by considering whether any error by the trial court was
harmless.
.:,.
r
119 Wanosik's second claim is that, even
assuming proceeding with sentencing in his
absence was appropriate, "[t]he trial court
violated due process and Utah R.Crim. P.
22[ (a) ] when it sentenced [Wanosik] without
considering relevant and reliable information
and without affording defense counsel or the
prosecutor the opportunity to speak at sentencing." These assertions require us to interpret both the mandates of Rule 22(a) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the requirements of Due Process at sentencing. Each of these inquiries pose questions
of law, which we review for correctness,
granting no particular deference, to the conclusions of the trial court. See Broivn v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, 1115, 16 P.3d 540 ("[T]he
interpretation of a rule of procedure is a
question of law that, we review for correctness."); State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159,
119, 27 P.3d 573 ("Issues of constitutional
interpretation are questions of law, which we
review for correctness.").
I. Sentencing; in Absentia
[1-3] H10 We begin by addressing Wanosik's claim that the trial court erred by sentencing him in his absence. A criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages of
trial included the right to be present at sentencing. See State v: Anderson, 929 P.2d
1107, 1109-11 (Utah 1996): "To intentionally
relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the proceedings."
Id. at 1110. See Utah R.Crim;; P. 17(a)(2),
22(b). "However, this right may be waived
. . . [by] the [defendant's] voluntary absence
from [sentencing]. This' waiver must be voluntary and involve an intentional relinquishment of a known right." State v. Wagstaff,
772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted).1
1996) (citing Wagstaff, 772 ,P.2d at 990;; Houtz,
714 P.2d at 678), Likewise, the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure .treat identically a defendant's right to be present at trial and a defendant's right to be present at sentencing. See
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(b). We therefore see no
basis on which to distinguish between trial and
sentencing in our analysis of a defendant's right

A. Specific Warning of Consequences' :.
[4] 1111 Notwithstanding that-the Utah
case law and rules referred to above appear
to require only notice to defendant of the
proceedings and of the right to be present in
order to permit the court to proceed to a
determination whether a defendant's voluntary absence is a waiver of the right to be
present, Wanosik argues that a further warning is required. Specifically, Wanosik argues
he was entitled to be warned that-the court
might proceed, with sentencing if he were.to
be voluntarily absents We disagree.*..
, •, j
' [5,6] 1112 To require an explicit warning
that sentencing will'proceed even in the defendant's voluntary absence is to conclude
that, without such a warning, defendants will
assume they have the right to avoid sentencing simply by refusing'to appear. See Taylor v. United State&WA U.S. 17^20/94 S.Ct.
194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174-(1973) (per* curiam).
It is inimical to the commonre'spect due'our
governmental institutions for us to indulge in
the presumption that- persons will assume
they have the right to impede the judicial
system by deliberately absenting themselves
from criminal proceedings to which they are
a party. See id. ("It seems I. .• incredible
to us . . . 'that .a defendant who flees from a
courtroom in the midst of a trial—where
judge, jury, witnesses, and lawyers are-presto be present and a defendant's voluntary waiver
of that right.
2. Wanosik references both the Utah : Constitution
and the United States Constitution as well as the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in making this
argument. However,
' ;H
[n]o argument has been made as to why, if we
were to uphold the [sentencing] under, the
Utah [Rules of Criminal Procedure], the result
would be different under either the Utah'or the
federal constitution. We will. therefore treat
the contention as a single argument with three
legal bases rather than as three separate 'krgu:
• ments.
• '••.. i<f: r. -•.••.: >•,<•:. x\ •,
State v. Anderson,
1996).
.

910 P.2d 1229, 1232 n . 3 (Utah
,, ; .
•• ;-SJ. >r

3. We acknowledge that, a defendant who flees in
the midst of a trial may have more; reason to
know that the proceedings will move forward in
his absence than a defendant, who absents himself from sentencing after entering a guilty plea.
We nevertheless remain unpersuaded that1 a
warning is required to disabuse defendants of the
belief that they may prevent their own sentencing

ent and ready to continue—would not know
that as a consequence the trial could continue
in his absence."' (citation omitted)).3 "The
right at issue is the right to be present." Id.
Notice of the proceeding is alone sufficient to
allow a defendant to exercise the right to be
present by appearing, or to waive that right
through voluntary absence. See id. Wheth^
er it be trial or sentencing, we must presume
defendants fully understand that important
proceedings will go forward without them in
the event of their, voluntary absence.4 Thus,:
there is no need to specially warn defendants
of this obvious fact. :.
r- .. ,;
v
11 IS Wanosik observes that although neither Wagstaff- nor Anderson '-addresses
whether a spech^c warning is required, sudh:
a requirement would not be inconsistent with'
the holdings of those cases. However, the
only federal case; Wanosik cites directly-supporting his proposition that a specific warning is required'to inform defendants that
sentencing may proceed in their voluntary
absence is United States v. McPherson, 421s
F.2d 1127 (t).C.Cir.l969), which ; held that
such a warning is required. See id. at 112930. The United'States Supreme Court has,
however, explicitly rejected McPherson's
holding requiring such a warning.' See\ Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20 n. 3, 94 S.Ct. at 196 n. 3
("[T]he Court of Appeals:.... disagreed with
through deliberate absence from the sentencing
proceeding. We therefore, again, do not distinguish between the right to be present at trial
from the,right to be present a| sentencing, in
terms of what type.. of notice is required to deem
a defendant's voluntary absenqe a knowing waiver of the right-to be present. See note 1.
4. Nor is this some unique'feature of the judicial
system that will be foreign to the average citizen.
Whether one is; a season ticket holder or a team
member, a scheduled basketball game will goforward whether or not he or she shows up. If
one does not appear for a scheduled dental or
medical appointment, he or she should expect to
be billed anyway. If one misses an employment
interview without prior explanation, he or she
knows the job will go to someone else. While
the uniqueness of judicial business makes these*
examples less than perfect, the expectation in
contemporary American society .is that one
should appear at duly scheduled events >;pr: ^be
willing to accept the ramifications of his or her
voluntary absence. In most social and commercial arenas,,-an expectation of unexcused absence
without consequence is not the order of the day.
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McPherson, and, in our view, rightly so.").
Nonetheless,
Wanosik
maintains
that
McPherson 's -holding is good law and cites
the more recent United States -Supreme
Court case, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S.
255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993)* as.
"further support for the McPherson requirement." Crosby, however, does not undermine Taylor's rejection of McPherson-s
warning requirement.

Criminal Procedure differ in an important
respect highlighted by Crosby. Federal Rule
43 treats differently absence at the commencement of trial from absence after the
commencement of trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P.
43; Crosby, .506.U.S. at 258-62, 113 S.Ct. at
751-53. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure draw no such distinction, but rather
treat a defendant's absence at any stage of
criminal proceedings similarly to the federal
1114 Crosby interprets Rule 43 of the Fed- rule's treatment of a defendant's absence
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure and holds after commencement of trial.7 Compare
that, under the explicit language of that rule, Utah R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2), 22(b) with Fed.
a court may never commence trial in a defen- R.Crim.P. 43(a) & (b)(1). . Thus, for our purdant's absence.6 See 506 U.S. at 258-62, 113 poses, the significance of Crosby is that it
S.Ct. at 751-53. The Crosby Court, also ,pb- affirms the United States Supreme Court's
serves, however, that under Rule 43 a defen- view that a warning of the consequences of
dant's absence after\{ trial... has commenced voluntary absence is not required to deem a
will automatically be deemed .a knowing defendant's absence after commencement of
waiver of the right to,be present, even,with- trial voluntary. Our holding, therefore, acout prior warning to the defendant regarding cords with that of the United States Supreme
the consequences of voluntary absence.. See Court when we conclude that a defendant
5Q6U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752. Thus, need, not be warned,that the proceedings
like Taylor^ Crosby concludes that in circum- may go forward in his absence in order to
stances where the federal, rules .otherwise deem voluntary absence a knowing waiver of
allow for trial in absentia, a warning is not the right to be present. Thus, although at
required to inform defendants that,voluntary least one state mandates a warning like that
absence will likely result in trial in absentia. required in McPherson, see People v. Link,
See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 291, Hl.App.3d 1064, 226 Ill.Dec. 369, 685
752; Taylor, 414 U.S.. at 20, 94 S.Ct. at 196. N.E;2d 624,;626 (1997), we, with the United
[7] 1115 Significantly, the Federal Rules States Supreme Court,; decline to adopt
of Criminal Procedure and the Utah Rules of McPherson 's holding.
5. Wanosik observes that the Utah Supreme Court
has cited McPherson with approval. See State v.
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 11 I'd (Utah 1996).
• However/the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on
McPherson extended only to the 'proposition that
"[t]o intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the proceedings." Id. Nowhere does Anderson intimate
that any further warning is ; .required. Indeed,
Anderson implicitly rejects the notion that a further warning is required by: affirming the sentencing, in absentia, of a ; defendant. who,. although he waived in writing, his right to be
present at trial, was not explicitly warned that
sentencing would proceed in his voluntary .absence. See id. at 1110-11.
6. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states in relevant part:
•>••..-..
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be
present at the arraignment, at the time of the
plea, at every stage of the trial including the
impaneling of the jury and the return of the
verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except
as otherwise provided by this rule. •

(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The
further progress of the trial to and including the
return of the verdict shall not be prevented and
the defendant shall be considered to have waived
the... right to be present whenever a defendant,
initially present,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has
commenced (whether or not the defendant has
been informed by the court of the obligation to
remain during the trial) [.]
7. Rule 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by
death, the defendant's voluntary absence from
the trial after notice to defendant of the time
for trial shall not prevent the case from being
tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein
shall have the same effect as if defendant had
been present.. ..
Furthermore, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(b) states: "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's
absence."

4 16 Wanosik was given notice of the date
and time of his sentencing. : He had the right
to appear if he chose; he-had no right io
assume the matter could be1' taken care of
some other time, when he felt more in the
mood to attend. We see no error in the trial
court's failure to specifically'^warn Wanosik
that sentencing would proceed -in the event of
his voluntary absence from "the proceeding.
B. Balancing of Interests'

"

[8] H17 Relying on two in a line of cases,
from the Second Circuit, Wanosik' argues
that even if a defendant's absence is properly
deemed knowing and voluntary,1 a trial court
may not proceed unless "the public interest
in proceeding clearly butweijghs the interest
of the voluntarily absent defendant in attending." Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2nd
Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S1 ,884, 120 S.Ct
200, 145 L.Ed.2d 168 (199^, Set United
States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2oT'33, 37 (2nd
Cir.1989).
, \
.; '. ; ' ,
If .18 The Second Circuit .. acknowledges
"that while [it believes], prudential concerns
animate the need for a balancing of interests
before a district court exercises its discretion
to conduct a. trial in absentia, all that the
Constitution requires, is a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to, be present at
trial." Mann, 173 F.3d at 76 (emphasis added). Accord Clark v. Scott, 70 F.3d 386, 389-.
90 (5th Cirii995), cert, denied, 52$ U.S. 88V
120 S.Ct. 200; 145 L.Ed.2d 168 (1999); The\
Second Circuit has thus, but of "prudential
concerns," hedged their trial courts' discretion to proceed in a defendant's" absence hf
imposing a judicially created balancing test
not required by either thei federal rules or
the tlnited States Cbnstitutibn/'We decline
the invitation to 'adopt a similar balancing
test in Utah. When a defendant's' absence1
from a '(iriminal proceeding''is properly
8. The fact that a defendant was informed of the
time and place of the proceeding allows' a court
. to presume that a defendant's absence therefrom
is knowing, i.e., that the defendant,knows he. is
missing the proceeding. The fact mat an absent
defendant had notice of the proceeding does not,
however, allow a presumption that absence
therefrom is voluntary. See Houtz, 714 P.2d at
678. After all, such a defendant may be incarc e r a t e d on another charge or comatose in: a
hospital.

'' '-1

' "•'••'•

deemed knowing and voluntary, the trial
court may proceed without further inquiry or
analysis. Therefore* it was not error for the
trial/court in this case* to fail to balance thepublic interest in proceeding against Wanosik's; interest in being present.
C. Vbluhtanhess" Inquiry- v
[9-11] 1f 19, We; hayerconclub^d,!(;hat a
trial court is :not required, to warn a defendant that trial or sentencing^may^proceed in
the defendant's voluntary absence.*' We" have
also concluded that a trial court is not required to balance the .public lnferest in .resolving the matter against'the defendant's
interest in being present before proceeding
in a defendant's voluntary afeehcei Howeve r / a trial court may not 'assume a'defendant's knowing absence is voluntary; but
rather is required to determine -whether a:
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary.8
See State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678. (Utah
1986) (per curiam). , We therefore review
whether the trial court in this case properly1
concluded that Wanosik's absence at sentenc- ing was actually voluntary.
••'
•

'
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1120 The sum of the trial court's oral findings and; analysis'on':'the voluntariness of
Wanosik's absence' 'at Sentencing is the following: '*, "I can only assume' because he has
not been m touch with'[defense counsel] nor
has he been: in touch with my court ihathe'
has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from*'
these proceedings.'* We do 'not; question the'
underlying findings of the trial court, i.e.,
that Wanosik -hid 0 hot' been iti' touch with1'
counsel or the court.' These bindings, howev^
er, suggest nothing more than that no one
knew why Wanosik , was absent With f no
reliable' information on the voluntariness of
Wanosik's absence, the trial court merely^
assumed that Wanosik's absence was voluntary.10 • -; .,: ,,'.:.> •
»•• .-•
9. The trial court's written findings and conclusions do not substantively differ'from what the
court stated orally at.the hearing. ,
10. As'hereafter more' fully .explained, case law.
rejects the legitimacy of'such an assumption, but*
it is not intrinsically an unreasonable one. Statistically, the vast majority of court no-shows
spaced it out, could not muster the courage or
effort*to be present, or got sidetracked in some
Volitional way. Only a tiny minority find them-
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[12-15] 1121 "[V]oluntariness<may not be
presumed by the, trial court." Houtz, 714
P.2d at 678.: Rather, an inquiry into/the
defendant's, ability to appear at the proceeding is required. See id. We have not previously detailed the type of inquiry required to.
determine if a defendant's absence is voluntary. We have, however, outlined some general principles:
Voluntariness is determined by considering
the totality of the circumstances. The
state carries the burden of showing voluntariness. A defendant must have a compelling reason to stay away from the trial.
If his absence is deliberate without a sound
reason, the trial may start in his absence.
State..v. Wagstaff; 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah
Ct.App.1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This case presents an opportunity to elaborate on these, general principles.

termine whether the defendant is incarcerated, see Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678 ("When a
defendant is in custody, he is not free to
make a voluntary decision about whether or
not he will attend the court proceedings.");
(2) inquiry of-local hospitals as to whether
the defendant has been admitted to one of
them, cf. State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642.
(Utah-1982) (per curiam) ("Trial proceeded
for four days, when on the fifth day, defendant failed to appear. He was found in a
Salt Lake City hospital suffering from a
heart attack, diagnosed as minor. His doctor contacted the court and recommended a
one-month continuance."); (3) inquiry of the
defendant's employer, if the employer can be
readily determined, as to the employer's possible knowledge of the defendant's whereabouts; (4) a reasonably diligent attempt to
contact defendant at his residence or other
place counsel knows the defendant to frequent; (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or
[16,17] U 22 In such circumstances, the
other entity supervising defendant's presenState must make a preliminary showing,
tence release; and (6) inquiry of any bail
based on reasonable inquiry, f that defendant's
absence is voluntary. Except as ,'otherwise bond company or other person or entity
required by the attorney-client privilege, de- posting bond to secure defendant's appearfense counsel has an obligation to aid the ance. Once inquiry appropriate to the case
State by being forthcoming with any infor- has been made, and a compelling reason for
mation defense counsel may have that could the defendant's absence remains unknown,
be helpful in determining the defendant's voluntariness, while not guarantied, may
whereabouts or reasons, for jphe defendant's then be properly inferred.
absence. When neither court nor counsel
1124 Defense counsel, however, must then
have information as to why the defendant is have the opportunity to rebut the inference
not present, a continuance will ordinarily be of voluntariness. Defense counsel may by
required.to allow the prosecution and defense that time have gathered additional informacounsel an opportunity to inquire into the tion regarding the defendant's whereabouts
defendant's whereabouts and the reasons for and may, for example, be able to contend
his absence.
that although no local hospital shows the,.
defendant
as currently registered, his room[18,19] 1f 23 Ascertaining whether a defendant's absence is voluntary will often be mate says he took him to the emergency
difficult if the defendant is simply a no-show. room the previous evening, suggesting the
While we need not in this case definitively possible involuntariness of the defendant's
prescribe what the State must do to meet its absence at a proceeding early the next mornpreliminary burden, and while the showing it ing.
must make will vary with the facts and circumstances of particular cases, some avenues for establishing voluntariness are: (1)
inquiry of law enforcement agencies to de-

1125 In this case, the State made no preliminary showing of voluntariness whatever,
and the trial court erred by making "inadequate inquiry into [Wanosik's] ability to ap-

selves comatose or otherwise involuntarily incapacitated at the time of trial or sentencing. Even
those who are incarcerated, assuming it is in this
state, usually have the means to let their circum-

stances be known. Cf. In re A.E., 2001UT App
202, H 5, 29 P.3d 31 ("Father'... was not transported from the jail for the trial because he did
not inform jail officials of the trial dates.").

pear on [May 26, 2000] or his subsequent
availability before deciding that he had
waived his1 right to be present at [sentencing].". Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678,
. •
^ :
Harmless Error
- - ;; •/
0i- D,
[20,21] ; U 26 A trial court's error in fail-,
ing to conduct an adequate inquiry into
whether a defendant's absence Was voluntey^
does not merit reversal, however,'unless the :
defendant was prejudiced by the lack of adequate inquiry. See State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah 199.6) ("It stands to
reason that a. defendant cannot demand reper
tition of a trial or sentencing.in which>lie
suffered no unfairness."). When finally apprehended, Wanosik sent a letter.to the trial
court candidly acknowledging: "I do not
have a legitimate excuse" for not appearing
for sentencing. Based on Wanosik's. subsequent concession of actual voluntary absence
at sentencing, we conclude that. Wanosik suffered no. prejudice, by the ,trial court's failure
to make adequate mquiry into whether his
absence was voluntary. Accordingly, the
court's error in proceeding to impose sentence was, in this case, harmless. .... ,,

formation in mitigation of punishment, otto show ' any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting;
attorney shall also be given an opportunity
to present any .information material to the
.. imposition of sentence.
Utah 'R.Crim. P. 22(a^ Initially, we must
determine whether Wanosik waived ', nis.
rights under rule 22(a) by voluntarily absenting' himself from the sentencing proceeding.'
[23,24] H 29 A defendant's personal exercise of .the rights granted in rule 22(a) is
referred to as allocution."; See State v.
Anderson, 929 P,2d 1107,; 1110-1^; (Utah
1996); State 1 KelbacK & Utah 2d 231, 461
P.2d 297, 299 (1969), vacated and remanded,
408 U.S. ^35, 92 S.Ct. 2i858; 33 L.Ed.2d 551
(1972). "[Allocution] is: an inseparable part
of the right to be present, which [a] defendant waive[s] by his voluntary, absence."
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Wanosik, ;there^
fore, .by his voluntary absence, waived the
right' to personally make a statement at sehtencihg and to personaUy ^presentinformation in mitigation of punishmentorto_,$how
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. See id. /

II. Sentencing' Procedure
If 27 Wanosik. .argues that, even if .proceeding with sentencing in. his absence-was appropriate, "[t]he trial, court violated due process and. Utah RCrim. P. 22[ (a) J when it
sentenced [him] without considering relevant,
and reliable information and without affording defense counsel or the prosecutor the.
opportunity to J3peak at sentencing." n ../

[25-27] 1130 A defendant does not/ however, altogether waive- his t rule 22(a) rights
through voluntary absence at sentencing; he
waives.only the .right,to personally exercise
them. ".Sentencing is a .critical stage of a.
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is
entitled to. the effective assistance of coun?
se\;i State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007.
(Utah. 1982), and the right to effective assistance, of counsel cannot be waived through.
;
V::
f
-"'
/ ;A;' Rule 22(a)
' • ' • ' ; - ' j voluntary absence alone. See State v.. BakaUT 45, 1116, 979 P.2d 799 (holding
[22] 1128 We first address Wanosik's lov,im
claim that the trial court violated rule 22(a) that, in order to waive the right to Counsel
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.11 and "invoke the right of self-represejitation,
The .second paragraph of rule 22(a) states: a defendant must in a timely manner' "clear;
Before imposing sentence the court shall ly and Uriequiv6caHy" ''request,[self-representation]"
;
(citations
omitted))., ..Furtherr
afford the defendant an opportunity to
make a statement and to present any in- more), rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the
11. The State asserts that Wanosik must show
plain error with regard to his rule 22(a) claim on
appeal because he did not preserve the'claim
below. We observe ' 'that rule 22(e) [of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure] permits the court
of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence
even if the issue is raised for the first time on

appeal." State v. Brooks, 908' P.2d 856; 860
(Utah 1995). The Brooks holding obviates the
need for appellants to show plain error in asserting on appeal unpreserved claims that the sentence imposed by the trial court was illegal. See
id. at 858-60.
'
' "'.,.
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sentencing court to "give[ ] [the prosecuting
ig
attorney] an opportunity to present any iniformation material to the imposition of senitence." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). It would be
'e
patently unfair, in the case-of .an absent
it
defendant, to hear only from the prosecuting
g
attorney and not from defense counsel reJgarding sentencing considerations. Thus,' wee
hold that a sentencing court is required, to0
afford a voluntarily absent defendant the op-,
T.
portunity to exercise his rule 22(a) rightss
:
through counsel. .
' •''•.:• '
••'•.)

•>. ESTATE v. ' VANOSIK

the court will. passively wait for, counsel to
make a request to be heard. Furthermore*
the Utah Supreme Court has said that rule,
22(a) "directs trial courts to hear, evidence
from both the defendant and the prosecution
that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed." State v. Howell, 707 P£d;115, 118
(Utah 1985).12 This, directive is nowhere
made conditional on a preliminary request by
counsel to present the information. Even if
a defendant is voluntarily absent, the trial
court has the duty to set its aggravation
aside and impose a reasonable sentence, and
to that end the court is required to hear
evidence from both sides relevant to sentencing. The onus is thus on the trial court to
"afford" the defendant and to "give" the
prosecutor the opportunity to present relevant information.13 Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a).
The trial court in this case erred by not
affording defense counsel an opportunity to
present information in mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor an opportunity
to present information relevant to sentencing.

If 31 At sentencing in this case, the trialj
court did hear briefly from defense counselj
on the issue of Wanosik's absence concerningy
any "legal cause why sentence should nott
[have been] imposed" at that time, Utahi
R.Crim. P. 22(a); briefly addressed that is-sue as discussed above; and then proceededi
to impose sentence. However, before pro-ceeding with sentencing, the trial court heard3
from neither defense counsel nor the prose-cutor with regard to "information" in mitiga-tion of punishment" or "any [other] informa-,-.
tion material to the imposition, of sentence."
Id. The State argues that under rule 22(a)
the burden rests on counsel to request an1
[28] 1133 Noncompliance with rule 22(a)
opportunity to present information relevant
to sentencing. The State's argument is con-' in this case was not harmless, as the State
trary to the plain language of the rule and suggests. Had either defense counsel or the
prosecutor been given a chance to address
the construction given it in case law.,
AP & P's recommendation that Wanosik be
ff 32 The language of the rule is that "the: sentenced to 20 days in jail with credit for
court shall afford the defendant an : opportu- time served and that he then be committed
nity to make a statement and to present any• to a substance abuse treatment program, the
information in mitigation of punishment."• sentencing outcome for Wanosik may well
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). have been more favorable than the maximum
Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative obli- sentences imposed by the trial court. Thus,
gation on the trial court to extend the oppor- we vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand
tunity to be heard; it does not contemplate for resentencing.
)

12. Howell actually interpreted the predecessor of
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a), Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-22(a) (1982). See 707 P.2d
at 118. Current rule 22(a) differs from thensection 77-35-22(a) only in.that rule 22(a) omits
the words "in his own behalf' from section 7735-22(a)'s sentence: "Before imposing sentence
the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-22 (a) (1982)
(emphasis added). See also. Utah R.Crim. P.
22(a). If anything, deletion of the italicized
phrase emphasizes that while defendant is entitled to make a statement, he need not personally
make it.
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13.
We [here] note that it is not just the defen-;
. dant, but the State as we'll, that has an interest
" in the sentence being based on accurate information. Decisions as to the type of rehabilita. tion program, if any, to which a defendant is
assigned and the duration of incarceration
both influence the allocation of scarce personnel and monetary resources. Such decisions
should be based upon the most reliable data
•:. possible as to each defendant so that this State
may deal with its criminal justice program as
efficiently as possible.
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah
1982).
'
...rv,

B.

Due Process Requirements
at Sentencing >\

formation considered by the trial court in
deciding,what sentences to impose.

^1f36 Wanosik's- Due Process rights were
[29-32] 1134 Due Process considerations'
?
underscore the propriety of our remand for compromised by the trial *court s failure to
resentencing. "The due process clause of base its sentencing decision on relevant and
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, reliable information - regarding the crime,
requires that a sentencing judge act on rea- Wanosik's background, and the interests of
sonably reliable and relevant information iir society. For the same reasons noted in the
exercising discretion in fixing a' sentence." preceding section, the trial court's'failure to
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah' base its sentencing decision on relevant and
1985). "A sentence in a criminal'case should,, reliable information was not harmjess. ; ,
be appropriate for the' defendant in light of
his background and the crime committed and
CONCLUSION
also serve the interests of society which -un,H 37 A defendant informed of the time and
derlie the criminal'justice system." State v.
McClendon, 611 P i d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). place for'sentencing need not be further
"[T]he sentencing judge[ ][has] discretion in informed that sentencing may proceed in the
determining what punishment fits both'the defendant's voluntary absence. t Furthercrime and the offender," but we have consis- more, a sentencing court need not balance
tently sought "to shore up the soundness and society's interest in proceeding against a volreliability of the factual basis upon which the untarily absent defendant with. the. defenjudge must rely in the exercise of that sen- dant's interest in being present before protencing discretion/' State v.. Lipsky, 608' ceeding with sentencing in-absentia. In.this
P.2d 1241,1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring disclo- case, the trial court's only ercor in regard to
sure of presentence report to defendant prior proceeding in absentia was,;.its inadequate
to sentencing). Although rule 22(a) imple- inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Wanments sound procedures ainied at insuring osik's absence. ; The > error, was, ; however,
that the trial court bases its sentencing deci J harmless given Wanosik's later concession
sion on such, information, a- criminal defen- that his absence, was indeed voluntary..
dant's right to be sentenced based-on releIf 38 Nonetheless, the trial court erred in
vant and reliable information regarding his not complying with Utah Rule of Criminal
crime, his background, and the interests of Procedure 22(a) by failing to aiford defensociety stands independent of -Utah .Rule of dant, through his counsel, an opportunity to
Criminal Procedure 22(a). .-__./ ,.:;i.:.
present information in. mitigation of punishment and by failing to also give the prosecu1135 The; record in this case fails to distor an opportunity to- present"' information
:
close any relevant i or reliable information,
relevant to sentencing. This course was also
other than the fact that defendant was ab*
at odds with Wanosik's. Due^ Process rights,
sent from the proceeding, relied on by the
as, the court failed to. base, its ~.(sentencing
trial court in imposing maximum—albeit condecision on relevant and reliablei .information.
current—sentences for both crimes. '•V6iuntary absence from sentencing may properly '• f 39 We vacate. Wanosik's sentences and
;
i.
serve as one factor m determining an appro* remand for resentencing;
priate sentence, as it is aniindirect—but tellri
:
ing—indication of the defendant's suitability /MT 40 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H.
for probation or susceptibility !to rehabilita- JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge,
tive efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to' WILLIAM A; THORNE, Jr., Judge/ rely upon that fact alone in deciding what
sentence to impose, nor may such absence be
punished by imposing a sentence more severe than is otherwise warranted., Fromn all
that appears in the record, however,: Wanosik's absence at sentencing was; the .only 'inr
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5.2 acres in lieu thereof. The evidence is in
dispute as to why plaintiffs did not deliver
a deed to the designated 4.24 acres, although it is undisputed that defendant did
not pay the sum due nor tender his performance. Thereafter, plaintiffs served notice of default, and ultimately initiated this
lawsuit. From a judgment in favor of
plaintiffs' terminating the contract, defendant appeals.
[1] Defendant's first contention on appeal is that his duty to pay and plaintiffs'
duty to convey were concurrent acts and
that neither could put the other in default
without a tender of performance. Defendant further contends that he was excused
from tendering his own performance because plaintiffs' alleged refusal to convey
the designated acreage constituted a repudiation or anticipatory breach of the contract.
Defendant cites and relies upon the case
of Johnson v. Jones1 as supportive of his
position. However, his reliance is misplaced. That case restates the familiar rule
of law that:
There is implied in an agreement for the
sale of real estate, unless a contrary intention is expressed, that the vendor shall
retain title until the balance of the purchase price is paid. . Where there is an
agreement on the part of one to convey
and on the part of another to pay a
definite sum, payment and conveyance
are concurrent acts, unless a contrary intention appears. [Emphasis added.]
In the instant case, a contrary intention
does appear in the clear, unambiguous
terms of the contract of the parties by
which they are bound. Plaintiffs' performance of conveyance is conditioned upon and
not concurrent with defendant's performance of payment. This is to be seen in the
language of the initial contract which provides in paragraph 19 thereof that:
The Seller on receiving the payments
herein reserved to be paid . . . agrees to
1. 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893 (1946).
2. Utah, 645 P.2d 52 (1982).

execute and deliver to the Buyer . . . title
to the above described premises . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
Like language is found in the addendum
agreement, wherein it provides:
[U]pon receipt of said payment, Sellers
will release to Buyer 4.24 acres of land
The rule of law recited in Johnson v.
Jones, supra, causes no hardship on a buyer.
If there is a basis for apprehension that the
seller will not, or cannot perform, the buyer
need only tender payment and demand the
seller's performance.
[2] In the instant case, defendant concedes that he made no tender of payment,
his remaining contention on appeal being
that he was excused therefrom.
This is not a case like Century 21 All
Western Real Estate v. Webb,2 Where the
facts were undisputed that the seller refused to convey property free and clear of
encumbrances and the buyer refused to pay
unless the seller removed the encumbrances. Under those circumstances, we
concluded that neither party could default
the other without first making a tender of
his own agreed performance.
In this case, there is a dispute in the
evidence. Therefore, it lies within the prerogative of the trial court to determine
where the truth lies, and the rules of appellate review preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for that of the trial
court in resolving issues of fact.3
There is substantial evidence in the record which supports' the conclusion of the
trial court that plaintiffs did not refuse to
convey, but simply declined to do so unless
and until payment was received. /Not having made or tendered payment, defendant's
contention of error is without merit.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
3. Reimschiissel
(1982).

v. Russell, Utah, 649 P.2d 26

Y. ^AOAivJCi^
Cite as, Utah, 656 P.2d 1005
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OAKS, Justice (dissenting):
a contract must make a tender of his own
agreed performance in order to put the
The buyer had paid $120,395 of the $245,other party in default Huck v. Hayes,
000 principal due on the purchase of the 20
[Utah, 560 P.2d 1124 (1977)]; 15 Williacres. An additional payment of $50,895
ston on Contracts § 1809 (3d ed. W. Jaewas due on February 2, 1980. Under the
ger 1972). [Emphasis supplied.]
amended agreement, the buyer was entitled
to designate 4.24 acres of the subject prop- Id. at 56.
erty for conveyance to him upon making
Under the quoted rule, the district court's
this payment. He made a timely designa- finding that this buyer made no payment or
tion and offered to make the Feb. 2, 1980 tender of payment would prevent the buyer
payment (though not formally tendering from suing for specific performance of the
the money), but the seller disputed the acre- seller's promise to make the partial conveyage chosen and offered an alternative 5.2 ance. But the buyer's nonperformance does
acres instead. Six weeks after the due not entitle the seller to a decree forfeiting
date, the seller served a notice of default, the buyer's interest unless the seller has
and one week later the seller brought this
tendered performance of his own concursuit and obtained a decree forfeiting the
rent obligation—to convey the acreage desbuyer's interest. The majority affirms that
ignated by the buyer. Since the seller
decree on the basis that the seller's agreemade
no such allegation and the court made
ment to convey the 4.24 acres was "conditioned upon and not concurrent with" the no such finding, the decree of forfeiture
buyer's payment, and the buyer made no was inappropriate. I would reverse.
payment or tender of payment.
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opinThe buyer's payment and the seller's par- ion of OAKS, J.
tial conveyance were concurrent conditions.
Simultaneous obligations, each dependent
upon the other, are commonplace in real
estate contracts. Such obligations should
be interpreted as concurrent conditions unless the contract clearly directs otherwise.
The language in this contract ("upon receipt of said payment, Sellers will release to
Buyer 4.24 acres of land") does not make
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
these obligations other than concurrent conRespondent,
ditions.
v. :
As we said in Century 21 All Western
Steven Michael CASAREZ, Defendant
Real Estate' v. Webb, Utah, 645 P.2d 52
and Appellant.
(1982); a contract that contemplates simultaneous performance by both parties—i.e.,
No. 16997.
concurrent conditions—can. pose "precisely
Supreme Court of Utah;
the sort of deadlock meant.to be resolved
by the requirement of tender." Id. at 55.
Dec. 9, 1982.
In that circumstance, we held,
[N]either party can be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment
Defendant was convicted in the Disfor damages or a decree for specific per- trict Court, Salt Lake County, Ernest F.
formance) until the other party has ten- Baldwin, Jr., J., of aggravated sexual as. dered his own performance. 6 Corbin on sault, and he appealed. The Supreme
Contracts § 1258 (1962). > In.other words, Court, Stewart, J., held that full disclosure
the party who desires to use legal process of presentence report should be made ex. to exercise his legal remedies under such cept that identify indicia of person who
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would be sentenced may be ev.-ln^d from
report.
Affirmed, vacated and rei •
,

rl.

Hall, C.J., concurred in re,

1. Criminal Law <§=>988
Sentencing is critical stage of criminal
proceeding at which defendant is entitled to
effective assistance of counsel U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
2. Criminal Law «»986.1
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at
sentencing phase of trial as at guilt phase.
3. Criminal Law «==>986.5
If defendant cannot inspect contents of
presentence report, his constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel at time of
sentencing is seriously impaired if judge
may rely on information which may be inaccurate and is unknown to defendant, U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
4. Constitutional Law ^=>48(1)
Statutes to 181(1)
It is policy of court to construe statutes
when possible to effectuate legislative in'tent and to avoid potential constitutional
conflicts.
5. Criminal Law <e=978
Statute providing that court may disclose all parts of presentence report to defendant or his counsel as interest of justice
requires was not intended to make disclosure of presentence report depend on personal whim or subjective standard of individual judge; rather, Legislature expressly
provided that exercise of discretion should
be guided as "the interest of justice requires" and, thus, statute was constitutional. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-1(2).
6. Criminal Law «=> 986.5
Only when disclosure of presentence
report will jeopardize life or safety of third
parties should there be deletions from report to protect them and, in such cases,
disclosure to defendant of as much of report
as possible should be made. U.C.A.1953,
77-18-1(2).

7. Criminal Law «=> 339.5, 1169.5(2)
In prosecution for aggravated sexual
assault, inasmuch as whether .defendant
took bus home or drove home was not material to central issue of whether he was
guilty, it was error to admit evidence comparing his footprints in area where rape
occurred with footprints around a stolen
vehicle later found near defendant's residence; however, court's striking of that
part of testimony relating to stolen car and
its subsequent admonishment and instruction to jury to disregard stricken evidence
was sufficient remedy under circumstances.
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-30.
Ginger L. Fletcher, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Joseph P. McCarthy,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Defendant was convicted of two counts
of aggravated sexual assault, one for rape
and one for sodomy, in violation of U.C.A.,
1953, § 76-5-405. He contends that the
trial court erred in 1) denying him access to
his presentence report prior to sentencing;
2) admitting evidence of another crime;
and 3) denying him his statutory right of
allocation at the time of sentencing.
As is to be expected, the testimony of the
prosecutrix and the defendant are in conflict. We, of course, accept that version of
the facts which supports the jury's verdict.
E.g., State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91
(1982).
The prosecutrix testified that at approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 21, 1979, she
parked her car on First South and State
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and proceeded to her place of employment. She was
confronted on the street by the defendant
who told her that he was a prison escapee
and needed her car and warned her that if
she did not comply with his wishes he would
kill her. At defendant's instruction the
prosecutrix walked back to her car. The
defendant pushed her into the car, drove a

few blocks, and stopped the car. After two
acts of sexual assault, rape, and forcible
sodomy, the prosecutrix bit the defendant,
who then struck her in the face. During
the ensuing commotion the prosecutrix escaped from the car. The driver of a passing
car took her to the rape crisis center at
Holy Cross Hospital. An emergency room
physician examined the victim that evening
and the defendant the following morning.
At trial the physician testified that the
bruises on the prosecutrix and the defendant were consistent with the prosecutrix's
testimony. Other facts in support of the
State's case need not be recounted.
The defendant testified that he had
stopped to ask the prosecutrix for the time.
He then asked her if she would like to go
out and have a good time, and she accepted
the invitation. He drove her a couple of
blocks and stopped. According to defendant, the prosecutrix then engaged in sex
acts with him voluntarily, upon the conclusion of which she unexpectedly bit him, and
after being struck by defendant, she fled
the car in fear. Defendant stated that he
then also left the car and took a bus home.
On appeal the defendant contends that
the imposition of the sentence was improper
because the trial court did not, prior to
sentencing, give him access to the presentence report as required by State v. Lipsky,
Utah, 608 P.2d 1241 (1980). The State
counters with the argument that an amendment to U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(2), enacted
subsequent to the decision in Lipsky, modified the rule in that case and justified the
trial court's discretionary refusal to give
the defendant the presentence report.
That amendment reads:
Prior to imposition of any sentence for
an offense for which. probation may be
granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date
for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of
obtaining a presentence report on the defendant. . . . The contents of the report
shall be confidential. The court may disclose all or parts of the report to the
defendant or his counsel as the interest of
justice requires. [Emphasis added.]
656P.2d—23

On the basis of that provision, the State
argues that the trial judge acted within the
proper bounds of discretion in not disclosing
the report.
[1-3] Sentencing is a critical stage of a
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Kg., Mempav. May, 389 U.S. 128, 88
S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18
L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948).
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at the
sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt
phase. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16,
99 S.Ct. 235, 236, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978).
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct.
1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), held that it is a
denial of due process in a capital case to
sentence a defendant on the basis of confidential information not disclosed to a defendant or his counsel. In Lipsky, a noncapital case, this Court held on a due process analysis that "fundamental fairness" requires that a defendant have the right to
inspect a presentence report prior,to sentencing so that a sentence will not be influenced by inaccurate information. 608 P.2d
at 1248. Furthermore, if the defendant
cannot inspect the contents of the presentence report, his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel at the time
of sentencing is seriously impaired if a
judge may rely on information which may
be inaccurate and is unknown to the defendant.
A number of other courts have held that
fundamental fairness requires disclosure of
the presentence report. See, e.g., Buchea v,
Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 497 P.2d 1169 (1972);
State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895
(1969); Jones v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 477
P.2d 85 (1970). This rule is implicit in several more recent cases. For example, in
State v. Lockwood, La., 399 So.2d 190
(1981), the court approved disclosure and
held that a defendant, who alleged that
false and prejudicial statements were contained in his presentence report, was entitled to an opportunity to refute or explain
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even though the trial court contended that
its decision was unaffected by the report.
In State v. Phelps, N.D., 297 N.W.2d 769
(1980), the court held that the trial court
acted unreasonably and abused its discretion in allowing defendant's counsel insufficient time to read and investigate a presentence report which contained a complicated
medical history. And in Ho well v. State,
Del, 421 A.2d 892 (1980), the court, construing a statute which provided that the trial
court "may, in its discretion, permit the
inspection of the [presentence] report, or
parts thereof by the offender or his attorney," id. at 900, stated in dictum that "[failure to disclose the investigative portion of
a presentence report to counsel for a criminal defendant may 4in practical effect' be
equivalent to denial of access to counsel."
Id. at 900 (quoting in part from United
States v. Verdugo, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1968), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct.
1623, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971).

We also note that it is not just the defendant, but the State as well, that has an
interest in the sentence being based on accurate information. Decisions as to the
type of rehabilitation program, if any, to
which a defendant is assigned and the duration of incarceration both influence the allocation of scarce personnel and monetary
resources. Such decisions should be based
upon the most reliable data possible as to
each defendant so that this State may deal
with its criminal justice program as efficiently as possible.

[4-6] It does not follow, however, that
§ 77-18-1(2) is unconstitutional. It is the
policy of the Court to construe statutes
when possible to effectuate the legislative
intent and to avoid potential constitutional
conflicts. E.g., State v. Wood, Utah, 648
P.2d 71, 82 (1982); In re Boyer, Utah, 636
P.2d 1085, 1088 (1982). In accord with this
approach, we find no difficulty in reconcilExcept for the very rare possibility when ing the defendant's right to disclosure with
disclosure might lead to harm of a third the language of § 77-18-1(2). That proviperson, there is no substantial reason for sion was not intended to make disclosure of
sentencing criminal defendants on the basis a presentence report depend on a personal
of confidential information gleaned from a whim or a subjective standard of an individvariety of more-or-less reliable sources ual judge. The interests at stake are far
without affording those defendants some too important for that. Rather, the Legisopportunity to point out mistakes in that lature expressly provided that the exercise
information. It is essential to both the of discretion should be guided as "the interform and substance of a fair proceeding est of justice requires." Under that stanthat the defendant have the right to point dard, it is the exceptional case where full
out errors, misinterpretations, or even to disclosure is not justified. Only when disdemonstrate that he is not in fact the per- closure of the presentence report would
son who is the subject of the report. Such jeopardize the life or safety of third parties,
errors are not unknown. Particularly when should there be deletions from the report to
the criminal justice system is being pressed protect them. In such cases, disclosure to a
to deal with ever more criminal defendants defendant of as much of the report as possion an impersonal basis not unlike an assem- ble should be made. Identifying indicia of
bly line, the possibility of error becomes a person who would be threatened should
even greater. If a defendant were not be excluded from the report, sealed, and
allowed to correct an error at the time of included in the record on appeal. In all
sentencing, the error is likely to go unde- other cases, full disclosure of the report
tected for as long as the defendant remains should be made.
subject to the criminal justice system since
Finally, it is of no moment that the trial
the presentence report remains in the file
on the defendant and is used by the Board court may disregard the presentence report
of Pardons and other authorities in making altogether in imposing a sentence. A dedecisions as to the length and terms of his fendant still has a right to disclosure of the
incarceration, rehabilitation, and parole.
report because of the subsequent uses made
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of it. State v. Lockwood, La. 399 So.2d 190 circumstances. On no reasonable view of
(1981).
the evidence did the objectionable evidence
[7] Defendant also alleges error in the taint the fairness of the trial.
admission of evidence comparing his footDefendant also complains that he was not
prints in the area where the rape occurred afforded his statutory right of allocution
with footprints around a stolen vehicle later before sentence was imposed. See U.C.A.,
found near defendant's residence. Defend- 1953, § 77-35~22(a). We have reviewed
ant argues that the evidence was improper- the record and conclude the allegation is
ly offered to link him with a separate, unre- without merit.
lated crime. The State contends that the
The conviction is affirmed, but the senevidence was admissible to contradict de- tence is vacated. The case is remanded for
fendant's testimony that he took a bus the defendant to review and verify the conhome from the scene of the crime, and tents of the presentence report, unless the
thereby attack the defendant's credibility. narrow exception above defined applies,
Whether the defendant took the bus and for the trial judge to resentence the
home or drove home was not material to defendant on a nunc pro tunc basis.
the central issue of whether he was guilty
Affirmed.
of aggravated sexual assault. There was
no need to prove how the defendant reOAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., conturned home. The testimony was neither
cur.
background evidence useful to establish the
circumstances surrounding the commission
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result.
of the crime nor did it shed any light on
defendant's conduct which might tend to
show a consciousness of guilt. The only
possible materiality of the evidence was
with respect to defendant's credibility. The
inference that he drove a stolen car home is
indeed inconsistent with his testimony of
taking the bus home. However, not every
inconsistency is admissible on the theory CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
that it bears on credibility. The law is that
Plaintiff and Respondent,
a witness may not be impeached on matters
v.
collateral to the principal issues being tried.
E.g., State v. Oswalt, 62 Wash.2d 118, 381 Wendell Alan JENSEN and Ann Jensen,
P.2d 617 (1963); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence
Defendants and Appellants.
in Trials at-Common Law §§ 1000-1003
No. 17754.
(Chadboum rev. 1970). The manner in
which defendant returned home following
Supreme Court of Utah.
the crime is a collateral issue; therefore,
Dec. 10, 1982.
impeachment evidence on that issue was
inadmissible.
However, the admission of the evidence
was harmless. See U.C.A., 1953, § 77-3530. Even assuming the evidence was offered to link defendant with an uncharged
crime, the court's striking of that part of
the testimony relating to a stolen car and
its subsequent admonishment and instruction to the jury to disregard the stricken
evidence was a sufficient remedy under the

Bank brought action seeking money
judgment against defendants for unpaid
balance on defendants' credit card account.
The Fourth District Court, Utah County,
George E. Ballif, J., entered default judgment against defendants and denied defendants' motion to set aside the default,
and defendants appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) summons
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Respondent-Appel let
No. 87-6651.
Un
Argue

3. Criminal Law ®=»641.3(4)
Defendant who requested attorney at
time of motion for new trial was entitled to
have one appointed, though he had waived
his right to counsel and represented himself at trial, absent showing that request
was made for bad-faith purpose. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
nd Submitted Oct, 31, 1988.
ecided Aug. 2, 1989.

James W. Menefield, Techachapi, CaL, in
pro per,
Donald F. Roet
Los Angeles, Cal

, Deputy Atty. Gen.,
respondent-appellee.

Defendant convicted of burglary petiAppeal from tht* United States District
tioned for writ of habeas corpus. The
"jurt for the Centra District of California.
United States District Court for the Central
District of California, Alice Marie H. Stot= -z--re SCHROEDER, REINHARDT
ler, J., denied relief, and appeal was taken.
ar^ ISAVY, Circuit Judges.
The Court of Appeals, Bernhardt, Circuit.
Judge, held that defendant who requested
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
attorney at time of motion for new trial
was entitled to have one appointed, though
I.
he had waived his right to counsel and
represented himself at trial, absent showAppellant James Menefield, presently
ing that request was made for bad-faith serving a twenty-nine year, 10 month senpurpose.
tence in.California state prison, appeals the
denial of his petition for habeas corpus.
Reversed and remanded.
Menefield argues that the state trial court
violated the Sixth Amendment when it refused his request for assistance of counsel
1. Criminal Law €=641.3(2)
in
the preparation of a motion for a new
Criminal defendant's
constitutional
trial.
right to counsel in critical stage of prosecution cannot : be denied absent compelling
In 1984, Menefield was arrested and
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. brought to trial for burglary, attempted
murder, assault with a deadly weapon,
2. Criminal Law <s=>641.3(4)
mayhem, and armed robbery. At pretrial
Under California law, motion for new proceedings, he was successively representtrial is critical stage of prosecution, for ed by two attorneys, and dismissed each in
purposes of determining . whether Sixth
turn. After failing to achieve a working
Amendment protections attach. U.S.C.A.
relationship with appointed counsel, MeneConst.Amend. 6; West's Ann.Cal.Penal
field asserted his right to self-representaCode § 1181.
tion.1 Appellant represented himself dur1. Although the record before us does not include the court's inquiry into the voluntariness
of appellant's waiver of the right to counsel, it
does include the trial court's recollection of earlier hearings.
THE COURT: Mr. Menefield, I suspect Judge
Miller talked about the issue of you representing yourself. You have probably been over that
a lot.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, he did.

THE COURT: You're convinced you want to do
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.
THE COURT: I am not going to hassle you
about it. I asked Judge Miller the simple question, is this guy some nut that's trying to turn a
courtroom into a circus or is it a guy that wants
to defend himself? And he said you are legitimately interested in doing your best to try the
case. And, you know, that's cool.

the protection of the Constitution in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In Faretta,
the Supreme Court, while noting the tension between a right of self-representation
and the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, concluded that the
principles of free choice and human dignity
woven through the Bill of Rights dictate
deference to a defendant's decisions to proceed without a lawyer. "It is the defendant . . . who must be free personally to
decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he
may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual
which is the lifeblood of the lawl' " Id. at
834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 9G: S.Ct. 1057,
1064, 25 L.Ed^d 353J1970) (Brennan, J ,
concurring)).
Faretta struck the fundamental constitutional balance between the right to counsel
and the right to self-representation; however, certain problems were clearly anticipated from the first formulation of the
doctrine. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the three dissenters, pointed out that Faretta left unresolved a series of important'
issues and questioned the federal court's
ability to reconcile the procedural dilemmas
raised by the self-representation rule,
"How soon in the criminal proceeding must
a defendant decide between proceeding by
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to
switch in midtriaU"Faretta,l422
U.S. at
852, 95 S.Ct. at 2549 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).2 The dissenters anticipated that "these questions . . . [would]
. . . be answered with finality in due
course," i d , and the issue of waiver "and
II.
reassertibn of the right to counsel has been
frequently addressed in state or federal
A.
The right of self-representation, long rec- court. Although we have previously considered the interaction of the right to counognized in statute, first explicitly fell under

ing extensive pretrial proceedings and then
during a protracted trial. After his conviction on all counts, Menefield asked the
court to appoint counsel to assist him in the
preparation of a motion for a new trial. .
His request concentrated upon the intricacies of the California statute governing
new trials. "I've studied it, but I just can't
grasp it. I see what they're saying, but I '
just can't get deep off into it, Tike the other
studies I did." The trial court denied the
motion, citing two factors. First, the judge
feared that the proceedings would be delayed while counsel familiarized himself
with the transcript and the issues in the
case. Second, although California grants a
statutory right to petition the trial court
for a new trial, the court concluded that the
statute confers no substantive rights that
could not later be raised on appeal.
"To tell the truth, if I appointed counsel at this point, we would have to get
the entire transcript done, he would have
to read every word of it to make the
motion. Since its denial is going to result in the appeal, it seems to me the
most appropriate thing is to wait for that
time, or to say it differently, even though
you waived your rights to counsel under
the Faretta case that you are very familiar with, if I could see any significant
impact that appointing counsel at this
stage, and we are only talking about new
trial motion for a practical matter, I
would, go ahead and do it, but I can't, so
I am going to deny that."
Appellant's subsequent pro se motion for a
new trial was denied. • After exhausting his
state remedies, appellant sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. The district court, adopting the magistrate's findings of law and fact, dismissed the petition.
Menefield appealed, and we reverse. :;•. •

On appeal, Menefield does not contest whether
the trial court's inquiry satisfied the knowing
and intelligent waiver standard articulated in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We there-

fore do not consider the constitutionality of the
state waiver inquiry.
2. The question in this case, of course, does not
involve a midtrial switch but, instead, a change
of course in a post-trial proceeding. :

w

sel and the right to self-representation in
the context of pretrial and trial proceedings, we now face a question of first impression in our circuit: is a criminal defendant entitled to the assistance of an attorney at a post-trial hearing when prior to
trial he waived the right to counsel and
chose to represent himself?
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he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53
S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Because
of the centrality of the right to counsel, we
will not deny a defendant that right during
a critical stage of the prosecution unless
compelling circumstances require us to do
so.

B.
[1] Faretta notwithstanding, we have
long recognized that the right to counsel is
C.
among the most fundamental rights of our
criminal justice system. "Of all the rights
Before discussing the interaction bethat an accused person has, the right to be tween the Faretta right and the right to
represented by counsel is by far the most counsel, we must first answer the question
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert whether a defendant possesses the latter
any other right he may have." Penson v. right at the time of the motion for a new
Ohio, 488 U.S. — ,
, 109 S.Ct. 346, trial. The right to effective assistance of
352, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (quoting Schae- counsel only attaches to certain parts of
fer, Federalism and State Criminal Pro- the criminal prosecution. The right to
cedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). Our counsel was originally a trial right, but the
adversary system is premised on the theory Sixth Amendment provision of effective asthat the clash of trained counsel will best sistance of counsel has been extended to
serve the court's truth-seeking function. various "critical" stages of the prosecution.
Without the "guiding hand of counsel," the See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
defendant may be unable to muster an 471, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1877, 68 L.Ed.2d 359
adequate defense. See Argersinger v.. (1981) (psychiatric interview); Mempa v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 92 S.Ct. 2006,. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19
2009, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) (sentencing); United
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct.., States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926,
792, 796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Absence 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (pre-trial line-up);
of counsel may frustrate the truth-seeking, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct.
and fairness goals of the system. Justice 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) (preliminary
Sutherland's observations, clear and accu- hearings). See also Douglas v. Califorrate in 1932, are no less valid today.
nia, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d
Even the intelligent and educated layman 811 (1963) (appeals). But cf. United States
has small and sometimes no skill in the v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37
science of law. If charged with crime, L.Ed.2d 619 (1973) (photographic arrays).
he is incapable, generally, of determining Critical stages of the prosecution include
for himself whether the indictment is all parts of the prosecution implicating subgood or bad. He is unfamiliar with the stantial rights of the accused. Mempa, 389
rules of evidence. Left without the aid. U.S. at 134, 88 S.Ct. at 256.
of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge and convicted upon in[2] Since this circuit has never settled
competent evidence, or evidence irrele- the question of whether a motion for a new
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissi- trial is a critical stage of the prosecution,
ble. He lacks both the skill and knowl- we must consider the factors enumerated
edge adequately to prepare his defense, by the Supreme Court. First, if failure to
even though he have a perfect one. He
pursue strategies or remedies results in a
requires the guiding hand of counsel at
loss of significant rights, then Sixth
every step in the proceedings against
Amendment protections attach. Id. 389
him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 257. Second, where

skilled counsel would be useful in helping
the accused understand the legal confrontation, we find that a critical stage exists.
Third, the right to counsel applies if the'
proceeding tests the merits of the accused's case. Ash, 413 U.S. at 311, 93 S.Ctat 2574.
• -;
Under Asfi, although the state trial court
expressed doubt as to the significance of
the motion, we think there can be little
question that the motion for a new trial
under California law is a critical stage of
the prosecution. California penal code section 1181 provides nine distinct grounds for
a new trial. The statutory provisions are
the exclusive grounds for the trial judge to
overturn the conviction of the accused.
See People v. Diltard, 168 Cal.App.2d 158,
335 P.2d 702, 707 (1959).
Although section 1181 lists several independent grounds for reversing the jury, the
most important, and most .frequently invoked, provision is section six, providing
for a new trial if the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.3 Unlike an
appellate court, the trial judge hearing a
motion for a new trial reviews the evidence
de novo and examines the record independently. The trial court "is under the duty:
to give the defendant the benefit; of its,,
independent conclusion as the sufficiency
of credible evidence to support the verdict."
People v. Veitch, 128 Cal.App.3d 460^ 467,
180. Cal.Rptr. 412 (Div. Two .1982).,' The
trial judge sits as the "13th juror" in evalu-.
ating the weight of the evidence against
the defendant. As a practical matter, the
motion for a new trial is the defendant's
last opportunity for an unconstrained re-.
,

view on the merits of the evidence against
him. On appeal, both jury conclusions and
the factual decisions of the trial court are
either immune from review or treated under a highly deferential standard. See,
e.g:t People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal.3d 156,127
Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d843, cert, denied,
429 U.S. 847, 97 S.Ct 13%"50 L.Ed.2d 119
(1976); People v. Love, 51 Cal.2d 751, 336
P.2d 169 (1959). See'generally Witkin,
California Criminal Procedure §§581*
582 (1985). Consequently; the defendant's
failure to take full legal advantage of the
statutory right substantially diminishes1 his '
ability to challenge the "sufficiency of the
evidence.
':ui
Not only are substantive rights involved
but counsel can,enable the defendant to
protect these rights. An effective motion
for a new trial ordinarily requires a lawyer's understanding of legal rules and his
experience in presenting claims before a,
court. The presence of trained counsel at
this stage insures that the most favorable
arguments will be; presented and ''that the
accused's interests \ will be protected con^
sistently with our theory of criminal prose?
cution." Wade, 388U.S. at 227, 87vS.Ct. a t
1932. Consequently, we hold that the right :
to counsel attaches ta the motion for a new
trial, stage.4
III.
Since we conclude that there ;is a constitutional right to counsel at the time "of a
new trial hearing, we; mustnow determine'
whether the trial court erred in '' denying
appellant's posttrial request for appoint-'

3. "When a verdict has been rendered or. a find^ 4. The Supreme Court";has expressed a limited
concern with the effect on the efficient adminising made against the defendant, the ; court may,
tration and investigation of justice of expanding
upon his application, grant a new, trial, in the
the right to counsel. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 314,
following cases only:
• ...
93 S.Ct. at 2576. There are, indeed, potential
costs to providing counsel at the postconviction
6. When the verdict or finding is contrary to
stage. However^ as a general matter,* the molaw or evidence, but if the. evidence shows the
tion for a new trial is simply one part of the
defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the
basic trial court litigation, and the trial; attorney
crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a
can handle the motion. In the unusual case, the
lesser degree thereof, or a lesser crime included
proceedings might be delayed for preparation of
a transcript or to allow counsel tb familiarize
therein, the court may modify the verdict, findhimself with the case. Nevertheless, we think
ing or judgment accordingly/Without granting
that this occasional delay does not rise to the
or ordering a new trial, and this power shall
level of the heavy burden on police investigation
extend to any court to which the cause may.be
discussed in Ash which would justify the denial
appealed;
of counsel.
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*' ment of counsel, and; for a continuance
:e dividual nor our system of adversarial juswhich would have enabled appointed counn- tice well. Therefore, although we recogrj
sel to prepare an adequate motion. Bee- nize .that the right to counsel—oncecause the right to counsel is so central to
;o waived—is no longer absolute, we startf
our concepts of fair adjudication, we are
•e with the strong presumption that a defen-,
reluctant to deny the practical fulfillment
it dant's post-trial request for the assistance \
of the right—even, once waived—absent a ;, of an attorney should not be refused. See-,
compelling reason that will survive constii-. United States v. Holman, 586 F.2d 322 "
tutional scrutiny.
(4th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (pro se plaintiff
j . at trial retained constitutional right to "
We are certainly unwilling to deny councounsel at sentencing).6
sel because of some conception that thee
defendant's initial decision to exercise hiss
There are times when the criminal justice
Faretta right and represent himself at trial.1 system would be poorly served by allowing is a choice cast in stone. It is not surpris-i- the defendant to reverse his course at the
ing that a criminal defendant, having decid-I- last minute and insist upon representation ,
ed to represent himself and then havingr by counsel. See United States v. Studley,
suffered a defeat at trial, would realize3 783 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1986); United.'
that he would be better served during the* States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th '
remainder of the case by the assistance off Cir. 1979). When, for example, for purcounsel. A criminal defendant may initial- poses of delay, criminal defendants have
ly assert his right to self-representation for: sought continuances on the eve of trial, we
reasons that later prove unsound. 5 The3 have refused to disrupt the proceedings to
accused may doubt the willingness of ani accomodate their wishes. In determining
appointed attorney to represent his inter- whether the trial court abused its disereests. More often, the accused may have ai tion in refusing to grant a continuance,
baseless faith in his ability to mount ani courts of appeals have considered whether
effective defense. The lure of self-repre- the continuance would adversely affect wit-'
sentation may, however, exact a significant: nesses, counsel, the court, and the govern-;
price; lost at trial, the defendant may miss5 ment; whether there have been other conimportant opportunities and even create; tinuances; whether legitimate reasons exgaping holes in his own case. The accused[ ist for the delay; whether the delay is the
has little recourse against the failingsi.-i defendant's fault; and whether a denial
Studley,
caused by his own inartfulness. See Unit- would prejudice the defendant.
ed States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 783 F.2d at 938. The state argues that this
1977) (defendant representing himself may test should be extended to post-trial pronot claim ineffective assistance of counsel). ceedings.
Forcing the defendant to stumble through
There is, however, a substantial practical
post-trial proceedings serves neither the in- distinction between delay on the eve of trial
5. Because of the potentially detrimental effect
of the right of self-representation on the defendant's case, federal courts have been unwilling
to find a waiver, of the right to counsel absent a
knowing and intelligent judgment on the
record. See, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth,
830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th; Cir. 1987). The trial
court is required to make a formal record showing that the defendant explicitly waived counsel
and was aware of the nature of the charges
against him, the potential penalties, and the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d
996, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S.
1209, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984).
Absent such assurances on the record, the reviewing court will not permit deprivation of the
assistance of counsel.

6. But see Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506
A.2d 580, 613, cert, denied, 479 U.S. at 873, 107
S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (upholding unexplained denial of counsel at sentencing). Grandison has not gone uncriticized. Two justices
dissented from the denial of a writ of certiorari.
Even at midtrial in a non-bifurcated proceeding, a trial court's unexplained refusal to permit a defendant to revoke his assertion of the
right of self-representation would surely constitute an abuse of discretion. A trial court
cannot insist that a defendant continue representing himself out of some punitive notion
that that defendant, having made his bed,
should be compelled to lie in it. Grandison,
479 U.S. at 876, 107 S.Ct. at 40 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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and delay at the time of a post-trial hear- the standards to this case becomes fairly
ing. Cf. United States v. Kennard, 799 simple. Here, there is no indication that
F.2d 556 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (abso- appellant was attempting to manipulate the
lute right to counsel in retrial after defen- right to counsel for any improper purpose.
dant represented himself in initial trial). The record reveals that Menefield made a
Delay immediately prior to trial engenders valiant, if ultimately futile, attempt to coma significant potential for disruption of ply with the rules of procedure at trial.
court and witness, scheduling. Witnesses, Moreover, the transcript of the hearing
may have travelled long distances and may shows that the trial court predicated its
be unable to accommodate more than one judgment not on bad faith but solely on its
that appointment of counsel
trip. Losing or substantially inconvenienc- determination
wrould require a continuance.
ing witnesses may prejudice the trial and
Appellee argues that Menefield's pretrial
the efficient administration of justice.
Shifting lengthy trials may disrupt the dismissal of two attorneys proves his bad
faith. While repeated firings of counsel
court's docket.
Conversely, it is unlikely that a continu- may in some circumstances evidence an
ance after the verdict will substantially in- improper motive, pretrial dismissals should
terfere with the court's or the parties' ; ordinarily have little influence on the deterschedules. Witnesses and jurors will have mination of whether a post-conviction mobeen dismissed. Moreover, the hearing on tion for appointment of counsel is improp-'
a post-trial motion is generally a brief af- er. Usually, the unsettling experience of,
fair, lasting substantially less than a day. trial, as well as its unsatisfactory result,
Rescheduling such a hearing—more likely will be the source of a defendant's disconthan not—will not involve a significant dis- tent with his own services and, consequent-,
ruption of court scheduling. While we are ly, the basis for his post-trial motion for the ,
aware that as a general matter it may be assistance of counsel. In any event, two
more efficient to have the motion for a new prior decisions to. dismiss counsel constitutes insufficient evidence standing alone
trial presented when the issue is fresh in
to warrant denying the right to counsel.
the minds of the parties and court, that is; ;
Without substantially more evidence of bad,
an insufficient interest to warrant denying
faith on the record, we cannot conclude <,
defendants the assistance of counsel.. We
that Menefield's post-trial request for aptherefore hold that, at least in the absence
pointment of counsel was made for an imof extraordinary circumstances, an accused
proper purpose. We reverse 7 the district
who requests an attorney at the time of a*.
court's denial of ?the writ of habeas corpus
motion for a new trial is entitled to have
and order the court to issue the writ.
one appointed, unless the government can
show that the request is made for a bad
REVERSED AND REMANDED
faith purpose.
•

I V .

-.
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'

^
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[3] Once the principles of waiver, are
clearly enumerated, the task of applying
7. Under harmless error jurisprudence, Sixth
Amendment violations that pervade trial require
automatic reversal of the tainted proceedings.
See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct.
1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 n.,
8, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wain-r
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799
(1963)). The parties do not suggest that the rule
should be different when the error pervades a
post-conviction hearing. Following remand, the
state court must determine whether, in the cir-

(o
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cumstanees; of this case, Menefield can receive
as adequate, review of his, conviction by newly
appointed counsel as he would have had if he
had been represented by counsel on his motion
for new.trial in the first instance. It may bethat, because of the passage of time.of problems
in reconstructing the record, he cannot, in
which case a new trial may be necessary. See
Bland v. Alabama, 356 F.2d 8, 15 (5th Cir.1965),"
cert, denied, 383 U.S. 947, 86 S.Ct. 1203, 16
L.Ed.2d 210 (1966).

281, 493 P.2d 1145. Nor does the requirement of observed volitional movement under the implied consent/license revocation
l770statutes call in question the propriety of
convictions under section 23152 based on
mere circumstantial evidence of vehicle
movement. (See e.g., Wilson, supra, 176
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 8-9, 222 Cal.Rptr. 540,
and cases cited.)
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is
reversed.

53 uai^sa iw
MOSK, PANELLI, KENNARD,
ARABIAN and BAXTER, JJ., concur.
BROUSSARD, J., concurs in the
judgment.
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April 4, 1991.
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Defendant was convicted of two counts
of attempted voluntary manslaughter and
two counts of robbery in the Superior
Court, San Mateo County, No. C-19513,
John Bible, Alan Bollhofer, Jose DeLarios
and Margaret Kemp, JJ., and defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Kline, P.J.,
held that: (1) where defendant seeks to
withdraw waiver of counsel, prosecution
does not have burden of demonstrating improper motive for request for counsel but
rather, defendant's motive in requesting to
withdraw Faretta waiver is one of factors
for trial court to consider in exercising its
discretion, and (2) trial court's refusal to
rule on defendant's posttrial motion for
assistance of counsel was harmless error.
Remanded.
Benson, J., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

ment of counsel to assist with motion for
new trial; court's statement that defendant's pretrial motion had previously been
denied did not address issue.
3. Criminal Law <&»1166.11(6)
Trial court's erroneous refusal to rule
on defendant's posttrial motion for appointment of counsel to assist with motion for
new trial was harmless in trial of defendant for attempted voluntary manslaughter
and robbery, though defendant claimed
that attorney could have obtained medical
testimony which, if favorable, could have
constituted newly discovered evidence;
medical evidence defendant sought to investigate regarding effect of wounds defendant suffered was speculative, of marginal relevance, and extremely unlikely to
affect outcome of case.
4. Criminal Law <s=>1181.5(6)
Defendant who was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and robbery was entitled to remand to enable trial
court to consider defendant's motion for
appointment of counsel to assist at sentencing, after defendant had earlier waived
right to counsel; defendant's claims that he
should not have been sentenced separately
on robbery and attempted manslaughter
counts or given two weapon use enhancements if he had counsel present questions
on which reasonable minds could differ and
on which counsel might have made a differ-

1 iiiTLinda Robertson, Burlingame, for defendant and appellant.
Moala; Ngaue, pro se.
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Sharon
Birenbaum, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

1. Criminal Law ^641.10(2)
Where defendant who waived right to
counsel later seeks to retract that waiver,
prosecution ia not required to demonstrate
improper motive for request for counsel,
but defendant's motive in requesting to
withdraw waiver of counsel is one factor
for trial court to consider in exercising
discretion.
2. Criminal Law <s=>641.3(4), 641.9
Trial court improperly refused to rule
on defendant's posttrial motion for appoint-

KLINE, Presiding Justice.
Moala Ngaue appeals from convictions of
two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and two counts of robbery. He
contends the trial court erred in denying

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976
and 976.1, this opinion is certified for publica-

tion with the exception of Part I. sections A.-D.
and Parts II—III of the Discussion,
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his repeated motions for substitution of his
appointed counsel, denying his request for
a continuance after granting his motion to
represent himself at trial, denying his request for appointment of counsel to represent him in a motion for new trial, and
compelling him to rest without enabling
him to recall one of the victims as a witness. He further claims the trial court
erred in imposing consecutive sentences on
the robbery and attempted voluntary manslaughter counts, imposing consecutive
sentence enhancements for gun use, imposing a three-year enhancement for infliction
of great bodily injury in connection with
the subordinate term sentence on a robbery
count, and giving an inadequate and conusing statement of reasons for its senence choices,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 22, 1988, an information was
filed in the San Mateo County Superior
Court charging appellant with the attempted murders (Pen.Code, § 664/187) and robberies (Pen.Code, § 211) of Abed Rabah
and Ali Negem. It was further alleged
that in the commission of these offenses
appellant personally inflicted great bodily
injury upon the victims within the meaning
of Penal Code sections 12022.7 and 1203.075, subdivision (a), and personally used a
firearm within the meaning of Penal Code
sections 12022.5 and 1203.06, subdivision
(a)(1), and that appellant had served two
prior prison terms within the meaning of
Penal Code section 667.5, 65 m8 subdivision
(b). An amended information filed on January 30, 1989, altered the language of the
attempted murder counts to add that they
were committed deliberately and with premeditation.
Appellant made a total of five motions
for substitution of his attorney, which were
denied by two different judges. The last
two of these were combined with requests
that appellant be allowed to represent himself if the motions for substitution of counsel were not granted. These motions were
also denied. A final motion for self-representation was granted by the judge to
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whom the case had been assigned for trial
on January 30, 1989, the first day of trial.
After a one-week continuance, jury trial
began on February 6. On February 14, the
jury reached verdicts of not guilty on the
counts of attempted murder but guilty on
two counts of the lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter and two
counts of robbery; it further found the
firearm use, infliction of great bodily injury
and prior prison term allegations true.
The jury was then presented with evidence
of the charged prior convictions and prison
terms and found them true.
Appellant requested a new trial and appointment of an attorney to assist him in a
new trial motion and at sentencing; ruling
on this request was deferred and appellant's motion for a new trial was later
denied at the sentencing hearing. Appellant was sentenced to a total prison term of
seventeen years and two months. He filed
a timely notice of appeal on April 10, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Abed Elsalam Rabah owned the Hi and
Bye Market on University Avenue in East
Palo Alto. On the night of November 27,
1987, Rabah and Ali Negem were working
in the store. Both recalled that appellant
came into the store three or four times that
night, the first somewhere between 8 and
10 p.m., and each time bought a bottle of
wine or a bottle of wine and bottle of beer.
Negem waited on appellant each time. Until appellant's last visit to the store, Negem
was behind the counter and Rabah was
circulating around the store.
The last time appellant came into the
store, about 12:30 or 12:35 a.m., both Negem and Rabah were behind the counter;
Rabah was preparing paperwork and had
his back to the counter. Appellant brought
a small orange wine cooler to the counter
and Negem put it in a small bag, rang up
the purchase, and asked for a dollar. Appellant reached behind his back as though
to get a wallet from his pocket but instead
pulled out a small silver gun, pointed it at
Negem and told Negem to open the cash
register and give \ mohim the money.
Hearing this, Rabah turned around; appel-
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lant pointed the gun at him and told him to
open the other cash register and take all
the money out. Both Negem and Rabah
opened the registers immediately and put
the money on the counter. Negem testified that appellant asked for a paper bag
and Negem got one, put the money in it
and handed it to appellant; Rabah could
not remember who put the money in the
bag but thought it was Negem, and testified that appellant grabbed the bag. Appellant also demanded that Negem and Rabah empty their pockets; Negem had $20
and his home keys, which appellant put into
the bag with the money, and Rabah had
nothing.
After taking the bag, appellant told Rabah " 'You guys must have a gun. Give
me the gun you have.'" Rabah said they
did not have a gun and appellant immediately shot Rabah twice in the right should
der and once in his left hand. Appellant
turned to Negem, who grabbed appellant's
hand; Negem was shot through the bottom
of his stomach and his left leg then turned
appellant's hand away so that a second
shot hit the counter. Rabah pulled out
a .357 magnum and fired six shots at appellant, at which time Negem let go of appellant's hand and fell to the ground behind
the counter. Rabah thought he hit appellant but could not remember. When Negem fell, he saw appellant fall and thought
he saw some blood on appellant's back,
then saw appellant get up and run away.
As Negem and appellant were struggling,
everything on the counter, including the
cash register drawers and wine and beer,
fell on the floor; when Rabah shot appellant, the bag with the money and the wine
fell on the floor.
Rabah followed appellant out of the store
with a shotgun kept behind the counter,
chased him for two blocks and saw him go
behind a small pick-up truck. Rabah told
him not to move, saw him start loading his
pistol and asked if appellant was going to
shoot him again. Appellant started to run
down the street and Rabah fired the shotgun, which "reared back" and hit him in
the face.
1. Churchill testified as appellant's first witness.

The police arrived and Rabah gave them
a description of appellant, including a tattoo on the left side of his neck which Rabah
identified on appellant at trial. Rabah was
taken to the hospital; he had surgery to
remove one bullet and another remained in
his body. Back at the store, someone
called the police and Negem told them
what had happened. Negem also recalled
the tattoo on appellant's neck and identified it at trial. Negem was taken to the
hospital and had surgery to remove a bullet
from his leg.
Police officer Renaldo Rhodes received a
call about a possible robbery at the Hi and
Bye Market at about 12:43 on the morning
of November 28, | u2 oarrived there three to
four minutes later and found officer Christopher Samuels outside. They entered and
found the store in disarray, with money on
the floor. Negem gave a quick description
of the suspect, which Rhodes broadcast,
and was then taken by ambulance to the
hospital. Other officers found Rabah,
called paramedics and took custody of Rabah's shotgun. Officer Frank Churchill 1
took photographs of the store which were
produced at trial; he testified that he saw
broken beverages, paper bags, currency
and expended shell casings from a .25 caliber weapon on the floor and that a bullet
fragment lodged in the wall above the coolers appeared to be larger than a .25 caliber.
Samuels, in charge of collecting evidence at
the store, seized $346.02 in cash which was
scattered on the floor near the front door,
two bags containing $17 and $342 respectively, a spent bullet shell on the floor, six
spent .38 bullet shells inside a .357 hand
gun on the floor. Samuels recalled a broken bottle of alcoholic beverage on the
floor and testified that the police photographs accurately depicted the scene as he
found it.
Detective Rod Lamour took photographs
of bullet holes in the Hi and Bye Market on
December 11, 1987. Three holes—one in
the window behind the counter at chest
level, one on the deli case next to the
counter which appeared to be a ricochet,
and one toward the rear,of the store about
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eight to nine feet off the ground—were
from a .25 caliber gun. Several others,
mostly in the area of a cooler, were from
a .38 weapons
On March 28, 1988, Redwood City police
sergeant Michael Manry went to the Mayfair Hotel looking for appellant. When he
found appellant, identified himself and told
appellant not to move, appellant asked " 'is
this for the robbery?' " Nothing had been
said about a robbery before this comment.

Appellant had never been to East Palo Alto
before.
During the evening, appellant went to
Rabah's store three or four times to buy
drinks for "Tongan kids" outside the bar.
He eventually gave a .25 caliber automatic
gun he was carrying to a "Tongan kid" at
the bar who had been pestering him for it.
The kid later told appellant he had sold the
gun to people at the store where appellant
had been buying beer.
Appellant, upset, went to the store, but
the two men there said no one had sold
Defense case
them a gun; after checking that he had the
Appellant called a number of witnesses
right store, appellant returned, told Rabah
who described aggressiveness on the part
he had his gun and offered to return the
of the store owner and workers. Several
$20. The two began to argue, then Negem
customers testified that they had been
came up from behind appellant and pointed
beaten or chased from the store at gunappellant's gun in his face, repeating "you
point by the store owner and employees, or
had seen others subjected to such treat- want gun? You want gun?" and jabbing
ment. The owner of the business next appellant in the face. Appellant hit the
door additionally described having seen Ra- gun out of his face and it went off, tempobah "sic" a dog on people, having been rarily blurring appellant's vision. Appelpersonally threatened by him and having lant grabbed. Negem's hand and the two
complained about him to city officials and struggled, during which time the gun went
off three or four times. Appellant flipped
the police.
Negem to the side of the counter, where
Recalled to the stand by appellant, Ra- Negem fell and got shot. Rabah and a
bah testified that the whole shooting inci- third person appellant claimed was behind
dent took about three seconds and he did the counter pointed guns at appellant; apnot remember whether Negem had been pellant was shot in the shoulder and fell,
shot before Rabah pulled his gun; he de- then ran for the door, felt something hit
nied the above j ^accusations regarding him in the head and heard gunshots from
his conduct but admitted that he had de- behind the counter. Appellant ran from
fended himself in incidents. On examina- the store, stopping because of dizziness
tion by the district attorney, Rabah testi- from the blow to his head; Rabah followed
fied that he had a bad relationship with the and shot at him with a .357. Appellant
next door store owner, who he said sold passed out and when he awoke managed to
drug paraphernalia and brought bad ele- walk slowly to a street where a Tongan kid
ments to the neighborhood, but denied hav- picked him up and told him someone had
ing threatened her or used his dog to intim- died at the store. Scared to go to a hospiidate anyone.
tal in the area because he did not want to
Appellant testified that he had sold be held responsible for the death, appellant
drugs in the past and had a prior felony for eventually had.relatives call his family in
sale of cocaine. During Thanksgiving Los Angeles and a sister flew in and took
week of 1987 he had come from Los Ange- him to a hospital in Monterey where he
les for a church "camp" in San Carlos with used a false name.
his sister and brother-in-law, who wanted
Appellant found out a month and a half
to take him away from the drugs and later that no one had died. When he was
street life. On Friday, November 27, ap- arrested, he asked whether it was for the
pellant and one of his cousins from Hay- robbery because he had been told the police
ward went to a bar in East Palo Alto. had been looking for a Tongan named Moa-
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la with aiimtattoo on his neck. Appellant
testified that Rabah and Negem were lying
about the entire incident, that he never
demanded money from them, shot them
after demanding their guns or tried to rob
them, and that the only reason he was the
suspect in the case and Rabah and Negem
the victims was that they went to the police
and he did not

his pro per status but the court told him his
motion for self-representation had been
granted and was not going to be reconsidered. Appellant made a lengthy statement
regarding his dissatisfaction with Keyes
and not having wanted to represent himself, then asked for a 60-day continuahce
and court appointed attorney to advise him
on sentencing procedure and assist him in
the preparation of a new trial motion,
promising to work with any lawyer other
DISCUSSION
than Keyes.11 I n2sAppellant further stated
1. A.—D.**
that he did not have access.to a law. library,
E. Appointment of Counsel for New had not gotten assistance on writing a new
Trial Motion
trial motion and did not "know the first
At the conclusion of his trial, appellant thing about points and authorities/', The
asked the court to waive time for sentenc- court told appellant none of the statutory
ing so he could prepare an appeal and to grounds for a new trial were present in the
appoint a lawyer to file a "retrial" motion case and denied the motion for new trial.
for him. Judge DeLarios explained that With respect to the motion for, appointment
appellant could not appeal until after sen- of counsel, there was some discussion of
tencing and asked appellant to file his mo- Judge Kemp having told, appellant before
tions in writing/providing some authority trial that he could either represent himself
12
which would be considered either by the or accept representation from Keyes and
trial judge or the criminal presiding judge, Judge DeLarios stated that appellant's moWith respect to the request for counsel, the tion had previously been denied.
judge told appellant he had had the help of
Appellant's contention that the trial
a lawyer for ten months and deferred rul- court erred in denying his request for aping, again telling appellant to submit mem- pointment of counsel to,make a motion for
oranda on the issue.10 Appellant filed no a new trial is based on Menefield v. Borg
memoranda.
(9th Cir.1989) 881 F.2d 696. In that case, a
On March 20, appellant's case came on defendant who had represented himself at
for sentencing before Judge DeLarios. trial later requested appointment of counAppellant wanted to question Keyes about sel to assist in the preparation of a j ^ y
** See footnote *, ante.
10. The judge's remarks indicate some irritation
with appellant: "We'll assume your motion has
been made. It has been made, but you support
it with some authority, or some kind of memoranda, some kind of argument, something that
indicates you should have. So that if you decide you want one, then later on you don't want
one, the judge will know what to do about it.
All right. But you give some reasons for it,
other than you want one now. [fl 1 You had one
of the best lawyers on the private defender
panel. You had the advantage of two investigators, then you had the guts to tell the jury you
only had a week to prepare your case/Which
was kind of dirty pool."
11. Respondent suggests that appellant may have
been asking only for advisory counsel to assist
him while he represented himself. While appellant used the terms "advise" and "assist," his
request must be viewed in context. Appellant

had made numerous attempts to substitute
counsel and, when these , were unsuccessful;
tried several times to represent himself; as. the,
only alternative to proceeding with ^ Keyes.
None of his motions were coupled with requests
for advisory counsel or give any reason to suspect appellant considered this a possibility. In
the request at issue, appellant told the court "it
was only with the utmost reluctance that I became pro per." His remarks indicate that appellant was seeking to change his status arid be
represented by counsel rather than to have advisory counsel assist him in representing himself...
• _•
12. After Judge Bible had granted appellant's
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, motion and a one-week
continuance on January 30 and 31, Judge Kemp
had denied a further motion for continuance at
another hearing on January 31 and confirmed
the trial date of February 6 / ;;
•'
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trial motion; the request was denied and
the defendant obtained habeas corpus relief from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court first determined that under California law a motion for a new trial
is a critical stage of the prosecution at
which a defendant has a right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (Id., at pp. 698-699.)
Although recognizing that the right to
counsel is not absolute after it has been
waived, the court stated a strong presumption that a post-trial request for counsel
should not be refused. (Id.,'at p. TOO.)
The court noted that there are times when
defendants should not be allowed to change
course and insist on counsel at the last
minute, as when they seek continuances on
the eve of trial for purposes of delay.
(Ibid.) While delay immediately before trial carries a significant threat of disruption
for the court and witnesses, however, the
court felt it unlikely that a continuance
after the verdict would substantially interfere with the court or parties. (Id., at pp.
700-701.) "[T]he hearing on a post-trial
motion is generally a brief affair, lasting
substantially less than a day. Rescheduling "such a hearing—more likely than not—
will not involve a significant disruption of
court scheduling. While we are aware that
as a general matter it may be more efficient to have the motion for a new trial
presented when the issue is fresh in the
minds of the parties and court, that is an
insufficient interest to warrant denying defendants the assistance of counsel. We
therefore hold | imthat, at least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, an
accused who requests an attorney at the
time of a motion for a new trial is entitled
to have one appointed, unless the government can show that the request is made for
a bad faith purpose." (Id., at p. 701.)
Since the record in Menefield did not indicate any improper purpose, and the trial
court had denied the request not because it
was made in bad faith but because appointment of counsel would have required a
continuance, the court granted relief,
(Ibid.)

identical to those presented here. Though
decisions of the federal courts are entitled
to great weight, we hesitate to follow
Menefield because in a related context our
state supreme court has allowed trial
courts greater discretion than have the federal courts. In People v. Burton (1989) 48
Cal.3d 843, 852, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d
1270 the court considered the issue of timeliness of a Faretta motion, holding that
since the right to self-representation is unconditional only if asserted " 'within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of
trial/ " a Faretta motion made after both
counsel had answered ready and the case
had been transferred for trial was directed
to the trial court's discretion. Burton declined to follow the federal rule that a
motion for self-representation is timely as a
matter of law if made before the jury is
impaneled and must be granted unless
shown to have been made for the purpose
of delay. (Id.,- at pp. 853-854, 258 Cal.Rptr.
184, 771 P.2d 1270.) The court noted that
the federal rule was in practice similar to
the California one, as it would allow denial
of a Faretta motion before the jury was
impaneled if the motion was made for the
purpose of delay and the need for a continuance could be evidence of dilatory intent.
The federal rule differed, however, in that
California put the burden on the defendant
to explain the delay when making a late
motion. (Id., at p. 854, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184,
771 P.2d 1270.) The court concluded, "To
the extent that there is a difference between the federal rule and the California
rule, we find the federal rule too rigid in
circumscribing the discretion of the trial
court and adhere to the California rule."
(Id., at p. 854, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d
1270.) Though it is not precisely on point,
Burton thus suggests the Menefield principle that counsel must be appointed to
assist in a new trial motion unless the
prosecution can prove an improper motive
for the request would not be accepted by
our state supreme court, which would vest
greater discretion in the trial court.

Menefield in effect holds that a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a Faretta waiver in circumstances substantially

While no California case has addressed
the specific question of withdrawal of a
Faretta. waiver after trial, such a with-
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drawal during trial is a matter for trial
court discretion. (People v. Hill (1983) 148
Cal.App.3d 744, 760-761, 196 Cal.Rptr. 382;
People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308,
319, 147 CaLRptr. 740; People v. Elliott
(1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 991-994, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 205.) Under California authority, a
judge confronted with a defendant's request to withdraw a Faretta waiver during
trial should consider, among other factors,
I.1125" W ftne] defendant's prior history in
the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to
counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set
forth for the request, (3) the length and
stage of the proceedings, (4) disruption or
delay which reasonably might be expected
to ensue from the granting of such motion,
and (5) the likelihood of defendant's effectiveness in defending against the charges if
required to continue to act as his own attorney.' " (People v. Hill, supra, 148 Cal.
App.3d at p. 760,196 Cal.Rptr. 382, quoting
People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 993-994, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205; People v.
Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at pp. 319-320,
147 Cal.Rptr. 740.)
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pete with the prosecutors—were valid and
that the defendants were not likely to be as
effective in defending themselves as an
attorney would be. (Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.
App.3d at p. 320, 147 CaLRptr. 740; Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 996, 139
Cal.Rptr. 205.)13
Application of these principles to the
present case suggests counsel should have
been appointed unless appellant was seeking representation for an improper purpose
such as delay: Since he had already been
convicted, granting appellant's request
would cause less disruption than that considered acceptable in Hill, Cruz and Elliott
(see Menefield v. Borg, supra, 881 P.2d at
p. 701); the fact that appellant had made
numerous requests for substitution before
trial would not necessarily indicate that his
request after "the unsettling experience of
trial" (Menefield v. Borg, supra, 881 F.2d
at p. 701) was for an improper motive, and
appellant clearly could not effectively represent himself at this stage of the proceeding.

Elliott, Cruz and Hill found abuses of
discretion in trial courts' denials of requests to reinstate counsel during trial—in
Elliott, after jury selection, in Cruz on the
date set for trial, in Hill immediately before jury selection. These cases noted that
the requests came at early stages of the
trial and would not have required lengthy
continuances or prejudiced the prosecution,
and found improper the trial courts' denial
of the motions on the basis that continuances would be necessary. (Hill, supra, 148
Cal.App.3d at p. 761, 196 Cal.Rptr, 382;
Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at pp. 320-321,
147 CaLRptr. 740; Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.
App.3d at pp. 996-998, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205.)
Cruz and Elliott specifically noted that the
defendants' reasons for requesting counsel—recognition that they could not com-

[1] Indeed, as a practical matter, consideration of the factors identified in Hill,
Cruz, and Elliott in the post-trial context
yields a result very similar to hi26that
reached in Menefield. While the California
test is discretionary, Menefield describes
why most of the factors considered in the
California cases would militate in favor of
appointment at this stage. On the other
hand, even under Menefield, the trial court
retains discretion to deny a request for
post-trial assistance of counsel where the
request is made for a bad faith purpose,
and factors such as the defendant's history
in substitution of attorneys or purpose to
delay further proceedings may bear on the
determination whether such a bad faith
purpose exists. (See 881 F.2d at pp. 700701.) Rather than imposing upon the prosecution the burden of demonstrating an

13. Hill and Cruz also involved the fact that the
defendants' initial Faretta waivers had been
found invalid because they were tainted by the
trial courts having improperly denied People v.
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156,
465 P.2d 44, motions. (Hill, supra, 148 Cal.
App.3d at p. 760, 196 Cai.Rptr. 382; Cruz, supra,
83 Cal.App.3d at p. 318, 147 Cal.Rptr. 740.)

While the present case differs in that the denial
of appellant's Marsden motions was proper, this
was not the determinative factor in those courts'
analyses. Elliott, like the present case, did not
involve any question of the initial Faretta motion being invalid but only of a defendant who
had waived his right to counsel later seeking to
retract that waiver.
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improper motive for the request for counsel, however, we view the defendant's motive in requesting to withdraw a Faretta
waiver as one of the factors for the trial
court to consider in exercising its discretion; clearly, a finding that the request
was made for an improper purpose such as
delay would militate against granting the
request.14
[2] In the present case, the trial court
never ruled on appellant's post-trial request
for counsel; it simply denied his motion for
a new trial on the merits. The court's
statement that appellant's pre-trial motion
had previously been denied by Judge Kemp
simply did not address the motion for appointment of counsel to assist with a motion for new trial. This was error.
Appellant urges that an erroneous denial
of his request for appointment of counsel
requires automatic reversal of the tainted
proceeding. In Menefield, the Ninth Circuit applied the rule that Sixth Amendment
violations pervading trial require automatic
reversal to the situation before it, where
erroneous denial of the request for counsel
on a new trial motion pervaded a post-conviction hearing. (881 F.2d at p. 701, fn.. 7.)
By contrast, several California Courts of
Appeal have employed a harmless error
analysis in determining whether a trial
court's denial of a request to retract a
Faretta waiver was prejudicial. (People v.
Sampson (1987) 191 Cal.App,3d 1409, 1418,
237 Cal.Rptr. 100; People v. Hill, supra,
148 Cal.App.3d at p. 762, 196 Cal.Rptr. 382;
People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at
p. 998,139 Cal.Rptr. 205.) As explained by
the court in Elliott, "[s]mce defendant has
exercised his constitutional right of selfrepresentation, an abuse-of-discretion error
in not | n27permitting defendant to change
his mind does not appear to us to be of
14. Respondent makes much of the fact that appellant did not file memoranda in support of his
motion for appointment of counsel as directed
by the trial court. Appellant's argument that he
was unable to do so because he did not have
access to a law library may be cast in doubt by
the fact that he filed at least two written motions before trial, for a continuance and to exclude use of prior convictions for impeachment
purposes. As the issue was never developed in
the trial court, the record before us does not

constitutional dimension." (70 Cal.App.3d
at p. 998, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205.) We agree
with these, latter cases.
[3] The trial court's erroneous refusal
to rule on appellant's post-trial motion for
assistance of counsel must be /viewed as
harmless. Appellant claims the record indicates the possible existence of grounds for
a new trial motion in that the court's forcing appellant to rest without recalling Negem to the stand and refusing to grant
appellant a continuance could have been
raised as errors in the decision of a question of law arising during the trial (§ 1181,
subd. 5) and an attorney could have obtained medical testimony which, if favorable, could have constituted newly discovered evidence. (§ 1181, subd. 8.) We have
already determined that the court's denial
of appellant's motion for a continuance was
proper and, as will be explained in the next
section of this opinion, will determine that
the court committed no error in concluding
the case when it did. As for the possibility
of medical testimony, a party is entitled to
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence only if certain conditions are
met, including that the evidence be such as
to render a different result probable on
retrial. (People v. Martinez(1984) 36
Cal.3d 816, 821, 205 Cal.Rptr. 852, 685 P.2d
1203.) As has been discussed, the medical
evidence appellant sought to investigate in
this case was speculative,,of marginal relevance, and extremely unlikely to affect the
outcome of his case. Accordingly, it is not
reasonably probable that the trial court
would have granted a new trial motion on
this ground. As for appellant's suggestion
that new counsel might have perceived additional grounds for a new trial motion, it is
appellant's burden to show prejudice on
appeal (People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d
permit any conclusions as to whether appellant
could or should have filed such memoranda,
but we caution that his failure to do so would
appear an insufficient reason to deny him representation unless that failure indicated an improper purpose in making his motion. Appellant's failure to file written memoranda was
clearly not the basis of the trial court's decision
to deny his new trial motion, as it was never
.mentioned by the court.
•.•*••••
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615, 643, 91 Cal.Rptr. 397, 477 P.2d 421)
and his speculative contentions fail to sustain this burden.
[4] More persuasive is appellant's contention that, entirely apart from the new
trial motion, counsel would have been able
to assist at sentencing either by arguing
for a lesser sentence or by raising the
claims of error addressed in later portions
of this opinion. As discussed in unpublished portions of this opinion, appellant's
claims that he should not have been sentenced separately on the robbery and attempted manslaughter counts or given two
weapon use enhancements present questions on which reasonable minds can differ.
Clearly, the trial judge could properly have
imposed the different sentence appellant
now claims should have been given. Counsel might have made a difference. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand for a ruling
on appellant's motion for appointment of
counsel. If the motion is granted, the
court shall hold a new sentencing hearing;
if it is denied, the judgment shall be reinstated (Menefield v. Borg, supra, 881 F.2d
at p. 701, fn. 7; People v> Winbush (1988).
205 Cal.App.3d 987, 992, 252 Cal.Rptr, 722),
subject to|n28the modifications of sentence
specified in sections III-B and III-C, infra.

SMITH, J., concurs,
BENSON, J., concurs and dissents.
BENSON, Associate Justice, concurring
and dissenting.
I dissent only to that portion of the majority opinion which remands to the trial
court for the purpose of conducting a hearing on appellant's motion for appointment
of counsel to assist in sentencing. In my
judgment the motion was heard by the trial
court, considered, and judicial discretion
properly exercised in denying appellant's
request.
While I might be more sympathetic to a
convicted pro per criminal defendant who
unconditionally seeks the guidance of counsel in the complicated area of post-trial
sentencing, that is not the situation before
this court. Here request for assistance
was conditioned on the court appointment
of any lawyer other than Richard Keyes.1
In effect appellant is asserting a veto over
the court's discretionary power to appoint
counsel, an incursion which cannot be condoned.

CONCLUSION
, , ,"
The matter is remanded to the trial court
for a hearing on appellant's request for
appointment of an attorney to assist him at
sentencing and, if this request is granted, a
new sentencing hearing in accordance with
the views expressed herein. If the request
for counsel is denied, the judgment shall be
reinstated subject to modifications that one
enhancement under Penal Code section
12022.5 must be stricken and the Penal
Code section 12022.7 enhancement appended to count 3 must be reduced to one year.

The record provides no basis, in law or
fact, justifying appellant's arbitrary, whimsical rejection of attorney Keyes as counsel
to assist on post trial sentencing issues.
On five separate occasions appellant's
Marsden challengesj^to the adequacy of
Keyes representation were heard by the
trial court and rejected. Indeed, at the
fourth Marsden hearing appellant acknowledged "he had been trying to get rid of his
lawyer 'not because he was incompetent'
but because appellant felt he was not inter?
ested in the case and had done nothing to
help gain confidence in him." Whatever
imagined shortcomings appellant may have
perceived with respect to Keyes' representation before and during trial certainly

***See footnote \ ante.
1. The statement to Judge De Larios is as follows: "I'm not making new trial motion here
today. I'm requesting 60 days continuance and
court appoint me a lawyer to advise me on the
sentencing procedure and to assist me in the

new trial motion. I promise that I will work
with any lawyer that the court appointments
[sic] other than Richard Keyes, and I point out to
the court that it was only with the utmost reluctance that I became pro per." (Emphasis addled.)

II.-III.***
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were not germane to Keyes' ability to provide legal assistance on sentencing issues.
Keyes' knowledge of the case, acquired
during his trial preparation over a tenmonth span would have provided valuable
insight on the sentencing issues to appellant's benefit. On the other hand, appointment of new counsel would substantially
increase the time and cost required to fully
educate a lawyer unfamiliar with the proceeding. I see no good reason why,the
taxpayers should be required to subsidize a
proceeding occasioned by appellant's fanciful intransigence.

any allegation of related physical injury or
manifestation.
Affirmed.

1, Insurance @=>514.9(1)
Liability policy providing indemnification for amounts insured "shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages" limited policy coverage only to tort liability, and
did not obligate insurer to defendant insured against action for breach of contract,
2. Insurance <3=>435.32

229 Cal.App.3d 209
J309AIM INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,
Cross-Defendant and Resp - *
v.
James CULCASI, Defen
Cross-Complainant a
Appellant.

t,

No. H006828.

Employee's allegation that she entrusted her health plan application and supporting documents to insured employer, who
told her she would be properly enrolled in
plan, but failed to properly forward documents, stated a cause of action for negligence based on employer's alleged breach
of duty to perform voluntarily assumed
task and thus stated cause of action for
negligence covered by employer's liability
Insurance policy. ;
8. Insurance ®=>514.22
Whether insured's expe-1;
fense is reasonable is a q .-

ev.

AIM INS. CO. v. CULCASI
229 Cal.App.3d 213

6. Insurance e»514.9(l)
Under liability policy's coverage for
"bodily injury," liability insurer did not
have duty to defend insured employer
against employee's claims of emotional distress based on employer's failure to process employee's health insurance documents absent any indication of physical
injury to employee related to emotional distress. '
7. Insurance ®=>514.9(1)
Insured's alleged loss or destruction of
a piece of paper insured's employee entrusted to insured was trivial or nonexistent property damage and thus did not
implicate insurer's duty to defend under
liability policy.
8. Insurance <s=>514.10(2)
Insured's employee's claim in underlying action for "great emotional distress"
she suffered as the result of insured's failure to properly process her health insurance documents, without any suggestion
that insurer was aware of facts indicating
that employee suffered some physical injury or manifestation, did not implicate insurer's duty to defend insured.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.
April 10, 199!
As Modified May 8 J 991.
Review Denied June " 1991.
Liability insurer filed action seeking a
declaration of no duty to defend and indemnify its insured in an underlying action by
the insured's employee. The Monterey
County Superior Court, No. 20868, William
M. Wunderlich, J., granted insurer's motion
for summary judgment, and insured appealed. The Court of Appeal, Capaccioli,
Acting P.J., held that: (1) complaint in underlying action stated a cause of action for
negligence based on insured's breach of
voluntarily assumed duty to process employee's health insurance application, but
(2) liability insurer did not have have duty
to defend or indemnify insured against its
employee's emotional distress claim absent

4, Insurance §=514.9(1)
Under employer's liability policy which
covered only "property damage" and "bodily injury," insured employer could not reasonably have expected that insurer would
defend employer from employee's claim for
economic loss when employer unintentionally failed to process employee's health insurance documents which allegedly resulted in employee's loss of insurance benefits:
loss of benefits was economic injury, not
property damages.
5, Insurance <s=»435(l)
As used in a liability policy, the term
"bodily injury" referred to physical injury
and its consequences, and did not include
emotional distress in the absence of any
physical injury or manifestation.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions. -
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| 2 i2Raymond Coates, Geneva Wong.: BJbisu, Low, Ball & Lynch, Redwood City, for
plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent.
George S. Roberts, Pacific Grove, for
defendant, cross-complainant and appellant.
CAPACCIOLI, Acting Presiding
Justice.
-,
Statement of the Case
Defendant James Culcasi (Culcasi), dba
Rosine's, a restaurant, appeals from a
judgment entered after the trial court
granted plaintiff Aim Insurance Company's
(Aim) motion for summary judgment. He
claims the court erred in granting the motion. We affirm the judgment.
1. This statement is taken from the allegations in
Culcasi's cross-complaint against Aim and,
therefore, constitutes an admission. (1 Witkin,

IzizScope of Review
The trial court may properly grant a
motion for summary judgment only if there
are no triable issues of fact and, as a
matter of law, the moving party is entitled
to judgment. (Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1470,
266 CaLRptr. 593.)
The Undisputed Facts
In October 1986, Culcasi hired NoemI
Grijalva as a waitress at Rosine's. At that
time, Culcasi made health insurance available to his employees. Around July 24,
1986, Grijalva submitted an application for
insurance coverage to Culcasi, who accepted it and undertook to forward it to the
insurer. According to Culcasi, the application "was entrusted by her to [me] for the
purpose of, transmitting the same to the
group health insurance company and plan
administrator." 1
In January 1989, Grijalva sued Culcasi
and others, for negligent breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and infliction
of emotional distress. In her complaint,
she alleged that eligibility for insurance
was part of the compensation Culcasi paid
his employees, and this potential eligibility
induced Grijalva to apply for and accept t h e '
job at Rosine's.
She alleged that on July 24, 1987, she
filled out an application and gave it to
Culcasi. He, in turn, represented that she
would be properly enrolled in the health
insurance program and undertook the obligation "to insure that her application and
documents were promptly and properly forwarded to the health plan and that' her
premium payment would result in the expected coverage." v • -.,-.•'.
Grijalva alleged that she met all the requirements for enrollment in the plan, premiums were deducted from her paycheck,
she believed she was so enrolled in the
plan, and, as a result, she did not attempt
to purchase other health insurance. However, according to Grijalva, Culcasi negligently failed "to properly complete her enEvidence (3d ed. 1986) The Hearsay Rule,
§ 646, p. 631-632.)
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Before De MUNIZ, PvJ., and DEITS-C.J.,
andHASELTON,J.- vs; s - \

penalty phase proceeding in defendant'^
death penalty case.., After deciding the ap*j
pealability issue, the Supreme Court deter*
J261PERCURIAM.
• JV,•• ..... i ••'•" .
mined that'the evidence could be admitted.*
Reversed and remanded. State ex ret Id at 617-18, 956 P.2d 202. Accordingly, we
Carlilev. Frost,: 326 Or..-607, 956 P.2d 202 reverse and remand;-...? ???-.''.- ,>y, ,:.• ..s*.;'^.
(1998). ..;,.••
, ,;..,:
Reversed arid remanded. ' ' /
The Supreme Court -has remanded this
case following its decision instate'-' ex rel
Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or. 607, 956 P.2d 202
(1998). The Supreme Court there^held that
we were wrong in dismissing, by order, the
state's appeal in this case. from the trial
court's order excluding evidence from the

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appelleev

John M. HEATON, Defendant
ahdAppeflanC

.

dant, and/thus, the defendant did not have
the responsibility to find out why his case
had not been sent for trial. U.C.A.1953, 7729-1. •• • •'•>'• ••;.<•• :-^. •*:>.< -I .> <
• -i
5. Extradition and Detainers ®»59

.<. . Even though most of delay in bringing
defendant to,. trial was occasioned by court
. 'Supr^e.,Cburt':Of/U^.7/.^r.
' ' clerk's,error, this did not constitute good
cause under detainer statute..for delay since
May 1,1998.
•^•y^U:;^
the prosecutor was not relieved of its burden
of complying with the statute. U;CAll953,
Defendant ..was •, convicted in the ; District 77-29r-l(l,3,:4), r ' M ^ .. ;,;},. v^h., ....>
Court, Ogden Department, .Michael J. Glass?
6. Extradition anii Detainers ®»59 1
man, J., of aggravated, robbery, and evading
When, a prisoner delivers vW^tten.:notice
arrest. Defendant appealed: The Supreme
Court, ;;Russon, J.,, held that; (1). burden,;of pursuant to detainer statute, prosecutor has
complying with the;_ detainer, statute; was .on affirmative,-,duty to have defendant's, matter
the prosecutor, .not^-the. defendant;] (2) delay heard within statutory period; implicitcin;this
occasioned . by ; .^ourfe-. clerk's error did not duty is duty.;tQ.:;notify court .that detainer
constitute good cause for delay underr detain- notice, has ; been filed and to. make fgoqd faith
JL1953,
er statute; (3). extending trial, date to; a reaj effort to;.complyfwith statute.,...,U.C
:
\;f
sonable time outside detainer,.statute's 120- 77^29-KlJ, 4X V "'• <:, ''V'y'i.
day disposition period to accommodate, in
7. Extradition arid Detainers fe»59
part, defense counsel's schedule' constituted
Since the detainer statute places' on the
good cause .for.thg delay .under, the statute;
and ,(4) ^defendant. sdjd not knowingly and prosecutor alone the burden of bringing case
intelligently^ waive* to ^constitutional right to to trial within 120-day period, the prosecuappointed cojunsel./ • ,•.....,-y .w/. i'([ ~>: >^ tor's duty musit be independent of the court's
docketing system. U.CJU953, 7fc£9n-l;...
Reversed^• -hoi--••-.::'••• AAy^rov,:?£.. ••#!*.#
8. Criminal Law <s=»1134(6) ; '
;•.-••

8 -:Na.:..950238.--;; !? . w

, ,,.^

•'"".'••

1. Criminal 1 ^ ^
',.<•••+
Denial of defendant's motion to] dismiss
under detainer statute was reviewed for correctness, where decision was based on legal,
conclusion that clerk's administrative, mistake
could excuse prosecutor's duty t a bring
charges to trial within statutory time liniit.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3, 4).
" K J j : "/' '

.•••;

'. • A

,

.)-••

.'••

Even if lower court erred in its legal
conclusions, Supreme Court1 may affirm trial
court's decision on any reasonable legal basis, provided that any- rationale for affirmance, .finds , suppqrt in tlie. record. . ,#
9.. Extradition and Detainersj®=»59

3. Criminal Law ^ U 3 4 ( 3 )
Supreme Court reviews trial court's legal deterriiinations for coirectrieSs.

, > Deciding whether. 'the ; district, court
properly denied defendant's motion .to.dismiss pursuant to detainer statute requires
two-step inquiry", first; Supreme^ Court must
determine when the 120-d^y period, commenced and when.<it expired,.second^,ifatrial
was held; outside the- l^O^day period,. Supreme Court must then ^determine whether
good cause excused the delay, U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1... . 1.•;-".:.-^vtf,•-.•'. ;;;-;r '•;'•.: ^ ; , V

4. Extradition and Detainers <®=>59

10. Extradition and Detainers <£*59 .

2. Criminal Law ^ 7 3 5
?
^
Whether a waiver of counsel was made
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact.
•V'*V>'-

•

•

"

"

"

"

.

'

'

•

•

' • ' • "

•

'

*

'

.

y

' • ' • ' • • •

A

v

'

"

• ' • •

..*•-., ,,,
'

•

'

•

"

'

"

'

'

•

3

Burden of complying with the detainer
statute was on the prosecutor, ^not.the defeg~

detainer statute's r 12(Hiay disposition
'period must .-be extended by amount .<)f time
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during which prisoner himself creates delay,
U.C.A.1953/77-29-1.''
\

his choice is made with eyes open. U.S.GA
ConstAmend. 6.
•% •.-,:;

11, Extradition and Detainers ®=>59
Extending trial date to a reasonable
time outside detainer statute's 120-day disposition period to accommodate*-to'part, defense couhsel's schedule constituted good
cause for the delay under 'the - statute.
U.C.AJ953,77-29-1(3, 4).

16. Criminal Law §=>641.7(1)

12.: Criminal Law <3=*641.4(4)y 641.7(1)
Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to appointed counsel, evehtidugh court refused to
dismiss: defense counsel, recommended that
defendant^rely on counsel during voir dire
andr strongly advised that he alldw^eounsel to
crossr-examine state's witnesses; where trial
court failed to advise defendant, at a minimum,'of dangers and disadvantages'of selfrepresentation, and had already allowed defendant to proceed pro se when warnings
involving.- defense counsel were issued.
;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. :
'
13. Criminal Law <3=>641.4(1)
Sixth' Amendment guarantees an accused right to self-representation, provided
only that "he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 6.
14. Criminal Law;<S=».641.4(2).
When a trial court is confronted with
defendant who either refuses to proceed to
trial with appointed counsel or insists on
proceeding pro se, court must carefully consider defendant's right to self-representation
with his right to' counsel. U.S.C.A. Const
A m e n d . 6 . ''-'

'' ''•

"•'••

'

• ;:

!

In addition to advising defendant of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
before permitting defendant to proceed without assistance of counsel, trial court should
(1) advise defendant of his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel, as well as his
constitutional right to represent himself, (2)
ascertain that defendant possesses intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate consequences of decision to represent
himself, including expectation that defendant
will comply with technical rules and recognition that presenting defense is not just matter of telling one's story, and (3) ascertain
that defendant comprehends nature of
charges and proceedings, range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts
essential to :'broad understanding of case.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6 . - v
.17;=. Criminal Law <®=>1139 .,..-.>
'
In the absence of a ' colloquy ' on the
record between the court and the defendant
determining the validity 'of 'a- waiver of counsel, Supreme Court will look at record and
make de novo determination regarding validity of defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the existence of which
the Court will address on a case-by-case
-basis.'-''' U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. :;.

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellee.

;

15. Crimirial Law ®^641.7(1)
Before trial court may permit defendant
to proceed' without assistance of counsel,
court5-must conduct thorough inquiry of defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that
defendant's waiver of edunsel is knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made; in making
this determination, the court must advise
defendant of dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation so that the record will
establish that he knowrs what he is1 doing and

Candace S. Bridgess, Kent E. Snider, nL>..
den, for defendant and appellant
RUSSON, Justice:
;

INTRODUCTION '
Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him
guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, and evading arrest, a third degree
felony. We reverse.
• •

BACKGROUND
Because some of the dates corresponding
to the facts in this case are critical to the
resolution of this appeal, we provide a detailed chronological summary of the relevant
events.
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for
the robbery of an Albertson's grocery store
in Roy, "Utah. The next,day,.;Heaton waived
his right to a preliminary hearing and was
bound over to district court.,, Heaton was a
parolee at the time, and on July, 26, he was
returned to the Utah State .Prison for violating his parole. r Heaton also...qualified for
public, assistance, and was appointed fcounsel
from the public defender's office.., On August
2, Heaton., appeared in district court for arraignment, at, which time he pleaded "hot
guilty" to the .charges and the judge set a
pretrial conference for August 30 and 4 jury
trial for September 9., On August 25, while
incarcerated at the prison, Heaton filed a
written request for final disposition of all
matters pending against him pursuant to
Utah Qpde Ann. § 77-29-1' (the . "detainer
statute"), which requires the prosecutor to
bring pending charges against a prisoner to
trial within 120 days from the date the notice
is delivered to certain state officials'or their
agents. An authorized agent at the prison
received Heaton's notice on September 3.*
At his pretrial conference on" August 30,
Heaton requested a preliminary hearing,
which he had initially waived. The prosecution had no objection, and the "parties and the
court agreed to hold a preliminary -hearing
on September 9, the date for which the ( trial
had'initially been set At the September 9
preliminary hearing, the court found that
probable cause existed and ;set a second arraignment for September*;^./"At the second
arraignment, Heaton ' requested that the
judge recuse himself on the basis that the
judge had also presided over Heaton's preliminary hearing. The judge recused himself
and ordered the case reassigned. However,
as a result of an-error in the district court
1. The prosecutor's office received the notice oh
September 8. The record does not indicate
whether the district court received Heaton's detainer notice; however, the prosecutor stated
that he believed the court probably received the
notice on September 8; 1994. .,v-'-.:': :-'-h'ul.: .

clerk's office, the case was not reassigned.
In.late November 1994, after receiving;inquiry by a witness regarding thei trial date, the
prosecutor contacted ithe: districtiacourt for a
status report,... whereupon' the .cleric's ;office
discovered the erroi* and reassigned the case
to a different judfeei. as 'previously ordered
On j Novernber'28, f %e' : distri^
sent
the parties a notice'^f: a trial^sch'edulihg conference se£ for December'TV :*lAfr; that conference, the court: initially attempted to! set the
trial date for January- 19^ 1995/ 'However,
because both'defense counsel andthe prosecutor had a scheduling conflict; -thecourt set
the trial for the next available date suitable
for all trie parties, February 16 and 17;' 1995.2
Subsequent to the 4 trial-scheduling conference on December 7, 1994, Heaton sent a
letter to the court requesting %ew counsel.
On February 8, 1995, the ebiirt held1 a hearing to address Heaton's requ6strwhich :, was
based in part oirhis defense counsel's1refusal
to bring a 'motion to dismiss1 pursuant to the
detainer statute. The1 court'denied Heaton's
request. On February 16, 199© after reevaluating Heaton's claim, Heaton's defense
counsel moved to dismiss pui^aht^tb the
detainer statute. The court, •however, found
that, at least 60 days of the 7 W a y delay—
le.,, the period Jbetween the second:;arraignment and* the itHal-scheduling .conferenee-r
were attributable to the administrative error
in the clerk's office.- <This delay, the court
concluded, constituted, "good cause" ^under
the .statute, and the court'therefore denied
the motion.
•-.••,••, -•'••;:•
Although originally scheduled for February 16 and-17,'1995j the trial was^not actually
held until April, 20 a n c l ^ 1.995.3 • Before
trial, JHeaton vflleia.pr^ se n]oton,reque§t^g
that the judge recuse .himseli^d. requesting
L a
:
; new, counsel.; A;fc 6 TO&?y#trWiJ- > °^i APT^
19, 1995, and the Judgq denj^^.bo%|requests.
During the hearmg,7Heatonimdieated that
he did not feel hei was* reeeiving^adequate
legal representation and that be felt forced to
•• :•; '- •-:•'••. ^•r<(rho...L.!1} *;oi »vo''•' ',,
2.

Defense counsel and. the-.pnjsecutor,were working on another criminal J^iariii'mid-January,

•3. The reasons for;,the. trial.delay,from .February
to April are not perthient to : uSis l ipp&l. jA ^''" '
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proceed on his own. His attorney indicated court's legal determinations for correctness.
that a;:"rift" had developed:between them, See. State v. Pena, ,869 P.2d 932, ,937-39
that he was. uncomfortable agoing to triaLi be- (Utah 1994); Harding v. Lewis^$Z4 ;F.2d
cause 'of the^"total^conftict£;;( between -them, 853,857(9thCir,198a.;; : ,.;,'\ 0 ^i}X>w
and that he thought Heaton .wanted to repre^
sent himself..Heatondid' not assert his right
ANALYSIS'
,*..w#
to^self-repfesentationv^an^thejudgedid not
"
[4]
HeatoH
^firstGca^gues:l
that
/the
trial
ask Heatontwhether he. <wished,t,o waive; his
court
erred
in
denying:his-motion
to-dismal
right to counsel;^ Instead^the, judge (1) advised Heaton /of his. right^to^self-representa- pursuarit-to" the detainer statute.^That stafc-'
tion, (2),refused,to-pennii-Heaton's counsel ute provides^ in relevant part:'-•'oj'jfr:.^. «>
' (l)'Whenever a prisoner • is-"serving !a
to withdraw, (3) indicated (tp Heaton, that. he
the1 state prison;
was requiring, counsel to^remain, as standby 'term of imjprisohinpht'in!
k
jail
or
other
f)eHM
or'cbrrectioHal
ifistittif
counsel to, assist ,Heaton; if, he, wanted the
''tion'
of'this
state,
and
there*'-is
pending
assistance, and; (4) indicated that Heaton was
v
unfree, to choose .to handle trial f matters ptn .his ' 'agamst;tfei&6hei;: in''th^^ate^ahy
tried indiefohent^ or inform&tibli' :iahd the
own but that the court would make a record
prisoner shall deliver to the %ar(iiefi; sher^
of Heaton's decision to proceed prbjb'e.'"
iff or custodial officer' 'in' authority; pr any
Although .Heaton's defense,,counsel assistappropriate agent of thei:saxhe, raf written'
ed Heaton in-selecting the jury,, Heaton-rep'.demand specifying the nature' of the
resented himself at trial.,. The jury convicted
charge arid the court wherein it is pending
Heaton on both, charges,,and he was senand requesting'disposition of the-Spending
tenced ,{xu.serve concurrent; terms of five
charge, he-shall be entitled to'have ttie
• years to life and zero to fiye years . at the
charge brought to'trialwifhm 120 days? of
Utah,State,Prison, such terms to.be served
, the date of delivery of written notice. K'' '•'.
consecutivelyi;tp: any:.sentences Heaton; was
already serving. ....•i.-j;.-,. ; f. y.,r,cn ';.'.. .•,
,, .,(3), After writften,demand is delivered,as
On appeal, 'Heaton alleges' ther following ; xequired in Subsection (l) the prosecuting.
y
errors: (l)the trialteourt ei*ed in denying .•.-.attorney or the defendant.or his counsel,
;
his motion to; dismiss ^pursuant > to the detains v yfor goqd cause shown in open court, with
er statute;1 (2) he: was denied his constitution^
,.'the prisoner or his counsel being present,
al bright to counsel; (3) he^wasu denied ;his ". may be granted any reasonable coniinuconstitutional right!to effective: assistance ;©f ^qnce, /;.'.,.,''']['' ' '[ , ."' /'/'"'' ''* ' .'
counsel; and (4). the prosecutor's misconduct . ., j.,(4) In. , the event the,,charge is' not
u
during closing 'argument r constituted; jfevers^ .,.} ,i)rought to,; tr^al,within
120,days,, or within
v
ible error.
..<^'.;;->fo .r-ri-j
; -such continuance as has been granted,.and
j. defendant or.-his counsel moves to, dismiss
•~...;,•;;• STANDARDS OF REVIEW^ nYm ;.. -the action,, the. court shall review tjie. pro[1] The trial court's decision''to7 de'hy ceeding. If the.court finds that theJailure
Heat6n'srmbtibtf to dismiss %afeb^se6rOri;its ,, of,the. prpseciiting attorney, to, have, the
legal Conclusion- that under the •' detainer stat- ,.-,matter heard ,within the time, requirASs
ute the'clerk's:Mmimstrative mistake could ..not supported ibygoodj' epuse, whether; a
previous . > motion for^continiianee, was
excusei' the"prosecutbrV duty to 'bring"Heaton's' charges! to trial .within the 120-day peri- \i .madeKor not, . the court shall order,the
od. Because/this is^a* legal* rather than a ^matter dismissed with,prejudice..,,,•,'. ,,,
factual, conclusion, we; review.the trial court's Utah Code Ann. :;§ 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (emdecision for correctness. See State v.. Peter- phasis added).
::
sen, 810 P.2d.421,;425;(i/tah1991).;';;;;In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the
[2,3] Whether a waiver of counsel was district court made the following ruling:
made kno\yingly^ and, intelligently is a mixed :..5;[T]his Court is going to deny;the Defendant's [motion on] the basis- that I believe
question of law and fact. We review the trial
••••'

• '

:

:'•••"-':.

'•••"

. ••''V>•-.};.:•:

''••» " > V " -
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of which was occasioned-fry the court derk's
error, constituted "good-cause" and thereby
relieved the prosecutor of its burden-under
the statute. , We first-note that the judge's
finding that the State did not * contributed
the delay .carries little significance. ><The
mere fact that the^delay was not cause<i by
The facts are that the bulk of thet-delay, the prosecutor has never been considered
60 days at least of it,was the. fault prpba- dispositive because, "to Kpld that (good cause
: bly of the Clerk's office in this case..,: And ig supported. by the/lone feet t h a t ^ e delay
again I don't know whether that fits into was not caused by the prosecutor would ccm1
.what could be called-, a good cause .shown, tradict the language in section 77-2^-11:4)
but the Court believes that it happens which places! the burden, of coniplying .with
from time to time,, that there can be]that the statute on the prosecution." Id. at 426;
kind of a glitch.
_' "'V .• '..'•';...'. see also^ Wilson, 453, P ^ a t .1?M0 (revers-r
And certainly: the.jDefendantcpuld have ing trial court's decision notto,dismiss, notpushed to find out why his case liad not withstanding, feet that prosecution clid not
*M'' ••,•••;•* • ••-••i wtf*- •••.'»
been set for trial. [He] [ciould haye c a u s e d e l a y ) .
pushed his counsel to make that request,
% 7] The State'ar^ie^that while it could
[a]nd. was in the same position [as was],the
have followed up on the cases earlier^ "defenStsite.tfc»-.. i ':i-i,- .'i\ •;•.,.••:.....»:. .... ^' : --j"..,- VVM
dant cites ho precede^ for attribtitmg td the
The case sat And it is unfortunate it prbsecutd^ the responsibility fbr'anticipating
did, but the Court;,will deny the motion at or preventing unexpected and infrequent adthis time.
•.._,, ,....,.;
ministrative mistakes made by co.urt personThe district court's ruling contradicts sec- nel.";>,.We agree-,with the State, that . it is not
tion 77-^29-1 and our pribr case law.; The resporisible for. the administrative mistakes
statute. requires the prosecutor "to have, the of the courtv.vNevertheless, it is responsible
matter- heard within the. time required." for complying with section ,77-29-1.. ..Because
Utah Code Ann.,§ 77-29^1(4), ,-Moreover, the statute .places on thevprosecutor alone
this court has; consistently (held, that, the lan- the burden of bringing thehvcase;to: trial withguage ,.of the detainer, statute;clearly places in the 120-rday i)eriod, the prosecutor's iduty
the burden of complying with the statute, on must be independent of the court's docketing
the prosecutor. See Petersen, 810 P.^djiat system. While Heaton's case-fell victim to
424; State %. Wilson,',22.Utah; 2d 3 6 ^ 4 ^ ;&i administrative "glitch*', at the clerk's •ofP.2d 158, 160. (1969)., In Petersen, tfee'trjal fice, his case- also fell through a crack in* the
court asked the defendant whether the .trial prosecutor's: office;>• Even though'the prose^
date was acceptable, and the defendant did cutor's office received Heaton's detainer nonot object to the date, which was outside the tice on September 8, 1994, neither the briefs
120-day period. Nevertheless, this court nor our review of the fecoM. indicates that
concluded that the defendant was'not re- the prosecutor'-even addressed Heaton's dequired to object to the trial date in order to tainer notice to the court until. February 16,
maintain his rights under the statute because 1995, after the dispositionperibd had Already
the burden of bringing the case to trial with- expired;- Wheii a prisoner delivers a written
in the disposition period rested solely with notice pursuant to the^detainer statute, the
the prosecution. 810 P.2d at 424. Thus, in prosecutor has^ an ^affirmative duty to have
the case at bar, the (court clearly erred in the defendant's matter heard within the^ statconcluding that Heaton was in the same posi- utory period;; Implicit in this duty'is the
tion as was the State and therefore shared
duty to notify the court that a detainer notice
some of the responsibility to find out why his
has been filed and to make a good faith effort
case had not been set for trial.... ,.,,, . : ,
,to comply with the^statute. This is not to
[5] The trial court furtherr erred ini its say that the-prosecutor; must; succeed>; ^fpr
legal conclusion that the 71-niay delay, most "good cause" may support -rthe^pTosecutor's
that there has been good ;cause[.]. And
that term doesn't quitefitin this, situation,
but explainable cause shown as to why the
delay occurred. And the Courts does, not
•findin any way that it.was as asresult-of
the prosecution's dragging its feet.
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failure to comply,^ • However, where the" prosecutor's failure is inaction—in this case,: doing nothing whatsoever to bring Heaton's
case to trial within?-the statutory period—the
trial courtvmay not conclude that the prosecutor's failure is supported by "good cause."
[8,9] Nevertheless, even if the lower
court erred in its legal' edrielusioiis, this' court
may. a t o m a trial court's' decision on any
reasonable legal basis, provided that aiiy rationale for affirmance finds support in'the
recorbf. See' K & f, Inc.1''% Koroulis, '888
P.2d %23; ); 6^ (IJtaH,!1994);;ri/iH b>SeMe
. First'"Ntiil Bokk,^
P2& 2 4 1 / M ^ U t a h
1992)" Deciding whether the district court
properly Sehied Heaton's motion to; 'dismiss
pursuant'to the detainer statute requires a
two-step inquiry. First, we must determine
when the 120-day period (.commenced and
when,, it expired. Second, if the trial was
held .outside the 120r-day period, w,e. must
then determine whether "good cause" excused ,the delay.
;

rized agent.at the prison received Heaton's
written notice." However, Heaton did cause a.
trial/delay. As set forth above, the court
initially scheduled trial for September 9,
1994. At his pretrial conference on August
30, Heaton requested a preliminary hearing,
which he had initially waived. The prosecutor having no objection^ the court granted
Heaton's request, changing the trial; date to
the preliminary bearing date. But for Heaton's1 request for'a preliminary hearing, his
case would have^beeri^brought ibJ trial on
September 9, 'just" *6 days after his 'written
notice had' been*' delivered. Thus',' fieaton
delayed his own trial and indicated his s willingnessto' temporarily waive his rights under
the /detainer statute. /'See Velasquez, 641

P.Matll6?

When the court changed Heaton's. trial
date to the preliminary hearing date,- in effect I t "continued Heaton's-trial pending the
outcome' of the preliminary hearing. Had
[10] The detainer statute clearly? provides the court not found probable cause at the
that the 120-day period commences on the hearing,: it would have had :lo dismiss the
date the written notice is delivered : "to the charges.. See;Utah R.Crim>P..7^hX3)/ Howwarden, sheriff or custodial officer in; authori- ever/ the court did - find probable cause, and
ty, or any appropriate agent of the? same." therefore scheduled a' second arraignment
Utah Code Ann. §'77-29-1(1); see also State for September 27/ ' T h e court could hot set a
v. Viles,- 702 P;2d;1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) new trial date until. Heaton entered his pleas
f
(holding that 12CMay disposition period com- at the second arraignment: Thus/ because
;
:
mences from date rof delivery :of; written no- Heaton's trial date was continued for the
tice to warden, not from date defense.counsel purpose of accommodating his request for a
files notice of appearance). ; .However, this preliminary hearing, and because a'new trial
court has held that when a prisoner himself date could 'hot even have been considered
acts to delay the trial,- he indicates .his. will- until the'second arraignment, Heaton niajr
ingness to l temporarily waive i his right ,to, a not include the 18 days between September 9
speedy: trial. .[Thus, the disposition period and September 217 as part of the 120-da;y
must be extended by the amount of time disposition period. "
'
;
during which the prisoner ^himself.(Creates the
delay./See"Statejv.: Velasquez^ 641 P.2d 115, J Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to
116 (Utah 1982) (concluding that where de- Heaton, the State had until January 19, 1995,
fendant's trial date was originally scheduled to bring Heaton to trial.V Although the court
less than, one month ; after defendant's re- initially attempted to set the jtrial for Januquest for disposition and • court: granted, de- ary 19, 1995, it scheduled the trial beyond
fendant's request for continuanee^defendant the disposition period because of the defense
was responsible for number of;;days during counsel's and prosecutor's scheduling coh^which continuance was granted and, could not flict. Therefore, we must proceed to step
include those days in disposition, period).
two of our inquiry to determine whether
In the case at bar, the'I204iay disposition continuing the trial to accommodate, in part,
period commenced on- September 3/1994, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good
because that I s ; the date ori' which an autho- cause" under section 77-29-1.

;•
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[11] A nearly identical issue was raised in
State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2dl47
(1970), wherein the initially scheduled trial
date fell within the disposition period, but
because defense counsel had a • scheduling
conflict the court rescheduled the trial for
five days beyond the- disposition period.
This court concluded that: section 77-65-1,
the predecessor to section 77!-29-l,4 permitted the court to grant, "'foj*,a good cause
shown in open court . V, any necessary or
reasonable continuance..';" . Bonny, All P.2d
at 147-48 {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-651). Thus, because the trial was rescheduled
at defense counsel's request and to accommodate his schedule, this.court held that' the
trial court/ had authority to' grant such .a
continuance, which was "entirely reasonable
and practical under the circumstances." M
at 148.

S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Edv 1461 (1938). If an accused is indigent, .he is entitled to courtappointed counsel. : See ••>State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2da20/421 (Utah 1986). However, the Sixth Amendment also guarantees
an accused the right to : self-representation,
"provided only thatrhe [or she], knowingly
and intelligently forgoes; his [or her] right to
counsel." • McKaskle .-.#.s.Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 173,/104 S.Ct. 944,; 79;.L,Ed.2d 122
(1984); see also Farettav.- California, 422
U.S. 806, 807, 818) .85 S.Ct 2§25, 45 L.Ed.2d
562 (1975).
The right to have the "assistance of counsel
in a criminal trial is a'fundamental c d h s t t e
tional right which'must be jealously protected by-the trial ^ourt. ilie United States
Supreme Court'Has'stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by' counsel invokes, of itself,
the protection of a trial court, iri which the
accused—whose life orlfcertyis at s t a k e is without counsel. Tliis protecting' dMy
imposes the serious and Mighty responsibility upon the tridl judge of determining
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.

Because section 77-29-1(3) contains substantially ; the same language as section 7765-1. and gives the court discretion to .grant
continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is applicable to the case at bar. The January 19,
1995, date initially offered by the trial court
fell within the 120-day disposition period,
and,the court was therefore within its authority to, grant a reasonable continuance Jojmso^ 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (emunder section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate de- phasis added). Because of the importance of
fense counsel's schedule. In light of the the right to, counsel and the heavy .burden
other criminal trial both defense counsel and placed upon the trial court to protect this
the prosecutor were engaged in, setting Hea- right, there is a presumption against waiver,
ton's trial one month beyond the,disposition and doubts concerning waiver, must be, reperiod was not unreasonable. Therefore, we solved, in the defendant's favor. See,,, e.g.,
hold that,while the.district court, erred,sin its Johnson, 304;U.S.7at 464, 58.s. S.Ct. .1019
M
legal conclusions, extending the trial date to ( '[C]ourts indulge every reasonable ^rea reasonable time outside the disposition pe- sumption! against waiver' of fundamental conriod to accommodate, in part, defense coun- stitutional rights." (quoting Aetna Ins. Co.
sel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809,
;
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937))); United States v. "Wilcorrectly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss. liamson,806 F.2d'216, 220 (10th Cir.1986)
(doubts concerning waiver of-counsel'must be
[12,13].... We next address Heaton's argu- resolved in defendant's favor).
ment that he did not knowingly and-intelli[14-16]
When
a
trial,
court
is
confronted
gently waive his constitutional right to appointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to with a defendant who either, refuses, to prothe United States Constitution guarantees an ceed to trial with, appointed counsel .or insists
accused the right to the assistance of counsel. on proceeding pro se, the court must carefulv
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U;S. 335, ly consider the defendant's' rigHt to self-^rep342-44, 83 S.Ct., 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); resentatiori with l^'/pg^^-Munsel^ NeverJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 theless, before .the v^eourt ,^ay, permit.Vithe
4. Section 77-29-1, enacted in 1980,; replaced

section 77-65-1.
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defendant to proceed without the assistance accused's^ professed waiver of counsel is unof counsel, the court ffiust conduct a thor- derstaridingly > arid wisely made .only from* a
ough inquiry of the''defendant to fulfill fits penetrating and comprehensive examination
duty of insuring that-the-defendant's waiver of all the circumstances."). In Frampton? we
of counsel is knowingly,a intelligently, and also stated ;>that> in the absence of such a
voluntarily made. • In making this determina- colloquy, we will look at any evidence in: the
tion, the court must advise the defendant of record to determine-whether the particular
the dangers and disadvantages of self-repre- facts and circumstances' support a valid waivF
sentation "so vthat the record will establish er. 737 P.2d-at 188;
that 'he knows what he--is doing--and his
[17] However, in light of the foregoing
choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, discussidri, this,court is; reluctant to assume
1
:
422 U.S; at -835, 95 S.C^ 2525 '(quoting the important responsibility'whichhas b&eri
Adams v. United States ex ret. McCahni 317 placed upon' ther trial court ' After ajl,' the
U.S,jr269, 279, ,63 S.Ct- 236, ,87 ,L,Ed.,268 trial court—hayingthe berieffi'of questioning
(1942)); see Von MoUke^ Gillies,, 332* U.S. the defendant arid bbserving his deriiefarior-^708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct^Jl^, 92" kJSd,. 309 is in trie best position to determine whether
,(1948); :,State v^rFram%tpn, ",737 P>2djl83, the defendant knowingly,'voluntarily, and in187-88 (Utah 1987). L 'In Edition,' 'the Atrial telligently waiveid his right to cminsei.'; In
court should (1) advise the defendant of-his contrast, thiis court's proper role is to review
constitutional right to tne assistance of coun- the trial court's findings and conclusions and
sel, as well as his constitutional fright Ho then determine whether the trial court5correpresent m^self;;; (2)'ascertain that the de- rectly concluded that the -defendant validly
fendant possesses the intelligence and capaci- waived counsel. - A meaningful review of the
ty to understand and appreciate the conse- trial court>'can take place ;b"nly after-that
quences of the decision to represent himself, court has conducted a meaningful inquiry of
including the expectation that the defendant the defendant. ; Therefore; in the absence- of
will comply with technical rules and the rec- such a colloquy, this court will' look^at the
ognition that presenting a defense is not just record and make-a de novo determination
a matter of telling one's story;r arid (3) ascer- regarding the validity of the defendant's
tain that the defendant comprehends the riaL waiver only in extraordinary circumstances,
ture of the charges and' proceedings) the the existence of which We will address on a
range of' permissible punishrhentsy' arid :any case-by-case basis- See Harding; '834 F.2d
additional facts essential to a broad under- a t 8 5 7 . ••:•'•••. ••••-•• • - • ^ . r
):.•..:..•:
v:
standing of the case. See State v. Fr#6,224
Conn. 253, 617 A.2d 1382,1386-87 (1992); ^ee '"' In the case at bar, the 1trial court clearly
also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88.5 • ^ v -S '• did not' advise Heaton of the dangers arid
disadvantages of self-represehtatioii. The
This court stated in Frampton that a collo- day before trial, during the hearing addressquy on the record between the court and the ing Heatori's motion for new counsel', the trial
defendant is the preferred method of deter- judge stated: '" " ' r"'"•"'
mining the validity of a.waiver,of counsel. ,,'"'" Now, with respect to counsel, you ^do
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 1&7. ",.r The reasoning " have the right to represent y°urself- I ani
not going to allow Mr. 'Caine's withdrawal
behind this, conclusion is that ithei information
at this pomt. Mr; C^me is' a capable denecessary for the court to" ma% its determination generally "can only be elicited after f'; fense attorney. He is. very familiar with
penetrating questioning by-the'' trial' court." •••;: the facts1 in ' your case. * I am going to
Id.; see also VonMoWie, 332U.S. at 724/68 •'y* require that he remain on- as -counsel to
S.CtL3i6 ("A judge can make certain that-an •'•'•* assist you if you want thetassistancej. • !
5. . ;In, Framptom Tas a guide for trial courts, ..this
court quoted a sLxteen-point colloquy recom1
mended to the federal'courts for use' j whehtori•''Fronting !ai. prospective pro se defendant. Frampton, 111 P.2d at 187-88 n. 12 (citing Bench Book
for United States District Court Judges, vol: 1,

w§§ 1,02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, '3d eo\
''i'986)). Once again, we strongly recommend
that trial courts use that-approach; ;as it is'an
'effective means by, which to; vdetennine. whether
the defendant has validly waived his right to
• > counsel/'

Cite a* 958 P.2d 919 (Utah 1998)

Mr: Heaton, if during the .process of the
Jury selection,, and the defense that you
want to present during the trial, you want
to handle that on your own, you are free to
do that. And you will be making that
decision as you ^oi We will makeTa record
of your decision to handle those riiatters on
your own if that's yourchoice.''',
; My recommendation, to you,,is' that you
rely on Mr. Caine's expertise.and experience and have him help you. But you can
make that choice.
V
The. court's cursory recommendation to
Heaton to rely on defense counsel did not
apprise Heaton in any way.of the. constitutional significance of the right to counsel and
the consequences of waiver.,. .The t .State, argues that Heaton should have been* aware of
the dangers and.disadvantages of self-representation because on the rlay;,p^ trial, after
the jury- had been selected, the:cpurt strongly advised Heaton .to allow defense, counsel to
cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch
as Heaton would certainly not be as effective
as .defense counsel. While the court's advice
was; certainly appropriate, it addressed only
one of the ; disadvantages of self-representation—i.e., not having experience and expertise in cross-examining witnesses. Moreover, the trial cotirt had' already deterniined
that iieatori had decided to' represent himself. As we have previously mentioned^ before a trial court riiay'pehnit a defendant to
proceed pro se, the court must'deterriiine
whether the defendant cbriipeteritly waived
counsel at the time. of waiver, not after.

We reverse Heaton's convictions and order
a new trial.
; HQWE,;CJ., DURHAM, Associate CJ.,
land STEWART and ZIMMERMAf ,:.JJ.,
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion.
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Former justice court judge brought action alleging county coirimission's pre-election elimination: of his precinct ;violated statutory prohibition against abolishing precincts
within SO days of-an election; The First District Court, Box Elder County, 'Ben H. Hadfield, J., granted summary judgment in favpr
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,We therefore hold that jbecause the trial
court failed to advise Heaton, at a minimum,
of the dangers and' disadvantages of setfrepresentatiorij Hektori did not validly waive
his constitutional right to courisel. The trial
court erred in permitting' Heaton to proceed
pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a new trial.
Reversed.
There are no e'xtradrcunary circumstances in
this 'case which would-justify' our exarniriatibn
of the record and maidrig1 a de novo determination as to whether Heaton knowingly arid 1. Appeal and Error ®»842(1)
Interpretation of statutes poses a quesintelligently waived : his • right to- counsel.
Moreover, because the waiver of counsel'is- tion of law, which Supreme Courftreviews for
sue is dispositive, of this appeal, we need not correctness and without deference to the lower court's conclusions..
address Heaton'& other,arguments. vvti;'.
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4. Criminal Law ^577.11(1)
Utah detainer statute, requiring
er against whom untried indictment or
mation was pending to be brought t
within 120 days of date of delivery of \
notice to warden, is designed to promc
prompt prosecution of charges againsi
oners, to prevent those charged with er
ment of criminal statutes from holding
head of a prisoner undisposed of cl
against him, and while not supplanting
statutes of limitation for various crim
encourage trials while witnesses are ava
and their memories are fresh. U.CA.uoo,
77-29-1.
""^
5. Criminal Law <s»577.10(10)
Under Utah detainer statute, after;, iai!
prisoner appropriately requests speedy reso-"0:
lution of pending charges, the .burden shifts ]
to the prosecution to commence trial withui'*
the 120-day period set out in the statute
prisoner's request must comply with tht
quirements of the statute in order V
effective. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.

• Parolee appealed conviction entered in
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis Frederick, J., pursuant to 6. Criminal Law ®=>577.10(10)
conditional guilty plea to various drug-relatPrisoner's statutory right to deir
ed felonies. The Court of appeals, Orme, J.,
speedy
trial was not triggered by wri
held that statutory right to demand speedy
trial was not triggered by written request for request for disposition of pending char
disposition of pending charges, where no for- where defendant had not been charged v
crimes by indictment or information,
mal charges were pending.
thus, no formal charges were pending
Affirmed.
..
which he could be tried under statute reqi
ing prisoner against whom untried ind
ment or information was pending to
1, Criminal Law <3=>1134(3)
brought to trial within 120 days of date
Matters of statutory interpretation pres- deliver}' of written notice to warden speci
ent questions of law which Court of Appeals ing nature of charge and court in which it
reviews for correctness, according no particu- was pending; prisoner was not entitled tolar deference to the trial court's interpreta- tender request in anticipation of forthcoming*
tion.
charges, as statute spoke in terms of untried
information
pending against
prisoner;
2. Statutes <3=>181Q)
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.
. • •>
Court of Appeals' primary objective in
construing enactments is to give effect t o the 7. Criminal Law <s»1134(3)
]\
legislature's intent.
Deciding whether the district court.'
properly denied a prisoner's motion to disX Statutes <S^188
miss pursuant to detainer statute, requiring
When examining a statute, Court of Apprisoner
against whom untried indictment or
peals looks first to its plain language as the
information is pending to be brought to trial' •
est indicator of the legislature's intent and
within 120 days of date of delivery of written
; urpose in passing the statute.
notice to warden, requires a two-step inquiry:
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Efct, Court of Appeals must determine when
fe 120-day period commenced and when it
jl&jred. and second, if the trial was held
Hlgide the 120-day period, Court of Appeals
K g t then determine whether "good cause"
Bused the delay. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.-^
• C r i m i n a l Law'<s=>577.10(10) '
BT. Premature request for disposition under
lltainer statute, requiring prisoner against
fyhom untried indictment or information was
pending to be brought to trial within 120
da^s of date of delivery of written' notice to
warden, does not later "kick in" once the
information is ultimately filed or the indictment returned; premature request is simply
a nullity, having no legal effect. U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1.
- . •• r<
9?J Criminal Law <§=*577.2 ...
Purpose of detainer statute, requiring
prisoner against whom untried indictment or,
information ; was, pending to be brought, to
trial within 120 days of date of delivery of
written notice to warden, is. • to promote
speedy trials, not the speedy filing of informations. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.
\, .
Kristine M. Rogers, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
Jan Graham, Kris C. Leonard, and Scott
W. Reed, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and
THORNE.

speedy trial pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-29-1 (1999). See State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Gt.App.1988). Lindsay,
who lodged an invocation of his speedy trial
right with the prison warden, argues the
claims against him should have been : dismissed for violation of the statute. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND
112 On July 23, 1998, Lindsay, who was on
parole at the time, was arrested and booked
on several charges. Soon thereafter his parole was revoked, and he was returned to
prison.1 On October 6, 1998, after his rein^
carceration, Lindsay filed a "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges,"'
pursuant to Utah Code' Ann. §77-29-1
(1999). Section 77-29-1 states, in relevant
part, with our emphasis:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term
of imprisonment in the iitate prison, jail or
other penal or correctional institution of
this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner inthis state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner
shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same,, a written demand
specifying the nature of the charge and the
court, wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall
be entitled to have the charge brought to
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery
of written notice.
.,

OPINION

11 Defendant Michael Cole Lindsay entered guilty pleas on, various drug-related
felonies. Lindsay conditioned his,; pleas of
guilt on his right to*, appeal the. trial court's,
conclusion regarding his statutoryright to a

(4) In the event the charge is not brought
to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of
the prosecuting attorney to have the matother survivors feverishly administered CPR,' ulti-

1. Lindsay has applied himself.-;to constructive
pursuits while in prison. T He is a member of a
highly-regarded inmate fire-fighting team called
the Flame-n-go's. While-fighting a fire in the
Stansbury Mountains • on August 23, 2000, a
Flame-n-go's crew, including Lindsay, was
struck by lightning. Lindsay was knocked unconscious. When he came to, he discovered
team members , Michael Bishop and Rodgie
Braithwaite lying on the ground. He and the

mately to no avail. Bishop and Braithwaite were.
the first Flame-n-go's to die in the line of duty in
the group's 22-year history. See The Salt Lake1
Tribune, August 24, 2000, at A-l; The. Deseret
News, August 25, 2000, at B-l. Without in any
way condoning the conduct that led to their
incarceration, we. salute the Flame-n-go's, the.
.sacrifice of their fallen comrades, and Lindsay's
devotion to duty. •
,
.;
,, •

ORME, Judge:

ter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
113 The information formally 'charging
Lindsay with the crimes for which he was
arrested on July 23, 1998, was not filed until
March 2, 1999, almost five full months after
he filed his disposition request. On April 6,
1999, Lindsay moved to .dismiss the charges
against him, alleging the 120-day statutory
time frame had begun to run when he filed
his disposition request with the warden and
thus had long since expired. On May 3, the
magistrate denied his motion to dismiss. After bindover, Lindsay renewed his motion to
dismiss in the district court. On July 16r the
district court denied the motion to dismiss
and adopted the magistrate's findings, conclusions, and order. On July 20, 1999, Lindsay entered his conditional guilty pleas. This
appeal followed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] 114 Lindsay argues the district court
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann.'§ 77-29-1
(1999) by refusing to dismiss- the charges
pending against him because more than 120
days had transpired between when he tendered his disposition request and when his
trial was scheduled to commence. Matters
of statutory interpretation present questions
of law which we review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial
court's interpretation. See State v. Harley,
1999 UT App 197,1119-10, 982 P.2d 1145,
cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
[2,3] 115 In reviewing the trial court's
application of section 77-29-1, we apply longstanding rules of statutory construction.
"This court's primary objective in construing
enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent." Gohlerv. Wood, 919 P.2d 561,
562 (Utah 1996). " 'When examining a statute, we look first to its plain language,as the
best indicator of the legislature's intent and
purpose in passing the statute.' "; Holmes v.
2. The Utah Supreme Court long ago determined
that the time limit in the detainer-statute did not
create a different statute of limitation for inear-

American States Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 552,
UT App 85,1-10-, 391 Utah Adv. Rep. r|§
(quoting Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, !
P.2d.416, 418 (Utah 1998)). Thereto
"where the statutory language is plain
unambiguous, we do not look beyond t h j
language's plain meaning to divine legislative
intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sum
821 P.2d 1167,1168 (Utah 1991).
;3
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[4] 116 Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (199™
known as the detainer statute, is designedly
promote the prompt prosecution of chargeJj
against prisoners, "to prevent those charged!
with enforcement of criminal statutes frono|
holding over the head of a prisoner undis^
posed of charges against him." State v. WiX$
son, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969^
The statute, while not supplanting other statutes of limitation for various crimes,2 encour^
ages trials "while witnesses are available ancB
• ^

;. ..to

their memories are fresh." Id. The s t a t u t e ^
designed to "protect the constitutional right'i
of prisoners to a speedy trial," State v. Viles?*
702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985), and ttr
"more precisely define what is meant by;
'speedy trial,'" as constitutionally guaran-...
tied. Wilson, 453 P.2d at 159.
^
[5] 117 After a prisoner appropriately re-;
quests speedy resolution of pending charges/
the burden shifts to the prosecution to commence trial within the 120-day period set out
in the statute. See State v. Petersen, 810
P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). However, the'
request must comply with the requirements
of the statute in order to be effective. See
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah
1987).
H8 Lindsay argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion t^o dismiss. In denying
the motion, the trial c/)urt adopted the magistrate's conclusion:
The Court finds that the 120 day requirement of Utah Code Annotated § 77. 29-1 et seq. is triggered by an information
or indictment existing or pending against
the defendant. The date of defendant's
cerated individuals. See State v. Farnsworth, 30
Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (1974).

fined as "[throughout the continuance of;
during." Id. Facing a similar question ; of
interpretation regarding whether a judge
had made an inappropriate. comment during
a "pending proceeding," the Utah Supreme
Court recently said:
Although the Code of Judicial Conduct
[say's request for disposition was premature,
does not define "pending,proceeding," the
land thus not properly tendered, because no
meaning of the .term is easily understood.
linfbrmation had been filed, and thus was not
"Pending," by definition, means "begun,
|-officially pending, when the request was
but not yet completed; during; before. thes
linade.
conclusion of; prior to the completion of;
| ••.[?> ,71 1f 9 "Deciding whether the district
unsettled; undetermined; in process of
court properly denied [Lindsay's] motion to.
settlement or adjustment." Black's ' Law
dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute reDictionary 1291 (rev.14th ed.1968). '
quires a two-step inquiry. First, we must
determine when the 120-day period com- In re Young, 1999 UT 81,133. n. 7, 984 P.2d
menced and when it expired." State v. Hea- 997.
tb%958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). "Second,
II12 The problem with Lindsay's request
if the trial was held outside the 120-klay is that, although parole revocation proceed-,
period, we must then determine whether ings were in process, at the time he made his
'good cause' excused the delay." Id. In this request there were no criminal charges pendcase, we must decide whether the 120-day ing against him for which he could be tried in
period was properly triggered by Lindsay's court.4 An action cannot be pending when it
request for disposition, which followed-•. his is yet to be commenced. As explained, with
arrest but preceded the filing of an informa- our emphasis, in the rules,
tion against him. Our answer obviates any
[u]nless otherwise provided, all criminal .
need to move to the second step of analysis.
prosecutions whether for felony, misdeU 10 The plain language of the detainer
meanor or infraction shall be commenced
statute provides that the 120-day period
by the filing of an information dr the recommences on the date the written notice is
turn of an indictment. Prosecution by indelivered "to the warden, sheriff or custodial
formation shall be commenced before a
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent
magistrate having jurisdiction of the ofof the same." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1)
fense alleged to have been committed,un(1999). No one disputes that Lindsay made
less otherwise provided by law.
* •
such a request on October 6,199& However, Utah R.Crim.P. 5(a). Thus, without such an
formal charges must be pending against him official filing, there were; no charges "pendwhen the request is delivered. It is hot ing" against Lindsay on October 6, 1998.
appropriate to tender a request in anticipa- The 120-day period could not commence untion of forthcoming charges, as the statute til March 2, 1999, the day the information
speaks in terms of an untried information charging him was filed.
"pending against the prisoner." 3 Id.
. 113 . While an arrest is not a meaningless
111 "Pending" is1 defined as "[remaining gesture, the statute does not in any way
undecided; awaiting decision." Black's Law suggest a mere arrest is adequate to trigger
Dictionary 1154 (7th ed.1999). It is also dearrest and/or his filing of a request for
^disposition of detainer prior to charges
joeing filed is irrelevant for purposes of
'.calculating the time requirement set forth

3. The decision to bring charges at all is in the
prosecutor's discretion. In many cases a defendant might be able to anticipate which charges
are likely to be officially filed, but until the time
of filing, no one can be certain what action the
prosecutor will take. Therefore, logically, it
makes no sense to start the 120-day period with
a defendant's merely anticipatory request for disposition.

4. The Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized that reincarceration as a result of a parole
violation, standing alone, does not trigger a defendant's speedy trial right regarding a different
crime. See State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711, 713
(Utah 1985).
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,,. the 120-day period. Rather, the statute spetheless, that "at the time the [alleged req^,
cifically states that the action must relate to
for disposition] was sent, defendant hacUij
a "pending . . . untried indictment or inforyet been charged with the . . . robbery/;!
mation." 5 Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1
no untried indictment or information'5'®
(1999). Before charges are formally brought
pending against defendant. Thus, not]
in an information, which eventually occurred
triggered the statutory right to demand «
in this case, the prosecution follows several
on any 'untried indictment or information^!
steps that had not taken place when Lindsay
(citation omitted); State v. Clark, 28 Utah%,
made his request for disposition. -See State
272, 501 P.2d 274, 276 (1972) (recognizihgl
exrel Cannon v. Leary, '646 P.2d 727, 730
persuasive State ex rel Dennis v. Morph&rk
(Utah 1982) (detailing how prosecutor first
ios, 252 So.2d 845 (Fla.Ct.App. 1971), and'cS
screens case, authorizes prosecution by signing its holding that any request for d i s p ^
ing information, presentment of information
tion filed "before" the charging informal^
to magistrate, subscribing and swearing to
• "is a nullity").
• ""^
information by complaining witnesses, and
finally filing information with clerk of court).
[9] 1115 The purpose of the statute isjjL
Whether—and with what—the prosecution
would charge Lindsay were questions "pend- promote speedy trials, not the speedy filitM
ing" in one sense of the term when Lindsay of informations. Lindsay's request came tog||
made his request. But according to the plain early in the process—defendants must awaitij
the;filing of an information or the return^eM
language of the statute, an "indictment of
an indictment for an action to be official!^
information" must have been brought so
pending. Lindsay jumped the gun, andhis§l
that it was "pending" against Lindsay; the
request for disposition had no legal effectiff
mere possibility of such was simply riot
Lindsay was entitled to file a valid request^!
enough. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999)
for disposition only after the information was"-U
6
(emphasis added) .
filed.
[8],, If 14 Moreover, a premature request
for disposition does not later "kick in" once
the information is ultimately Sled QT the indictment returned. A premature request is
simply a nullity, having no legal effect. Cf.
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah
1987) (While finding no actual request for
disposition was filed, Court concluded, nqne5. Defendant's parole revocation proceeding featured a document entitled "Information on Parole Violation," generated on .August 3, 1998.
Such an "information" is not the,, sort contemplated in the statute. The statute refers to "trial
within 120 days" arid "the court wherein'[the
information or indictment] is pending,'; ;thus
making it clear the statute refers only to the
traditional and statutorily identified "information" used to commence a criminal proceeding.
Significantly, no document formally entitled an
"information" is required to commence parole
revocation proceedings, see Utah Code Admin.P.
R671-405-1, R671-509-1 to -516 (2000), and
Adult Probation and Parole's choice of terms in
captioning the document, while inadvertently
adding an additional layer of intrigue to our
resolution of when an "information" is "pend-

CONCLUSION
1fl6 Charges cannot be pending against.'a
defendant until an indictment or information
is filed with the court. Therefore, Lindsay's
motion to dismiss was properly denied by the
district court. Moreover, such a request, if
filed before charges are pending, is a nullity,
ing" for purposes of section 77-29-1, is of ho'
moment.
6. While we conclude a case must first be "pending" to invoke the 120-day period, there are
limits. For example, as the Utah Supreme. Court
recognized under a previous version of the statute, when a pending 'case is dismissed after a .
defendant has filed his request that the pending
charges be disposed of, and the prosecution then
refiles, the new "complaint, information or indictment does not affect the commencement of"
the original 120-day period. State v. Moore, 521
• P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1974) (applying Utah Code
' Ann. § 77-65-1 (a) (1953) with its 90-day period
for commencement of trial). Such manipulative
tactics would not restart the 120-day clock, even
though the case, after its first dismissal, would
not technically still be "pending."
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K

g no legal effect, including when the
;es are later officially filed. "

l*f.:17 Affirmed.

IS:-

'

if 18 WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings,
idge, William A,. Thorne, Jr., Judge.

: SYSTEM^

1. Child Support €>89
Divorced father was not entitled, as matter of law, to exemption from having income
imputed to him, for purposes of paying child
support, because he was obtaining a bachelor's degree under statute permitting exemption in pursuing career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; four-year
college education was not training contemplated by statute, since it would afford employment at a level far beyond that necessary
to establish basic job skills. U.C.A.1953, 7845-7.5(7)(d)(iii).
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jjawn MANCIL, Plaintiff, and Appellee,

Serald SMITH, Defendant and Appellant
State of Utah, Office of Recovery
Services, Intervenor.
No. 990804-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah. : ,
Dec. 29, 2000.
In post divorce proceeding, after former
husband was ordered to pay child support,
he filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was a full-time student with no
income other than his Social Security Disability Insurance and so should be excused
from paying child support. The Fourth District Court, Provo Department, GuyR. Birmingham, J., denied motion. Former husband
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J.,
held that:' (1) husband was not entitled, as
matter of law, to exemption from having
income imputed to him, for purposes of paying child support, because he was obtaining a
bachelor's degree; (2) evidence was: sufficient
to impute former husband's income though
trial court made no explicit findings as to
husband's occupational., qualifications and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds; and .(3) Social Security Administration's determination that ; former husband was disabled was not material change
in circumstances justifying a child support
modification.
. Affirmed.

2. Divorce <®=>150
Trial court's findings in divorce proceeding are adequate only if they are sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
3. Appeal and Error <s»919
In determining whether trial court properly dismissed action for failure to state
claim upon which relief may be granted,
Court of Appeals assumes factual allegations
in complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in light most favorable to
plaintiff. Rules CivJProc, Rule 12(b)(6).
4. Divorce @=>184(5)
In divorce proceeding. Court of Appeals
reviews a determination on whether a substantial change of circumstances has, been
shown for abuse of discretion.
5. Child Support @=>201
Evidence was sufficient to impute former husband's income at rate of pay of $6.00
an hour for purposes of determining child
support obligation, though trial 5 court made
no explicit findings as to husband's occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings
for persons of similar backgrounds, where
husband's qualifications, background, and actual past earnings were, not; in dispute.
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7.5(7).
6. Child Support <3=>234
Social Security Administration's determination that former husband was, disabled
was not material change in circumstances
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IV. CONCLUSION
H 156 Inez Campbell had no standing to
sue State Farm for bad faith, and the jury
never found that State Farm was liable to
her in that regard. Her only actionable
claims were for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As a result, the
trial court's multiple instructions that State
Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for bad faith tainted both the entire
verdict as to Mrs; Campbell and the punitive
damages assessed against State Farm in behalf of Mr. Campbell. Accordingly, I would
(1) reverse as to Mrs. Campbell's claim for
bad faith, (2) vacate and remand for a, new
trial on Mrs. Campbell's, claims for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress,.(3)
affirm on the issue, of State Farm's liability
to Mr. Campbell, and (4) vacate and remand
for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages as to Mr. Campbell inasmuch as that
award was rendered jointly to both Mr.
Campbell and Mrs. Campbell.
O i KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

Contending that Crookston does not question
the legitimacy of joint punitive damage awards,
the majority opinion assails the argument. that
the punitive award in this case must be vacated.
However, the majority's contention must fail for
at least two reasons. First, in characterizing the
necessity for vacating the punitive award solely
"due to its joint nature," Justice Durham oversimplifies the reasons stated above for why the
award must fail. While Crookston did recognize
the policy objectives of punitive damages to in;
elude "punish[ment] and deter[rence]," 817 P.2d
at 807, we specifically held in Crookston that
awards rendered for such purposes must be constrained by well established "parameters" that
tether punitive damages to some sense of reasonableness in order to avoid "excessive awards."
Id. at 808. Those parameters include the seven
factors listed above, which "must be considered
[by the jury] in assessing the amount of punitives." Id. (emphasis added). Because, as explained above, the jury was unable to properly
consider two of those factors in this case due to
the trial court's erroneous instruction that State
Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for
bad faith, the punitive award must be vacated
and remanded. See id.; C.T. ex rel. Taylor v.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,

Charles K. LEATHERBURY, Deffehdajtp
and Petitioner.
^$

ings of fact and conclusions of law and specifically ordering dismissal of case against inmate constituted final, appealable order; and
(4) there was no information pending against
inmate at time inmate requested disposition
of pending charges, and thus, request had no
legal effect.
Affirmed.

No. 20010424.
:

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb, 11, 2003.

Inmate moved to dismiss vanouj|
charges against him in connection.with 1&
alleged participation in a police chase,, allegt
ing that period for bringing him to trjaj
expired based on inmate's request for dispo-'
sition of pending charges. The trial court
dismissed case. State appealed. The Court of
Appeals reversed. Inmate petitioned for certiorari review. The Supreme Court, Wilkinsy
J., held that: (1) signed minute entry directing inmate's counsel to prepare findings of
fact and conclusions of law precluded entry
from constituting final, appealable order; (2)
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions
of law did not constitute final, appealable
order; (3) order incorporating court's firidJohnson, 1999 UT 35, Iff 17-26, 977 P.2d 4?9
(upholding a punitive award only because the
trial court's failure to instruct the jury to consider all of the seven Crookston factors was harmless since the jury did in fact fully and properly
assess each factor); Onglnt'l (USA.) Inc. v. 11th
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d.447, 458-59 (Utah 1993)
(affirming a punitive award because the jury
"made a detailed finding based on the seven
factors enunciated in Crookston "). Indeed, no: where in her opinion does Justice Durham even
attempt to address this issue. Second, there is
good reason why the "joint nature of the punitive
damages award was never questioned" in Crookston. Unlike the case now before us, neither of
the parties involved in Crookston ever had their
standing to sue questioned, nor was the issue
raised on appeal. Consequentiy, the problematic
situation created here—where one party who
was awarded punitives had every right to sue but
the other party given the same award should
have never been involved in the lawsuit—simply
did not exist in Crookston. See 817 P.2d at 794
* (recognizing that both Mr. and Mrs; Crookston
were named as insureds in their homeowner's
. policy).

1. Criminal Law <s>1179
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court
reviews the .Court of Appeals'decision, and
not the opinion of the trial court.
2. Criminal Law <&>1179
In exercising certiorari jurisdiction, Supreme Court reviews the appellate court's
ruling for correctness.
3. Criminal Law <a=>1024(l)
Requirement in signed minute entry directing inmate's counsel to prepare findings
of fact and conclusions of law dismissing the
case against inmate indicated that trial court
did not intend for entry to be final, thereby
precluding entry from constituting final, appealable order, in case against inmate'arising
from inmate's alleged involvement in police
chase.
4. Criminal Law <3=>1024(1)
Trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law did not constitute final, 'appealable order, in case against inmate arising
from inmate's alleged involvement in police
chase, where findings merely explained
court's rationale for and intent to,.dismiss
case against inmate, and contained no order.
5. Criminal Law <3=>1024(2), 1069(1)
•
Order incorporating trial court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law and specifically
ordering dismissal of case against inmate
arising from inmate's purported involvement
in police chase. constituted final, appealable
order, and thus, State's appealfiledwithin 30
days of order was timely. Rules App.Proc.,
Rule4.
6. Criminal Law <®=>1023(2)
A signed minute entry will not be considered a final order for purposes of appeal
where its language indicates that it is. not

intended asfinal;thus when: further action is
contemplated by the express language of the
order, it cannot be a final determination susceptible of enforcement.
7. Criminal Law <&=>577.10(l0)
Indictment and Information <s=»43
Filing of signed accusation against .u>
mate by the clerk of court was precondition
to having a pending information against •• inmate, such that inmate's request for disposition of charges pending against him .filed
prior to clerk's filing of signed accusation
was premature, and. thus,, inmate's -disposition request had no legal effect. U.C JL1953,
77-1-3,77-29-1. ,
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Att'y Geii.,; Kri"C.
Leonard, Asst. Att'y Gen., for jriaintiff. ' '
Joan C. Watt, Daniel, M. Torrence,; Salt
Lake, for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Justice: •
111 We granted Charles "Leatherbury's petition for, certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision in State, v. Leatherburyt
2001 UT App 113U, 2001 WL, 333079, The
court of appeals held that it had appellate
jurisdiction of the case, i t also reversed the
trial court's order of dismissal, which was
premised on section ; 77-29-1 of the Utah
Code. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
U 2 Leatherbury. was charged by information with failing to respond to a police officer's signal to stop, possession of o>ug paraphernalia, reckless driving,, and other
charges related to his alleged participation in
a police chase on January 14, 1999. The
information was authorized for presentment
and filing by the Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office on February 2, 1999, sworn
to a magistrate on February 12, 1999, and
filed with the clerk of the Third District
Court on March 26,1999. ,
• ••
• 113 On January 29, 1999, Leatherbury,
then an inmate at the Utah State Prison,
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signed a form entitled "Notice and Request UT App U3U, 2001 WL 333079. The court o i l
for Disposition of , Pending Charge(s)" re- appeals reversed the case on the merits hold^§
questing final disposition of any charges ing that at the time of Leatherbury's request^
pending in the Third District Court related for disposition there was no pending infbrm>$|j
to his "fleeing a police officer." The request tion and his request had no legal effect. M ? |
was signed as received by the appropriate
prison official on February 8, 1999 and forANALYSIS
warded to the Salt Lake, County District
Attorney's Office. This form purportedly
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
satisfies the requirements of section 77-29^-1
[1,2] 117 On certiorari review "we review
of the Utah Code and invokes Leatherbury's
right to be tried within . 120 days of the the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion
of the [trial] court." State v. Weeks, 2002 UT
request. •
98, 1110, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 61 P.3d 1000.
14 On June 10, 1999, at.the final pretrial That decision is then reviewed for correct1
conference, Leatherbury filed a motion to ness. Id.
dismiss arguing that the 120 day period for
bringing him to trial-had expired on June 8,
II. JURISDICTION OF THE
1999 and that the charges must be dismissed.
COURT OF APPEALS
The State argued in response that Leatherbury's request for disposition was premature
[3-5] 118 Leatherbury argues that the
and of no effect because no information was State's notice of appeal failed to vest the
pending against Leatherbury at the time of court of appeals with jurisdiction to hear the
its preparation. At a hearing held on June case because it came more than thirty days
21, 1999, the parties argued the motion and after entry of the final order. If the final
the trial court indicated its intention to dis- order in the case was, as Leatherbury conmiss the case. However, the court ordered tends, either the signed minute entry or the
Leatherbury's attorney to prepare findings findings, he is correct and we must vacate
of fact and conclusions of law ("findings"). the court of appeals' decision. See Utah R.
The court's intention to dismiss the case was App. P. 4; State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 115,
memorialized in a signed minute entry.
57 P.3d 1065 (noting 30 day filing requirement in rule is a jurisdictional requirement),
115 On July 26, 1999, the trial court signed
Thus, our resolution of this point turns on
the findings, which had been prepared by
whether either document was a final appealLeatherbury's attorney. Nearly two months
able order, or whether, as the State argues,
later, on September 17, 1999, the trial court
the final order did not come until the order
signed an order of dismissal prepared by the
of dismissal was signed and entered.
State. The State filed its notice of appeal on
September 23,1999.
[6] If 9 Although Leatherbury is correct
11 6 Before the court of appeals, Leatherbury argued that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the notice of
appeal was untimely filed. The State argued
that the order of dismissal should be reversed because no information was pending,
within the meaning of section 77-29-1, at the
time Leatherbury made his request for disposition. In an unpublished memorandum
decision, the court of appeals rejected Leatherbury's jurisdictional argument. It held
that the State's notice of appeal was timely
filed because the order of dismissal, not the
signed minute entry of June 21, 1999, was
the final order. State v. Leatherbury, 2001

that a signed minute entry may constitute a
final appealable order, he is incorrect that
the minute entry in this case was such an
order. A signed minute entry will not be
considered a' final order where its language
indicates that it is not,intended as final.
Swenson Assocs. Architects, P.C. v. State ex
rel Div. of Facilities Constr., 889 P2d 415,
417 (Utah 1994). Thus, where further action
is contemplated by the express language of
the order, it cannot be a final determination
susceptible of enforcement. The court of
appeals correctly concluded that the signed
minute entry's requirement that Leatherbury's counsel "prepare Findings of Fact and
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Conclusions of Law" indicated that the trial
court did not intend the minute entry as a
final order. Leatherbury, 2001 UT App
113U, 2001 WL 333079. Further, Leatherbury's argument that the findings constituted
a final order is also incorrect. The findings
merely explain the trial court's rationale for
and intent to dismiss the case, and contained
no order. Thus, the final order in this, case
was the order of September 17, 1999, which
incorporated the previously entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law and specifically
ordered dismissal of the charges against the
defendant. As a result, the State's notice of
appeal was timely filed, and the court of
appeals had jurisdiction, to hear the case.
III. AN INFORMATION WAS
NOT PENDING
[7] 110 Leatherbury would have us reverse the court of appeals' determination that
there was no information pending against
him at the time of his request for disposition
under section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code! He
argues that an information is pending once it
is signed by a prosecuting attorney, even
before filing with the court. We disagree.
1111 Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code
provides: .
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term
of imprisonment in the state prison . . .
and there is pending against the prisoner
in this state any untried ..'.. inforrnation,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden . . . a written demand specifying the
nature of the charge and the court wherein
it is pending and requesting disposition of
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to
have the charge brought to trial within 120
days of the date of delivery of written
notice.
••
Utah Code Ann. § 77^-29-1(1) (1999) (emphasis added). Section 77-29-1 also provides
that failure to bring the matter to trial.within
the 120 day period, unless justified by good
cause, shall result in dismissal. Id at § 7729-1(4). Under subsection (1) there are essentially two prerequisites to the filing of a
1. In his brief Leatherbury places the date of his
request for disposition as February 8, 1999,
when the designated agent at the prison signed
her name to the request. This date is the latest

_.-,
First, a prisoner
request
for disposition..
4
must be serving a term of imprisonment in a
state penal institution, and second, there
must be an untried indictment or information
pending against that prisoner. Only the second requirement is at issue here.
. 1112 "Information" is a statutorily defined
term. It "means an accusation, in writing,
charging a person with a public offense which
is presented, signed, and filed in the office of
the clerk [of the court] where the prosecution
is commenced." Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 1 3(3) (1999) (emphasis added). Pursuant to
the statute, a written, signed accusation does
not become ran information until filed with
the clerk of the courts Assuming but not
deciding that Leatherbury's request for disposition of the charges against him was made
on February 8, 1999,1 the request was premature because there was no- pending information until the clerk of the court received
the signed document and filed it on March
26, 1999. Because there was no pending
information, the request for disposition had
no legal effect. We affirm the court of appeals' decision.
CONCLUSION
U 13 Because the court of appeals correctly
concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider
the State's appeal and ,it correctly held that
filing was a precondition to a pending inform
mation under section 77-29-1, we affirm the
court of appeals' decision in State v. Leatherbwry, 2001 UT App 113t, 2001. WL333Q79
and remand for further proceedings.
''
1114 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice
RUSSON, Judge BALDWIN, and Judge
LOW concur in Justice.WILKIN$' opinion.
U 15 Having disqualified himself, Associate
Chief Justice DURRANT does not: participate herein, and Justice HOWE- did not participate herein; District Judge BALDWIN
and District Judge LOW sat.
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM/

of the dates on the request itself; Leatherbury
signed it on January 29, 1999. For purposes^of
this opinion we apply the date offered by Leatherbury in his brief.
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,KS, Justice (dissenting):
e buyer had paid $120,395 of the $245,>rincipal due on the purchase of the 20
An additional payment of $50,895
due on February 2, 1980. Under the
ided agreement, the buyer was entitled
jsignate 4.24 acres of the subject propfor conveyance to him upon making
payment. He made a timely designaand offered to make the Feb. 2, 1980
lent (though not formally tendering
noney), but the seller disputed the acrechosen and offered an alternative 5.2
3 instead. Six weeks after the due
, the seller served a notice of default,
one week later the seller brought this
and obtained a decree forfeiting the
>r's interest. The majority affirms that
ee on the basis that the seller's agreet to convey the 4.24 acres was "condied upon and not concurrent with" the
*r's payment, and the buyer made no
ment or tender of payment.
he buyer's payment and the seller's parconveyance were concurrent conditions,
ultaneous obligations, each dependent
n the other, are commonplace in real
ite contracts. Such obligations should
interpreted as concurrent conditions unthe contract clearly directs otherwise.
\ language in this contract ("upon re)t of said payment, Sellers will release to
jrer 4.24 acres of land") does not make
se obligations other than concurrent conions.
is we said in Century 21 All Western
al Estate v. Webb, Utah, 645 P.2d 52
82), a contract that contemplates simuliieous performance by both parties—i.e.,
jjfeurrent conditions—can pose "precisely
p o r t of deadlock meant to be resolved
§the requirement of tender." Id. at 55.
tihat circumstance, we held,
l^either party can be said to be in del i s t (and thus susceptible to a judgment
fer damages or a decree for specific perfemance) until the other party has tenfeed his own performance. 6 Corbin on
Mntracts § 1258 (1962). In other words,
me party who desires to use legal process
§|> exercise his legal remedies under such

a contract must make a tender of his own
agreed performance in order to put the
other party in default. Huck v. Hayes,
[Utah, 560 P.2d 1124 (1977)]; 15 Williston on Contracts § 1809 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972). [Emphasis supplied.]
Id. at 56.
Under the quoted rule, the district court's
finding that this buyer made no payment or
tender of payment would prevent the buyer
from suing for specific performance of the
seller's promise to make the partial conveyance. But the buyer's nonperformance does
not entitle the seller to a decree forfeiting
the buyer's interest unless the seller has
tendered performance of his own concurrent obligation—to convey the acreage designated by the buyer. Since the seller
made no such allegation and the court made
no such finding, the decree of forfeiture
was inappropriate. I would reverse.
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of OAKS, J.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Steven Michael CASAREZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16997.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 9, 1982.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Salt Lake County, Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr., J., of aggravated sexual assault, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that full disclosure
of presentence report should be made except that identify indicia of person who

1006

Utah

656 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

would be sentenced may be excluded from
report.
Affirmed, vacated and remanded.
Hall, C.J., concurred in result.
L Criminal Law <s=>988
Sentencing is critical stage of criminal
proceeding at which defendant is entitled to
effective assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 6.
2. Criminal Law «*=»986.1
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at
sentencing phase of trial as at guilt phase.
3. Criminal Law <s=>986.5
If defendant cannot inspect contents of
presentence report, his constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel at time of
sentencing is seriously impaired if judge
may rely on information which may be inaccurate and is unknown to defendant. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.

1. Criminal Law &=> 339.5, 1169.5(2)
In prosecution for aggravated se
assault, inasmuch as whether defen<
took bus home or drove home was not m
rial to central issue of whether he
guilty, it was error to admit evidence c
paring his footprints in area where r
occurred with footprints around a st<
vehicle later found near defendant's r
dence; however, court's striking of t
part of testimony relating to stolen car ;
its subsequent admonishment and instr
tion to jury to disregard stricken evide
was sufficient remedy under circumstam
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-30.
Ginger L. Fletcher, Salt Lake City,
defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Joseph P. McCart
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and resp<
dent.

STEWART, Justice:
Defendant was convicted of two cour
4. Constitutional Law <s=>48(l)
of
aggravated sexual assault, one for ra
Statutes <s=> 181(1)
,
and
one for sodomy, in violation of U . C J
It is policy of court to construe statutes
'
1953,
§ 76-5-405. He contends that t
when possible to effectuate legislative intrial
court
erred in 1) denying him access
tent and to avoid potential constitutional
his
presentence
report prior to sentencin
conflicts.
2) admitting evidence of another crim
5. Criminal Law <s=>978
and 3) denying him his statutory right <
Statute providing that court may dis-• allocation at the time of sentencing.
close all parts of presentence report to deAs is to be expected, the testimony of tl
fendant or his counsel as interest of justice5 prosecutrix and the defendant are in coi
requires was not intended to make disclo- flict. We, of course, accept that version <
sure of presentence report depend on per- the facts which supports the jury's verdic
sonal whim or subjective standard of indi-' E.g., State v. Howell Utah, 649 P.2d S
vidual judge; rather, Legislature expressly7 (1982).
provided that exercise of discretion shouldI
be guided as "the interest of justice reThe prosecutrix testified that at approx
quires" and, thus, statute was constitution- mately 9:00 p.m. on December 21, 1979, sh
al. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-1(2).
parked her car on First South and Stat
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and proceed
6. Criminal Law <s=>986.5
ed
to her place of employment. She wa
Only when disclosure of presentence
i
confronted
on the street by the defendan
report will jeopardize life or safety of third
I
who
told
her
that he was a prison escape*
parties should there be deletions from reand
needed
her
car and warned her that i:
port to protect them and, in such cases,
,
she
did
not
comply
with his wishes he woulc
disclosure to defendant of as much of report
t
kill
her.
At
defendant's
instruction the
as possible should be made. U.C.A.1953,
, prosecutrix walked back to her car. The
77-18-1(2).
defendant pushed her into the car, drove a

STATE v. :ASAREZ
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few blocks, and stopped the car. After two
acts of sexual assault, rape, and forcible
sodomy, the prosecutrix bit the defendant,
who then struck her in the face. During
the ensuing commotion the prosecutrix escaped from the car. The driver of a passing
car took her to the rape crisis center at
Holy Cross Hospital. An emergency room
physician examined the victim that evening
and the defendant the following morning.
At trial the physician testified that the
bruises on the prosecutrix and the defendant were consistent with the prosecutrix's
testimony. Other facts in support of the
State's case need not be recounted.
The defendant testified that he had
stopped to ask the prosecutrix for the time.
,He then asked her if she would like to go
X)ut and have a good time, and she accepted
the invitation. He drove her a couple of
blocks and stopped. According to defendant, the prosecutrix then engaged in sex
acts with him voluntarily, upon the conclusion of which she unexpectedly bit him, and
after being struck by defendant, she fled
the car in fear. Defendant stated that he
then also left the car and took a bus home.
On appeal the defendant contends that
the imposition of the sentence was improper
because the trial court did not, prior to
sentencing, give him access to the presentence report as required by State v. Lipsky,
Utah, 608 P.2d 1241 (1980). The State
counters with the argument that an amendment to U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(2), enacted
subsequent to the decision in Lipsky, modit fied the rule in that case and justified the
trial court's discretionary refusal to give
|he defendant the presentence report.
i%at amendment reads:
Prior to imposition of any sentence for
an offense for which probation may be
granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date
for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of
obtaining a presentence report on the defendant. . . . The contents of the report
£shall be confidential. The court may dis' close all or parts of the report to the
defendant or his counsel as the interest of
justice requires. [Emphasis added.]
656 P 2d—23
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On the basis of that provision, the State
argues that the trial judge acted within the
proper bounds of discretion in not disclosing
the report.
[1-3] Sentencing is a critical stage of a
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. E.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88
S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18
L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252,92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948).
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at the
sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt
phase. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16,
99 S.Ct. 235, 236, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978).
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct.
1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), held that it is a
denial of due process in a capital case to
sentence a defendant on the basis of confidential information not disclosed to a defendant or his counsel. In Lipsky, a noncapital case, this Court held on a due process analysis that "fundamental fairness" requires that a defendant have the right to
inspect a presentence report prior to sentencing so that a sentence will not be influenced by inaccurate information. 608 P.2d
at 1248. Furthermore, if the defendant
cannot inspect the contents of the presentence report, his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel at the time
of sentencing is seriously impaired if a
judge may rely on information which may
be inaccurate and is unknown to the defendant.
A number of other courts have held that
fundamental fairness requires disclosure of
the presentence report. See, e.g., Buchea v.
Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 497 P.2d 1169 (1972);
State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895
(1969); Jones v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 477
P.2d 85 (1970). This rule is implicit in several more recent cases. For example, in
State v. Lockwood, La., 399 So.2d 190
(1981), the court approved disclosure and
held that a defendant, who alleged that
false and prejudicial statements were contained in his presentence report, was entitled to an opportunity to refute or explain

1008

Utah

656 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

even though the trial court contended that
its decision was unaffected by the report.
In State v. Phelps, N.D., 297 N.W.2d 769
(1980), the court held that the trial court
acted unreasonably and abused its discretion in allowing defendant's counsel insufficient time to read and investigate a presentence report which contained a complicated
medical history. And in Howell v. State,
Del., 421 A.2d 892 (1980), the court, construing a statute which provided that the trial
court "may, in its discretion, permit the
inspection of the [presentence] report or
parts thereof by the offender or his attorney," id. at 900, stated in dictum that "[failure to disclose the investigative portion of
a presentence report to counsel for a criminal defendant may 'in practical effect' be
equivalent to denial of access to counsel."
Id. at 900 (quoting in part from United
States v. Verdugo, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1968), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct.
1623, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971).
Except for the very rare possibility when
disclosure might lead to harm of a third
person, there is no substantial reason for
sentencing criminal defendants on the basis
of confidential information gleaned from a
variety of more-or-less reliable sources
without affording those defendants some
opportunity to point out mistakes in that
information. It is essential to both the
form and substance of a fair proceeding
that the defendant have the right to point
out errors, misinterpretations, or even to
demonstrate that he is not in fact the person who is the subject of the report. Such
errors are not unknown. Particularly when
the criminal justice system is being pressed
to deal with ever more criminal defendants
on an impersonal basis not unlike an assembly line, the possibility of error becomes
even greater. If a defendant were not
allowed to correct an error at the time of
sentencing, the error is likely to go undetected for as long as the defendant remains
subject to the criminal justice system since
the presentence report remains in the file
on the defendant and is used by the Board
of Pardons and other authorities in making
decisions as to the length and terms of his
incarceration, rehabilitation, and parole.

We also note that it is not just the
fendant, but the State as well, that has
interest in the sentence being based on
curate information. Decisions as to
type of rehabilitation program, if any,
which a defendant is assigned and the du
tion of incarceration both influence the a
cation of scarce personnel and monefc
resources. Such decisions should be baj
upon the most reliable data possible as
each defendant so that this State may d
with its criminal justice program as ei
ciently as possible.
[4-6] It does not follow, however, tl
§ 77-18-1(2) is unconstitutional. It is t
policy of the Court to construe statut
when possible to effectuate the legislati
intent and to avoid potential constitution
conflicts. E.g., State v. Wood, Utah, 6
P.2d 71, 82 (1982); In re Boyer, Utah, 6
P.2d 1085, 1088 (1982). In accord with tl
approach, we find no difficulty in reconc
ing the defendant's right to disclosure wi
the language of § 77-18-1(2). That pro\
sion was not intended to make disclosure <
a presentence report depend on a person
whim or a subjective standard of an indivii
ual judge. The interests at stake are h
too important for that. Rather, the Legi
lature expressly provided that the exereis
of discretion should be guided as "the into
est of justice requires." Under that star
dard, it is the exceptional case where fu
disclosure is not justified. Only when dis
closure of the presentence report woul
jeopardize the life or safety of third partiej
should there be deletions from the report t
protect them. In such cases, disclosure to ;
defendant of as much of the report as possi
ble should be made. Identifying indicia o.
a person who would be threatened shoul<
be excluded from the report, sealed, anc
included in the record on appeal. In al
other cases, full disclosure of the repon
should be made.
Finally, it is of no moment that the trial
court may disregard the presentence report
altogether in imposing a sentence. A defendant still has a right to disclosure of the
report because of the subsequent uses made
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it. State v. Lockwood, La. 399 So.2d 190
•81).
7] Defendant also alleges error in the
mission of evidence comparing his footnts in the area where the rape occurred
bh footprints around a stolen vehicle later
md near defendant's residence. Defendt argues that the evidence was improperoffered to link him with a separate, unreed crime. The State contends that the
idence was admissible to contradict deldant's testimony that he took a bus
me from the scene of the crime, and
jreby attack the defendant's credibility.

circumstances. On no reasonable view of
the evidence did the objectionable evidence
taint the fairness of the trial.
Defendant also complains that he was not
afforded his statutory right of allocution
before sentence was imposed. See U.C.A.,
1953, § 77-35-22(a). We have reviewed
the record and conclude the allegation is
without merit.
The conviction is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated. The case is remanded for
the defendant to review and verify the contents of the presentence report, unless the
narrow exception above defined applies,
and for the trial judge to resentence the
defendant on a nunc pro tunc basis.
Affirmed.

Whether the defendant took the bus
me or drove home was not material to
i central issue of whether he was guilty
aggravated sexual assault. There was
need to prove how the defendant reOAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, J J., conrned home. The testimony was neither
cur.
ckground evidence useful to establish the
•cumstanees surrounding the commission
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result.
the crime nor did it shed any light on
sfendant's conduct which might tend to
ow a consciousness of guilt. The only
>ssible materiality of the evidence was
ith respect to defendant's credibility. The
ference that he drove a stolen car home is
deed inconsistent with his testimony of
,king the bus home. However, not every
consistency is admissible on the theory CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
lat it bears on credibility. The law is that
Plaintiff and Respondent,
witness may not be impeached on matters
)llateral to the principal issues being tried.
',g., State v. Oswalt, 62 Wash.2d 118, 381 Wendell Alan JENSEN and Ann Jensen,
;2d 617 (1963); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence
Defendants and Appellants.
i Trials at Common Law §§ 1000-1003
No. 17754.
piadbourn rev. 1970). The manner in
iiich defendant returned home following
Supreme Court of Utah.
(fe crime is a collateral issue; therefore,
Dec. 10, 1982.
Tipeachment evidence on that issue was
ladmissible.
•

^However, the admission of the evidence
| s harmless. See U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35^ Even assuming the evidence was ofifed to link defendant with an uncharged
§pe, the court's striking of that part of
p testimony relating to a stolen car and
P subsequent admonishment and instruc|$ji to the jury to disregard the stricken
pdence was a sufficient remedy under the

•

•

.

•

'
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Bank brought action seeking money
judgment against defendants for unpaid
balance on defendants' credit card account.
The Fourth District Court, Utah County,
George E. Ballif, J., entered default judgment against defendants and denied defendants' motion to set aside the default,
and defendants appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) summons

Addendum D: Notice from Prison of 120-Day Disposition, Certificate of Inmate
Status, Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges
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0^13 CW/&

-." o

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE (S)

TO:

()

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

Notice is hereby given that I, J o W L i L g G k A R
\°QXQ (Inmate name)
do hereby request final disposition. Charge (s) of
ftt^fbc*^
jf^oCvo A ^ e - V j y
U^ej*r~e o^r ^ V ^ c ^ T
are now
pending against me in the
X o c e l ^ Cd ,
Court
brought by ^ V e ^ I X W W H Y / ^ U * > ^ ^ / y V ^ \
(prosecuting
agency i.e., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the State of Utah) and request is
hereby made that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities together with such
information as required by law.

Dated this _Q

day of Q e c E f A Y ^ f C

Inmate's Name Tv<bUw JLi

WJEGG.

-^-

(Month/Year).
USP # l°\ Z v O

I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing notice this a

\-lftiU/jULi

cJ/JT V

day of

(Month/Year).

Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020
CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634

nnn

"1

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS
Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
Mike Chabries
Executive Director
Scott V. Carver
Division Director

nun mnrnsn euro
Third Judicial Dtetrict

m
PO Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
(801)576-7000

j s 200%

TOOELE COUNTY

8 January 2004

Tooele County Attorney
47 S. Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
RE: LEGG, John Lyle Jr.
U.S.PJ 19210
DOB 12/13/68
YOUR CASE # UNKNOWN INTAKE REC # A31081
Dear Sirs:
MR/MRS/MS John Lyle Legg Jr. is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison.
He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges of Arson and Auto Theft, pending in
your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
Sincerely,
Mr. David Worthington
Director of Institutional Operations

by: Alberta Smith
Records Office Tech HI

End. (2)
cc: Third District Court Clerk - Tooele
Inmate File

nonoR

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

C E R T I F I C A T E OF INMATE

STATUS

120-DAY DISPOSITION
TO:

Third District Court Clerk - Tooele

RE:

LEGG, John Lyle Jr.
Inmate Name

19210
USP#

TERM of COMMITMENT: Aggravated Assault 0-5 yrs, Burglary of a
Building 0-5 yrs Consecutive to Agg. Assault,
Attempted Receive or Transfer Stolen Vehicle
0-5 yrs Consecutive to Burglary of Building.
Total 15 yrs.

TIME SERVED:
TIME REMAINING:
**time calculated

Approx 03 year(s) 08 mo
Approx. 11 year(s) 04 mo
may not include
toll
time/credit

time

served**

PAROLE ELIGIBILITY: scheduled for parole 00/00/00

BOARD OF PARDONS
DECISION:

Hearing set for 00/00/00

Mr. David Worthington, Director
Institutional Operations

Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
Utah State Prison
P. O. Box 250
Draper, UT
84 020
cc: file

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th of October 2005 I hand delivered to:
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
two (2) copies of the attached Appellant's Brief.
Dated this 27th day of October 2005
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